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The new Millennium closing its first decade, the talk of democratization in what formerly was Soviet 
Union is still highly relevant. The discourse of the Cold War now luckily outdated, that of democratic 
development in the majority of the Soviet-successor countries stays in the center of attention: 
politicians and other policy makers, journalists, consultants, human rights organizations and activists 
around the world devote plenty of their time and effort discussing, analyzing, advising and criticizing 
the democratic processes in post-Soviet countries, and academics do not give up on producing hundreds 
of volumes by doing the same.  
In its contemporary expression, this rich debate rarely involves constitutional courts that were once paid 
a somewhat special attention in the context of post-communist transitions. The general approval of the 
constitutional courts’ role in democratic transition- definitely based on merit- has largely overshadowed 
the discussion on the ways in which this function could be improved, made even more effective. The 
discussion on the institutional design of the post-Soviet constitutional courts, in this context, has largely 
fallen victim of the praise paid to the institution of constitutional review in general, while the political 
virtues of the larger function of constitutional review have been, by inertia, attributed to the accepted, 
almost standard institutional form that it took in the post-communist world. In other words, voicing our 
endorsement of constitutional courts as “flagships” of constitutionalism and the rule of law,1 we have 
intuitively taken for granted the goodness of their institutional construction which, needless to mention, 
has seen “remarkably little experimentation in constitutional design”2 all over the post-communist 
world and has basically submitted to a common model in all its incarnations. This unfortunate fallacy 
has probably distracted us from subjecting the courts to review on the subject of their inner structure 
and mechanism that enable them to efficiently perform their important tasks in regime transition.        
Rethinking the mentioned stereotype and having observed considerable potential for improving the 
capacity of constitutional courts, this work suggests opening a discussion on the redesign of these 
tribunals in post-Soviet countries. The existing institutional settings of post-Soviet constitutional courts 
are subject to scrutiny from the point of view of these courts’ democratic contributions. Against the 
variety of settings of institutional architecture of constitutional review tribunals discussed throughout 
the text, the work primarily concentrates on two fundamental questions of their design: 1. “political 
empowerment” or whether or not constitutional tribunals should have responsibilities of conflict 
resolving nature which de-facto involve them in partisan-type politics (such as the review of elections, 
jurisdictional conflicts between the separated branches of the government, impeachment cases, etc.);   
                                                 
1 Patricia Wald (formerly the Chief Judge at the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia), Foreword: 
Herman Schwartz, The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe, University of Chicago Press 
(2000). 
2 Sadurski, Wojciech, Rights Before Courts: A Study of Constitutional Courts in Postcommunist States of Central 
and Eastern Europe (Springer, 2005), p. 1 of the Preface.  
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2. the question of a separate tribunal or the problem whether or not the Kelsenian design of 
constitutional courts is optimal given the specific local challenges facing democracy and the rule of 
law. These two subjects are of particular interest from the considerations of democracy-building, and 
this is the major reason why this work pays a special attention to them. Still, it is also worth mentioning 
that the proposed items have been traditionally overlooked by the academic community, while the 
issues with the other institutional settings, especially access, tenure, appointment, and the mode of 
review, have been previously paid somewhat more attention.  
The study and its focus are area and time specific. The research is done strictly on the formerly Soviet 
states and the proposals for the institutions’ redesign are projected exclusively on these countries’ needs 
and for their use. For the purposes of this research, the term “post-Soviet region” or equivalent terms 
(“post-Soviet countries”, etc.) include all former republics of the Soviet Union except Lithuania, Latvia, 
and Estonia. These are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, 
Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.  Interchangeably, then, the term “CIS”, 
standing for the Commonwealth of Independent States, will be sometimes used.3 Hardly any bias or 
prejudice can be suspected in this choice as the spatial focus in the study is not formal but rather 
considers the “geography” of democratic development in the post-communist world. As the title of the 
study perfectly indicates, this research’s inquiries into the design of constitutional institutions are solely 
aimed at and guided by the rationale of promoting constitutional democracies in the countries of the 
region. In this light, the study targets those former constituencies of the Soviet Union which still have a 
lot to accomplish on their way towards building constitutional democracies. This approach justifies the 
exclusion from the scope of the review of three formerly Soviet countries in the Baltics which by the 
time of the inception of this study had shown considerable achievements in democratization and were 
considered as consolidated democracies.4  
All this said, both the Baltic republics and the other Central and Eastern European post-communist 
countries and especially their experiences with democratic development and constitutional justice serve 
as a tremendous resource and often as inspiration for this work. The comparative method embraced by 
this study engages the Central and East European (including Baltic) paradigms and experiences and 
often heavily relies on them. Some of these paradigms have long ago become well-known models of 
how courts contribute to democratization,5 often through ways and manners which raise essential 
                                                 
3 Created in December 1991, the Commonwealth of Independent States included all formerly Soviet republics except 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. These last three never participated in this Soviet-successor organization. As of 
January 2009, all 12 countries of this study remained members of the CIS, including Georgia, which has filed an 
official withdrawal application in August 2008, after its brief Ossetian conflict with Russia, but will formally remain 
a member of the organization until its withdrawal becomes effective a year after the application.  
4 For the assessment of the democratic credentials of different countries, this work relies on the regular surveys by 
Freedom House (found at www.freedomhouse.org), as well as various studies and expert opinions. For more details 
on the post-Soviet states and a comparative survey of their democratic indicators, see Chapter 2.  
5 Especially Hungary’s experience with constitutional justice has become a famous case-study, acquiring a 
widespread attention due to the very generous empowerment and activism of its Constitutional Court in the 90-ies. 
For only some studies, see Scheppele, Kim Lane, “Constitutional Negotiations: Political Context of Judicial 
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normative questions,6 through ups and downs, conflict and deadlock, which is inherent to the political 
process.7 Some other paradigms, such as Estonia’s deviation from the otherwise unanimous 
subscription to the Kelsenian architecture of constitutional review, have been peculiar and appealing, 
but have nevertheless acquired little attention, while, as this work will argue about the transplantative 
potential of the Estonian design, they might serve as a perfect comparative model and should have been 
paid particular attention. However, deriving much insight from the Central and East European 
experiences, the recommendations made by this research may not be exactly relevant for the countries 
west of the CIS borders.   
The area focus of this study, meanwhile, has to be perceived with caution. Among the twelve target 
countries, Turkmenistan has never created a constitutional court or a substitute body to implement 
constitutional review, and hence its case largely falls out of the scope of this research as far as the 
empirical work is concerned. The other countries have been paid uneven attention by this work, though 
this has not been an arbitrary or discriminatory choice of the author at all. The case-studies of this 
research were selected based “on merits”, rather than in a formal observation of a balanced, 
proportionate representation of each country. The well-recognized “political neutrality” and the 
subservient status of constitutional courts in such countries as Azerbaijan, Tajikistan or Uzbekistan8 is 
the obvious reason why the activity of these courts’ was not taken as an example to demonstrate the 
patterns of activist struggle for constitutional democracy. On the other side, the courts in Armenia, 
Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine and Russia have at different times and modes appeared at the center of important 
political developments affecting the state of democratic governance in their respective countries, and 
hence due to these cases the mentioned countries were paid more attention throughout this study. As 
this work will show, the degree of independence allowed to constitutional courts and hence also their 
potential for democratic contributions is directly dependent on the extent of democratic pluralism 
within a country. The most striking case-studies referred in this work, therefore, originated in political 
environments which ever allowed opposition to the government and which witnessed a healthy contest 
and pluralism in politics. Nonetheless, not a single country is excluded from the scope of this research; 
                                                                                                                                              
Activism in Post-Soviet Europe”, 18 International Sociology (2003); Schwartz, Herman, The Struggle for 
Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe, University of Chicago Press (2000); Solyom, Laszlo and Brunner, 
George, (eds. ), Constitutional Judiciary in a New Democracy: The Hungarian Constitutional Court, University of 
Michigan Press (2000). Via frequent references to the CEE paradigms discussed in these and other studies, this 
thesis factually considers them in the comparative light, even though there may be no specific direct reference to a 
particular CEE case or country.   
6 Sadurski, Wojciech, supra note 2, pp. 27-63; SAJÓ, András, "Reading the Invisible Constitution: Judicial Review 
in Hungary," 15 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 253 (1995), pp. 266-267; Scheppele, Kim Lane, “Democracy by 
Judiciary (Or Why Court Can Sometimes Be More Democratic than Parliaments)”, in Wojciech Sadurski, Martin 
Krygier and Adam Czarnota (eds.), Rethinking the Rule of Law in Post-Communist Europe: Past Legacies, 
Institutional Innovations, and Constitutional Discourses, (Central European University Press, 2005). 
7 The democratic effect of constitutional justice in CEE transitions is widely recognized despite the controversies. 
For one, Susan Rose-Ackerman writes that although the constitutional courts in Hungary and Poland have 
experienced different limitations, whether statutory/regulatory or informal, both courts “have been essential to the 
process of democratic consolidation.” See Rose-Ackerman, Susan, From Elections to Democracy, Building 
Accountable Government in Hungary and Poland, Cambridge University Press (2005), p. 70.   
8 For some evidence of this, see Erik Herron and Kirk Randazzo, “The Relationship Between Independence and 
Judicial Review in Post-Communist Courts”, 65 Journal of Politics 422 (May), 2003.  
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notwithstanding what was previously said, the countries in the post-Soviet space have a lot in common 
both in terms of the general features of political regimes and practices, and in terms of the 
characteristics of constitutional justice and review. The case-studies in this work, in this light, may 
equally well represent the patterns of political processes which may still arise in any of the target 
countries, given the change in the political practices and dynamics of democratic development. 
Therefore, the recommendations of the research are thought to be equally relevant for each country in 
the region, including Turkmenistan, supposing that this Central Asian country may one day choose to 
create a body of constitutional review.  
We can conclude that the area focus in this work is not on particular countries within the former Soviet 
Union, but on the post-Soviet region as an idiosyncratic entity, a special species. The typology of 
political regimes in the region is the principal macro-criterion which allows speaking of the post-Soviet 
region as such. Despite some substantial variations in political regime types, this work will show the 
particular commonalities which justify this generalization. These commonalities (mostly to be 
discussed in Chapter 2, but also to get exposed in all the other parts of the thesis) relate both to the 
general characteristics of the political regime performance and to the role of constitutional courts within 
these political contexts. These include first of all the basic patterns of governance, in which all of the 
countries of this study have a lot in common. Shared by these countries are also the general 
characteristics of constitutional mentality and the vision of constitutionalism within both the societies 
and the ruling elites, as well as the status of constitutional courts in the power-structures, the degree of 
legitimacy and public support earned by them, and even the general contours of their institutional 
design. Understandably, in this light, the countries share virtually the same trajectory of democratic 
development and hence their needs for change and development are largely similar too.   
The special focus of this study on democratic development reasonably predetermines the time-specific 
nature of the inquiry. The recommendations of this work are made strictly for the consumption for the 
transition to democracy, the analysis of the “political ingredients” is based on the current status of 
democracy in the region, and the conclusions are similarly fit for now. But this hardly means that the 
scope of inquiry is unduly narrowed to the extent that the entire value of the research may be lost in a 
matter of a few years. The “current status of democracy” in the region proved to be quite enduring and 
long-lasting and the democratic transition never appeared complete. Being limited to the paradigm of 
the democratic transition, the practical value of the work is thus not limited to a particular short period 
of time. The post-Soviet transition to democracy has already seen many long and difficult years of 
struggle, controversy, encouragement and disappointment, but it seems to be requiring still a long way 
to pass. This forecast, pretty much shared by the greater part of the expert community,9 promises 
considerable prospect for the recommendations made by this work both in terms of geographic and 
                                                 
9 For one, see Larry Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy: the Struggle to Build Free Societies throughout the World, 
Times Books, 2008, pp. 190-207, as well as the discussion in Chapter 2.  
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temporal latitude. Needless to mention, the study in its particular propositions may, in general, appear 
of value for democratic transitions throughout the world.  
Constitutional courts in Soviet-successor states started coming to the fore following the major turn in 
the political regime, the collapse of the Soviet Union and building of initial constitutional institutions in 
the newly independent entities beginning in 1991. Already by 1993-1994, a number of countries in the 
CIS had created constitutional tribunals, almost all of them being generously empowered.10 This study 
explores the emerging experiences with constitutional justice from the very beginning of the transition, 
though from the considerations of fitting the analysis into the context of the existing and inherent 
patterns of political practices throughout the region, the post-1993 period is rather taken as the start of 
the “modern era” reflecting the current state of affairs in the field of concern. This divide is related with 
the events in Russia in October 1993, which resulted in the first matter-of-fact in-house violent political 
conflict after the transformation, bringing among other things to suspension of the Constitutional Court, 
and which marked the beginning of a new epoch in democratic politics throughout the region.11 The 
observation of the post-1993 constitutional courts in the region is undertaken with a consideration of 
the significant informal constraint which the courts experience from the side of incumbent power-
holders. With various inconsiderable digressions, this phenomenon characterized the status of the 
constitutional courts and the entire political context in which they were put to operate. By the beginning 
of 2009, this status has not changed dramatically, though the extent of limits on the constitutional courts 
differs from one country to another. In this light, this particular political reality has been taken by this 
work as the long-standing and inherent political-cultural context on which to focus when making 
suggestions for constitutional reconstruction.         
As it may be obvious from the preceding introductory comments, this research contains an embedded 
presumption that the democratic development is the key target aimed by the countries included in its 
scope. This presumption, carrying in a way an axiomatic status, at some point may seem to be 
misleading as the discussion will expose that it is not in all of our countries that democratization is 
considered to be the priority, aside the official declarations properly endorsed by all of their 
constitutions. Two arguments can be drawn in reply to such critique.  
Firstly, the disappointment with the democratic ideals in the post-Soviet region, although largely 
observed also by this work, cannot be exaggerated and, moreover, presented as an entrenched, 
irreversible and universal tendency in the entire region. In many countries and, fairly enough, in Russia 
itself, democracy seems to have passed its golden age of widespread inspiration and now rather looks to 
be somewhat out of favor, if not as a concept and a value system, then at least as a political priority for 
                                                 
10 See Table 1 in Chapter 2.  
11 This study attempts to call this epoch an era of “post-romanticism” or “neo-rationalism” in post-Soviet politics. 
This particular discussion is a subject of a lengthy deliberation in Chapter 2.  
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a country at this time.12 With all this in mind, though, generalizations, as well as categorical, definitive 
statements, would be unjustified.13 The ideal of democracy is in decline in a number of countries, but it 
is enjoying a new momentum in some others in our days. Meanwhile, it is believed by this work that 
the decline in support for democracy is in a major part a product of earlier failures and disappointments 
with the first democratic practices that all post-Soviet nations experienced. If so, democracy may be 
treated with pessimism as far as the interim practices are concerned, but it may well be sincerely 
believed and desired by all, even the most autocratic leaders and the least consolidated nations, as the 
ultimate goal to reach.  
Secondly, a response should be given from the point of view of this work’s largely normative character. 
From this perspective, the propositions of this research essentially rely upon the normative presumption 
that there exists a devoted and decent institutional designer, collective or personalized, who is guided 
by the rationale of democratization and justice. As the text will demonstrate furthermore, this 
perspective should not seem too naïve since the determinants of political decision-making and 
institutional design are believed to include not only mere egoistic, rationalistic motivations but also a 
range of other ones, which allow space and force to considerations of public good, law, values and 
morals. In this regard, this work heavily relies on the insights from the latest neo-institutional 
revolution in social sciences,14 and while behavioralist arguments do often find a place in this study, the 
sort of balanced and comprehensive approach offered by the new-institutionalist science is thought to 
prevail.    
The ample references to politics may speak of the inter-disciplinary focus of this study. Indeed, the 
subject of this research is traditionally shared by law and political science. The influence of the latter 
may be seen especially in the parts dominated by institutional theories and transitology (see Chapter 1), 
as well as in the assessments of constitutional courts’ performance in politics, of which this work is also 
amply full (Chapter 3). Meanwhile, the legal analysis and long-established legal-theoretical debates 
dominate the discussion. The study of courts, including constitutional courts, has traditionally been the 
domain of the legal science, though inter-disciplinarity has cut across the subject.15 In a matter of 
principal methodological choice, this work has chosen empirical research (in the meaning of “field 
studies”) and the analysis of the practice and political experience as one of the key sources of 
argumentation, often in contrast with the conventional normative dogmas. The empirical study presents 
a series of cases from the recent practice of constitutional courts in the region.  
                                                 
12 See, for example, McFaul, Michael, “A Mixed Record, an Uncertain Future”, Journal of Democracy 12.4 (2001), 
as well as the discussion in Chapter 2.  
13 For a fine although subtle critique of the political science literature which categorically reports on the failure of the 
democratic development in Russia, see Sakwa, Richard, “Two Camps? The Struggle to Understand Contemporary 
Russia”, Comparative Politics, July 2008.  
14 James March and Johan Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics, Free Press, 1989.  
15 Smith, Rogers M., “Political Jurisprudence, the New Institutionalism, and the Future of Public Law”, 1 American 
Political Science Review 88 (1988).  
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The work is also essentially comparative. The comparative method is in effect the principal way in 
which this work evaluates the different institutional models as alternatives to the existing post-Soviet 
ones. The comparative evaluation of the major constitutional review systems- the diffuse (American) 
and concentrated (continental European or Kelsenian) models- is an important, albeit only one example. 
This work considers a range of models of constitutional courts (Kelsenian or not) and a number of 
specific settings within each of them. In the meantime, it does not shy away from inviting attention to 
so far overlooked, or hybrid, or sometimes hypothetical, experimental models.  
The discussion proceeds in the following order. Chapter 1 develops a concept of “optimal institutional 
design” based on its review of the latest feedbacks from the studies of constitutional design, new 
institutionalism and transitology. The concept of optimal design is central for this work, as the main 
propositions defining it guide us further into the details of suggested alternatives to the existing 
institutional architecture, in the way as they are supposed to guide the institutional architects while in 
the process of institution-designing. New institutionalism,16 as already mentioned, is the key scientific 
tool applied in this work which helps to discover the proper role of institutions and the subtle ways in 
which they influence societies, actors and inherited habits of social interaction. The science of 
transitology, or perhaps “consolidology”,17 and the latest inquiries in democratic transitions in the post-
communist world help to define the real needs of the societies and targeted countries in order to better 
identify the specific designer strategies intended at overcoming the complex challenges of 
democratization.  
Chapter 2 presents facts and analyses about the post-Soviet countries of this research on their way to 
building constitutional democracies, their path towards democracy and their democratic credentials, the 
constitutional courts, their emergence, legitimacy and institutional characteristics, etc. This is a largely 
descriptive section which serves as a detailed introduction to the political regimes and constitutional 
frameworks emerged in the post-Soviet region and to the dynamics and peculiarities of political and 
constitutional developments in target countries, in historical and comparative light. This background is 
necessary for understanding the specific social and political environment behind the scene, and hence, 
for perceiving the specific needs and challenges facing the respective countries, as well as the 
differences which place the countries of the region in a special category vis-à-vis the other transitional 
entities. Following this, Chapter 2 collects and summarizes some rather technical data on institutional 
settings of constitutional courts in the region, outlining the institutional profile of these bodies since 
their inception and over time. This information depicts the existing architecture of courts which is to be 
                                                 
16 March and Olsen, supra note 14, as well as Clayton, Cornell and Gillman, Howard (ed.), Supreme-Court Decision-
Making: New Institutionalist Approaches, University of Chicago Press (1999); North, Douglas, Institutions, 
Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press (1990); Peters, Guy B., Institutional 
Theory in Political Science: The New Institutionalism (London: Continuum, 2005); Smith, Rogers M., “Political 
Jurisprudence, the New Institutionalism, and the Future of Public Law”, 1 American Political Science Review 88 
(1988), etc.   
17 Schmitter, Philippe, “Transitology: The Science or the Art of Democratization?” in J. S. Tulchin (ed.), The 
Consolidation of Democracy in Latin America, Boulder, Lynne Rienner (1995). 
11 
 
taken as a point of departure in projecting the expected changes. The two charts, to be found at the end 
of the Chapter, summarize the institutional settings of concerned constitutional courts and provide for 
the first time a systemized collection of such information about post-Soviet constitutional courts.    
Chapter 3 proceeds by defending the political empowerment of constitutional courts. It is running into 
an empirical analysis of higher courts’ involvement into politics and concludes by supporting these 
courts’ political role in democratic development. The reader in this part is warned against approaching 
the problem from the purely normative perspective as the questions of judicial activism and political 
involvement of courts are among the most controversial topics within the discipline. This work’s 
approach is rather utilitarian, and the political empowerment of courts is praised and encouraged by this 
work strictly from the considerations of the practical dividends gained by the prospect of democratic 
development from each and any case of  constitutional review against the arbitrary rule of autocratic 
governments.18  
Chapter 4 discusses the weaknesses and the dangers of the current institutional settings and attempts to 
propose an “optimal” design for political empowerment of constitutional courts. The projection of the 
optimal design builds on the propositions on restructuring of the entire logic of constitutional 
construction from the one based on rules and procedures to one based on concepts and principles. This 
proposed “new” model of constitutional mentality serves as a basis for devising the key milestones of 
the alternative institutional construction of the constitutional review courts.  
Finally, Chapter 5 proposes a criticism of the Kelsenian transplant. It suggests that while the creation of 
a special tribunal has undermined the consolidation of the judiciary and has in this way contributed to 
the fragmentation and eventual weakening of the judiciary, there are institutional design alternatives 
that would better uphold emergence of a consolidated, powerful judiciary as the foremost guarantor of 
the rule of law. Although the proposed alternatives envisage elimination of the separate constitutional 
courts, this should not raise concerns with the proponents of a strong body of constitutional review in 
countries in transition to democracy.  
The idea behind the proposed reforms is exactly to strengthen and empower the function of 
constitutional review, and this work does not make any attempt whatsoever to consider elimination of 
this important function. This work rather challenges the habitual albeit often intuitive attitude, 
sometimes strongly carved in the minds of policy-makers or academics, that the option of the separate 
tribunal is the best, if not the only, reasonable and sustainable structure in which effective judicial 
review can be implemented over constitutional issues in Europe and in the post-communist countries in 
Europe or its immediate neighborhood. One very illustrative manifestation of this attitude is contained 
                                                 
18 This approach is largely influenced by Ronald Dworkin’s position according to which courts acquire their 
legitimacy not from any conventional normative constructions, but from their institutional virtue to contribute to the 
democratic conditions; see Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution, 
(Harvard University Press 1996), p. 34.  
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in “Models of Constitutional Jurisdiction”- a study19 which brings together the Council of Europe’s 
“standards” on the design of constitutional review in Europe: “In conclusion of what the Draft Report 
discussed under the sub-heading “Principal Types of Constitutional Jurisdiction- Possible Advantages 
of a Special Constitutional Court”, it is recommended to have constitutional jurisdiction exercised by a 
permanent special constitutional court.”20  
This “template” recommendation authored and promoted by the Venice Commission of the Council of 
Europe- an organization famously known for its persuasive influence on constitutional reforms all over 
Europe, but especially in the new democracies- self-speaks of the state of the discourse on the matter. 
This discourse reflects an embedded perception that the mere existence of constitutional courts is 
strictly indispensable for constitutional democracies, especially the new, struggling ones- a viewpoint 
which probably owes to the still widely accepted deduction of Mauro Cappelletti about the “genetic” 
links between the continental legal traditions and the Kelsenian design21 as much as to the widespread 
and mostly rewarding reference to constitutional courts in the new democracies of the Central and 
Eastern Europe after the fall of the former regime. Chapter 5 puts this long-accepted convention on trial 
by a detailed analysis and deliberation where the above-mentioned positions, supporting the 
exceptionality of the separate tribunal, meet with opposition from different perspectives in the context 












                                                 
19 Herman Schwartz says that this study is basic to any discussions on European constitutional courts, Schwartz, 
supra note 5 , Footnote 6 to Chapter 2, p. 253.  
20 Steinberger, Helmut, “Models of Constitutional Jurisdiction”, Science and Technique of Democracy N 2, Council 
of Europe Publishing (1993), p. 3.  
21 See Cappelletti, Mauro, The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), as 




DEFINING “OPTIMAL INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN” 
 
A. “Optimal institutional design”: insights from new institutionalism 
 
The objective of this chapter is to develop a normative concept of the optimal design of constitutional 
institutions in post-Soviet countries. This notion is to be elaborated based on the premises that the key 
objectives which are to be pursued by the societies and governments in these countries are 
democratization and rule of law. The concept will be later applied for the assessment of ex-Soviet 
constitutional judicial review models and their relative merits and drawbacks in view of the role of 
judicial review in fostering constitutional democracy. At the end of the day, this instrument is intended 
for making respective conclusions and recommendations for the (re)design of constitutional courts. In a 
sense, the mentioned task is plain and straightforward: to analyze a variety of existing and hypothetical 
models and configurations of institutional settings of judicial review- variations ranging between the 
variants with different disposition of the courts in the political system and the key option whether or not 
to designate a special tribunal for the purposes of constitutional review, political empowerment, 
jurisdiction, mandate, as well as, to some extent, the issues of access, mode of review, etc. In fact, the 
main discussion of this work will proceed exactly in this mode.  
By and large, the majority of studies of the design of political institutions begin and proceed by the 
elaboration of the “perils” and the “merits” of this or that architecture and a consideration of their “fit” 
with the particular social and political environment without any underlying references to the basic 
insights from the sciences of institutional theory and institutional design, even when they are perfectly 
in line with them. Not even assuming any deficits on the part of these types of works, this work chooses 
to advance by a groundwork examination of the larger scholarly discussions on social and political 
institutions simply because it undertakes to come up with a conceptual scheme or a framework of 
principles which should guide the design through a challenging process of identifying, comparing, 
assessing, and opting for one or the other model.      
Initially, the reactions of the pretty numerous and often controversial institutional theories are not 
certainly expected to be without their portion of criticism towards such efforts as this chapter 
represents. The very term “optimal design” may raise a fair bulk of controversies and opposition: by 
and large, the principal suggestions of the institutional theory are that institutions can hardly be chosen 
and that intentional interference into institutional dynamics has never proved to be effective, optimal, or 
determining.22 The emergence and evolvement of institutions is not solely a product of human 
                                                 
22 James March and Johan Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions, supra note 14. 
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interference: institutions may arise and change by accident or they may follow the inherent logic of 
evolution. To the extent that these dynamics prevail, the design theories may seem to be inadequate. 
Institutions can also be argued never to be perfect or optimal; since the raise of new institutionalism, the 
theories of “the efficiency of history” are now out of favor, while the new wisdom suggests that 
institutions, in line with the logic of historical development, are rather inefficient.23  
Then, even if we skip through such “grand theories” and simply concentrate on the architecture of 
formal institutions, different perspectives may open about the “optimal” and about the different 
attitudes, motivations and interests shaping the process of institutional construction. At the end of the 
day, even to the extent that institutions are shaped by rational actors, the rationalist paradigm, backed 
by conflicts of interest among different actors, would heavily predetermine the form of the institutions 
and their particular configuration. “Do institutions matter after all?” might be the other reaction to the 
effort in this work- a way of argumentation which is quite popular in the scholarship.24  
To proceed and succeed, this work has to face and respond to such potential criticism to pave its way. 
To start, the term “optimal design” is not as naïve and unprofessional as it may seem. In fact, the 
modern theories of institutional design do not even shy away from using the term in exactly the same 
combination as it is attempted here.25 As such, the application of the word “optimal” with the word 
“design” (whether it is of institutions or policy or anything else) in the most functional definition of the 
latter- let us say creation of an actionable form to promote valued outcomes in a particular context26- is 
as normal, as the appropriateness of using “optimal” in relation to any situation of intentional rational 
intervention involving multiple alternatives.  
It is rather the lack of proper comprehension of the intentions of those who use the term or the lack of 
clearness in the way the users of the term explain the designation of this instrument and the exact 
logical link between each component of the term that may lead to the controversy over its meaning. To 
put it simply, the term “optimal design of institutions” is not an attempt to challenge the massive supra-
rational nature of institutions- rather it is applied in regard to perhaps the formal element of the 
institutional foundation, the one which is subject to intentional interference in the very material sense of 
this expression. In a sense, this approach may be labeled as “empirical institutionalism”27- a term which 
is largely associated with the study of government structures and their impact on politics. However, an 
important warning needs to be made that although mostly devoted to discussion of the routine 
                                                 
23 James March and Johan Olsen, “The New Institutionalism: Organization Factors in Political Life”, 78 American 
Political Science Review 3. 
24 For only a few, see Weaver, Kent, and Rockman, Bert (editors),  Do Institutions Matter?: Government 
Capabilities in the United States and Abroad , The Brookings Institution, 1993; Steinmo, Sven and Tolbert, 
Caroline, “Do Institutions Really Matter? Taxation in Industrialized Democracies”, Comparative Political Studies, 
Vol. 31 No. 2, April 1998 165-187; Norris, Pippa, Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism, Cambridge 
University Press, 2002. 
25 Robert Goodin in The Theory of Institutional Design, edited by Robert Goodin, Cambridge University Press 
(1996), at 34. 
26 Davis Bobrow and John Dryzek, Policy Analysis by Design, University of Pittsburg Press, 1987. 
27 B. Guy Peters, Institutional Theory in Political Science, supra note 16. 
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performance of government structures, this research will pay a somewhat greater attention to the 
interaction between formal political institutions and the other social phenomena shaping the socio-
political behavior of the societies and nations. Hence, this study will perhaps differ from the mentioned 
academic style (empirical institutionalism) to the extent that the mainstream “empirical-institutionalist” 
works assume “unidirectionality of influences” by somewhat ignoring the mutual influence of different 
determinants,28 or to the extent that these works expressly abstain from discussing the institutions and 
social structures in the full, comprehensive meaning.29     
The term “optimal design”, despite the apparent intuitive suggestion contained in its meaning, is not 
assuming either optimality or pure intentionality of real-world institutions. It is hardly contestable that 
institutions are not necessarily products of the human mind and much less it is likely that they are 
optimal or effective as such. One should recognize that there is a lot of misleading potential in the very 
terms that we appeal to, unless the meaning and the subject of each of the terms in this sequence is 
made clear. Perhaps it is this troubling combination of potentially controversial words in the foundation 
of the theory that may raise the major part of opposition to its very core concept. It might be this 
consideration that first led to the proposition about framing the phenomenon as “designing schemes for 
designing institutions”30. Indeed, the actual shape of a social institution is hardly subject to the 
designers’ command. But even having this fact recognized, the main status of institutions still keeps 
being considerably contingent on intentional activities, not necessarily the rational or correct ones and 
not necessarily the ones which particularly intended the factually emerged form, and likely not single in 
their nature but diverse in their form and goals. Intentionality plays a much more important role in the 
emergence and dynamics of institutions than it is assumed even in those cases when the key driving 
force in place is supra-human, natural as such: neither the accidents and contingencies are so “purely 
stochastic”, nor the “selection forms” in the theory of evolution are so exempt of intentionality that one 
could ignore the importance of human action in the process of institutional change.31 After all, the 
hypothetical designer creates “schemes” rather than desired ideal forms- a proposition calling for due 
regard to the multiplicity of “localized attempts at partial design cutting across one another”.32  
To avoid being ambiguous and misleading, on should just warn that it is not the institutions that should 
be portrayed or should be conceived as optimal but their design. The design of institutions is simply a 
rational intervention on the level of the “institutional hardware” that is the “rules, rights, operating 
procedures, customs, and principles”, while the very core of the institutions- their “software”- has its 
somewhat autonomous dynamic which is dependent on multiple “discourses surrounding any complex 
                                                 
28 Id. at 93. 
29 Robert Elgie, “From Linz to Tsebelis: Three Waves of Presidential/parliamentary Studies”, 12 Democratization 1, 
2005. 
30 Robert Goodin, supra note 25, at 28. 
31 Id., at 25. 
32 Id.  
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institutional setting.”33 The lessons to be learnt from the logic of this framework are telling the 
institutional designers, among other things, that although instrumentally taking place on the level of the 
hardware, the sophisticated intervention, or the intervention following the “informal logic” of 
institutional design, should necessarily consider the “discursive software” if there is any ambition for 
the success of the project.  
As a reference to this subtle proposition, this work offers a conceptual distinction between “ideal(istic)” 
and “optimal” designs of political institutions. While the “ideal design” is a hypothetically desired 
configuration of the projected institution- a category largely relying on the neutrality of the multiple 
factors which in reality impact the actual configuration of the institution, the category of “optimal 
design” refers to the institutional architecture which is rather largely responsive to the influence of these 
factors. Meanwhile, this distinction is also the tool which allows distancing from idealistic perceptions 
of institutional dynamics based on over-praising of the role of formal institutions and, at the same time, 
from categorical claims about the determining role of other factors- cultural dependency or the human 
agency. It is exactly the recognition of autonomous and self-reinforcing nature of institutions that 
defines the core idea behind this concept. Without an appreciation of this important aspect, the task of 
the social engineers would be simply to pick up ideal-looking institutions which have an evidence of 
success in a different setting or are endowed with a mathematically well-calculated physical 
characteristic. And although one can notice some signs of such simplistic attempts in social sciences of 
largely economic origin, it is fairly evident in fact that the social phenomena are much more complex 
and multi-faceted than is assumed by the theories which over-emphasize the role of any one 
determining source of institutional dynamics.  
The behavioralist-rationalist opposition to this would proceed from the position of stressing the human 
agency’s strategic role in institutional architecture. In reality, the emerging form and the contents of 
social institutions are immensely dependent on the preferences of different political actors and groups 
each of whom promote their own self-interest in social relations, eventually shaping the respective 
institution. This framework hardly avoids propositions that in real life and politics there is barely any 
situation which does not involve a conflict of interests and that the designing of binding political 
procedures is unavoidably a product of these conflicts, whereas the proposition of a solution based on 
rather an abstract normative notion of a “public good” is idealistic, unrealistic and is not compatible 
with real-life politics. 34  
                                                 
33 John Dryzek in The Theory of Institutional Design, supra note 25, at 104-105. 
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such: Gillman, Howard, “Martin Shapiro and the Movement from “Old” to “New” Institutionalist Studies in Public 
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There may be more than one way of responding to this opposition. The first should definitely argue 
from the positions of the constantly fast growing discipline of neo-institutionalism which convincingly 
keeps taking over the somewhat deficient and one-sided claims of “individualist” science.35 Called 
reductionist, the above described behaviorist-rationalist tendency in the theory of politics portrays 
political phenomena as a mere aggregation of individual action, while much of it should be attributed to 
organizational structures and rules of behavior.36 Institutions impose their own logic on the individual 
political behavior through norms and values; they shape the interests, actions and even the resources of 
political actors. However, although this “new institutional” approach stresses the importance of 
structural constraints, the individual and attitudinal factors are not out of its scope. It is rather a call for 
a comprehensive analysis of the factors and for due regard of the multiplicity of factors and their 
interaction, though based principally on a key proposition that in the presence of any combination of 
multiple determinants, institutions and organization rules  provide for the underlying framework of 
political choices.  
At the same time as the study of such individualized decision-makers as presidents is to a large extent a 
scrutiny of the personal, attitudinal and psychological characteristics of individual holders of 
presidential positions, the more inclusive studies concentrate on the range of organizational 
determinants (various bureaucratic agencies, as well as formal and informal rules and procedures of 
decision-making). This makes the study of the institution of presidency to be more competent for 
describing the activities of chief political executives than the study of individual presidents.37 Similar 
shall be the treatment of any other political and social actors and functions: legislatures, courts, and 
obviously the various types of (other) institution or policy designers. In conclusion, no comprehensive 
study of individual political behavior can successfully address the entire spectrum of relevant 
phenomena and factors without an “overt and tacit reference to the institutional arrangements and 
cultural contexts that give it shape, direction and meaning.”38 Similarly, no any analysis of institutional 
design can thrive without a due respect of these factors.  
The designing of post-Soviet political institutions at the beginning of the 1990-ies, although largely 
subjected to banal human intervention, was not a province of anyone dominant paradigm of strategic 
considerations and their conflicts. Even though it may sound somewhat naïve, the early 90-ies 
institutional construction was rather a “romantic” designing by democratically inspired patriots of the 
                                                                                                                                              
Law Scholarship”, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 7: 363-382 (2004). Throughout this thesis, especially in 
Chapter 3, I am also looking at the ways for reconciling these tendencies, trying to arrive to a balanced account 
where both the force of human agency and that of institutions themselves is paid due attention.      
35 For an overview of the rational choice stream within the new-institutional science itself, see Weingast, Barry R, 
“Rational Choice Institutionalism”, in Political Science: The State of the Discipline, ed. Ira Katznelson and Helen V. 
Milner, New York: W.W. Norton (2002); Shepsle, Kenneth, “Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational 
Choice Approach”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 1, No. 2, 131-147 (1989).  
36 March and Olsen, supra note 23, at 735. 
37 Researching the Presidency: Vital Questions, New Approaches, by George Edwards, John Kessel, and Bert 
Rockman (editors), University of Pittsburgh Press (1993).   
38 Cornell Clayton and Howard Gillman, supra note 16, at 3. 
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new political conviction driven by the invisible force of the “new” values, expectations, and ultimately 
the new formal principles of the game. It is rather the next generation of institutional design and re-
designs, often led by the same political leadership- the previous “romantics” but already quite 
experienced politicians- that carried the first visible and consolidated signs of rational calculations of 
their interests in the process of constitution-making.39 What was said about “romantic designing” is 
even less relevant to the modern re-design of the post-Soviet political institutions, which, it is worth 
mentioning, is the very subject of my work. The modern institutional re-design can hardly be similar to 
the democratically inspired and largely idealistic designing of the immediate after-collapse period. In 
the “post-romantic period”, the institutional design of constitutional review courts has been largely 
shaped and still continues to be so according to the preferences of dominant political actors.40  
However, even with this quite strong presence of outcomes provoked by rational choice, the modern 
political-institutional re-design is exactly a process with multiple determinants, sources and influences, 
not the least of which is the inner imperatives of the organizational rules and procedures. Insofar, the 
considerable impact of rational actors on the modern institutional designing is hardly a valid ground for 
undermining the merits of identifying better fitted institutional models for our days- an effort which, as 
it will be clarified later, has to be of clearly theoretical and methodological value as much as it assumes 
identification of “optimal designs” for the sake of the best public interest. 
Hence, another response to the rationalists shall be drawn from methodological perspectives. It should 
be clarified from the beginning that the objective of this particular undertaking is rather normative in 
nature. It is obvious that regardless the certain values underlying the particular choice of design or 
policy, the eventual outcome of the institutional architecture is not likely to be the one exactly intended 
by the designer, but rather a hybrid of different predetermining factors, including the conflicting 
interests of rational actors and their groups. In line with this, the propositions of this research in large 
part proceed from the perspective of a principally hypothetical situation in which there is a major 
consensus on the basic political value system at a time on which to ground the future institutions (here: 
democracy and rule of law) or where a hypothetical neutral and devoted “designer” is in place to 
materialize the best possible efforts of a democratically-inspired government in stipulating new 
democratic institutions. “If so, the work acquires a considerably theoretical importance”- should be the 
reaction.  
Theoretical or not, I believe this exercise is of value. As a point of departure, my position exactly takes 
the proposition that “the ideal can be a good guide to the real”41 which just makes the connection 
between the normative and empirical in any “institutional design projects”. It is to be argued that 
although the eventual institution is not likely to emerge exactly as supposed by the designer, the virtue 
                                                 
39 For a more detailed analysis, see Chapter 2.  
40 See, for example, Pedro Magalhaes, “The Politics of Judicial Reform in Eastern Europe”, 32 Comparative Politics 
43-62, October 1999. 
41 Robert Goodin, supra note 25, at 34. 
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of the social architecture will be precisely in taking into account the factors which would resist this 
hypothetical match and to propose a design that will result in the best possible variation or alternative 
of the ideal one. If so, there is a lot of sense in construction of such theoretical models at least from 
methodological perspective because the “ideal” and then its more realistic but still hypothetical 
improvement- the “optimal”, become necessary methodological tools for working out the “real”. From 
this perspective, the “optimal design” is the best possible mode of intentional intervention available at 
the disposal of institutional designers, which is intended at the most possible presence of the elements 
of the hypothetical “ideal” institutional shape in the real institution to emerge.   
The comprehensive attack on the attitudinal and, eventually, rational choice models by the new-
institutionalist analysis, as basically outlined above, shall also be part of the reply to the largely 
rhetorical question “Do institutions matter at all?”42 This question, in one of its perspectives, precisely 
assumes the central role of the agency and rational considerations and the secondary importance of the 
core elements of the very institutions: the rules, procedures, and frameworks. But the other 
interpretation of this controversial but well-liked claim may advance from a completely different angle, 
and this is the radical structuralist tradition which often underestimates the role of formal institutions 
vis-à-vis the other strongest factors in social life- the cultural background, historical heritage, inherited 
patterns of social interaction, etc.43 The analysis of the role of these factors is one of the central 
inquiries in this work, and the interrelationship between the force of these factors and the institutional 
factors embraces the essential core of the “conceptual framework” on which this particular chapter 
relies. But while the main propositions of this work also take the assumption about strong cultural 
dependency in the target countries as a point of departure, the core idea behind the applied framework 
advances from the belief in the reciprocated interaction between the determinants and their 
comprehensive contribution to each others’ status. And from this perspective already, the “optimal 
design” eventually appears as a compromise in the rational designers’ efforts in reconciling the 
different sources of influence. 
The necessity of paying a due regard to the factors outlined in the previous paragraph makes it essential 
to develop a particular theory of optimality based on the variety of local factors. In fact, this refers to 
what is generally considered to be the “fundamental notion of design”- the “goodness of fit” of the to-
be-shaped institution with the general environment in which it is set to function.44 This account is the 
other crucial component of the present assessment of “optimal design”. But the environments vary. 
                                                 
42 Supra note 24.   
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What is optimal for one country, nation or polity may be not so good for the other. In the same token, 
something that is good today is not necessarily going to be good tomorrow. The concept of optimal 
design in this work is both area and time specific. Defining the concrete area of its expertise, this work 
distinguishes between the different (post-communist) countries based on their current actual 
achievements in the key dependent variables of this inquiry: democracy/democratization/democratic 
consolidation and the state of the rule of law. Then, the scope of this work is going to be confined 
strictly within the political regimes in the former Soviet system where these regimes are characterized 
by weaker civic participation and traditions, non-consolidated democratic institutions, concentrated 
presidential or otherwise executive governments, and non-independent judiciaries.45 Despite the 
considerable variation among the target countries in terms of these variables, this work considers that it 
is possible to generalize about the relatively steady dominance of these trends in all of the post-Soviet 
countries that allow us to think of a concept of optimal design which will generally fit these countries in 
its main propositions at least. And from this perspective, the “optimal design” in this work is an 
institutional reform agenda which is at most sensitive to time and country specific constraints.  
Finally, what are then the particular sources of influences which prevent the idyllic, mechanism-like 
functioning of newly created formal institutions of constitutional democracy? To answer such a 
question, one should necessarily start by   studying the multiple determinants of the consolidation of the 
institutions of constitutional democracy. Hence, this chapter proceeds further by looking at these 
determinants. This will be followed by elaborations about the “conceptual framework”, as described 
above, then by proposition of a “theory” for designing optimal institutions and by definition of “optimal 
design” based on already the particular target values and particular social and political environments.        
 
 
B. The determinants of democratization: lessons for institutional design 
 
The issue of determinants of democratic consolidation is perhaps one of the central inquiries in 
transitology. The remarkable variation of reactions to the apparently identical challenges of political 
transition across the globe has provoked a permanently vibrant and continuously topical debate on the 
problem. What makes some countries build democracy effectively and others not?  
The theories of development and democratization have thought for answers from a number of 
explanatory perspectives. The determinants of successful democratic transformation are numerous 
and complex. The variety of the factors which enable effective environment for democratic 
development has stipulated a need for their classification. The most influential schools of academic 
                                                 
45 This discussion is undertaken in Chapter 2.  
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literature have explained the success of democratic transformation by cultural, socio-economic, 
institutional, and other factors. All of these traditions of thought, or at least most of them, have their 
origins in the earliest political-philosophical schools as old as the works of Plato and Aristotle, but 
meanwhile, all of them have got their new birth and inspiration in the twentieth century which 
witnessed the most massive movement to regime transformation, development and democratization in 
the world.  
The cultural tradition of the modern studies of determinants starts probably with the “all times 
classic” of Alexis de Tocqueville and his insightful analysis of civic traditions in the United States.46 
In the more recent past, the cultural tradition was given renewed attention by very insightful studies 
of civic capital47, the studies of political culture,48 religion,49 national identities, etc.  
The other group of determinants emphasizes the role of social-economic factors. The newest insights 
of this school come from the works of Dahl,50 Lipset,51 Huntington,52 etc. These works emphasize the 
importance of economic development and its companions- such as the level of industrialization, 
urbanization, and education- on the quality of democracy. However, the peculiarity of these last 
seminal works is rather in their tendency to a more balanced approach. Seymour Lipset, for example, 
tended to consider two major features of society as “bearing heavily on the problem of stable 
democracy”: economic development and legitimacy, where the later is characterized as the “degree to 
which institutions are valued themselves and considered right and proper.”53   
The third major trend in the study of democratization, represented by different traditions of 
institutionalisms, pays increased attention to formal institutions and their design. The institutionalist 
traditions, in their different forms- old and new- are mentioned throughout this work.  
The success of democratic reforms has been also often thought to be conditioned by factors external 
to the society in change. The various explanations ascribe the success of the transformations to the 
international environment, regional geopolitics, and the preferences and actions of international 
actors, as well as international and regional assistance. Robert Dahl, for example, among the essential 
conditions for democracy mentions the ability of elected officials to control military and police and 
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the absence of a foreign control and influence which is hostile to democracy.54 Last but not least, the 
success of democratic reforms has been also greatly conditioned by the choice of competent policies 
and the making of correct decisions by those in charge of the reforms.55  
The tremendous change brought about by the collapse of the communist block has been the newest 
and one of the best opportunities for testing the competence of the above-mentioned theories. Since 
the collapse of the Soviet block, the post-communist transformation has become a tremendous 
treasure for social scientists. The determinants of successful transformation in post-communist world 
have become a theme for numerous studies, starting at the earliest time of the transition where no 
sufficient empirical evidence could yet be obtained in support of this or that proposition. As early as 
1991, Samuel Huntington’s work on third-wave democracies attempted an overview of the paradigms 
of regime change of post-communist countries in his comprehensive study of transitional dynamics 
across the world.56 Referring to the determinants of democratization, Huntington starts with prior 
democratic experience as a favoring condition for the consolidation of new democracies. This is then 
followed by a range of other factors: economic development and industrialization, international 
environment and foreign actors, the time of a country’s transition, the mode of transition itself, and 
finally, the so-called contextual problems (these are problems “endemic to individual countries”57) 
and the way “political elites and publics responded to those problems.”58  The factor of formal 
democratic institutions and their choice in Huntington’s list takes its place out of this primary 
framework: the importance of this authority seems to be only slightly hinted upon, and the impact of 
the choice of macro-political institutions appears accompanied by a question mark in his analysis.59   
These observations of the series of factors which enable effective environment for democratic 
development have stipulated a need for conceptualizing the study of determinants. The new 
generation of “determinants’ studies” departs from mere classification of numerous individual 
determinants and basically arrives at an abstract framework whereby the different factors are 
conceptualized rather by the “temporal structure of determination and the degree of intentionality” 
and where their interaction is paid greater attention.60 In these frameworks of determinants and their 
interaction, the institutional impact comes as one of the major variables, coupled and often opposed to 
what is commonly called the “legacies” perspective. Crawford and Lijphart insightfully address each 
of these factors as “ideal types” to underline the contrast for the purposes of academic analysis and 
for “generating hypotheses about diverse trajectories of East European countries after the collapse of 
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communism.”61 In the study by Elster, Offe and Preuss, “the burden of explanation” is put on three 
central variables: legacies, institutions and decisions.62 Legacies are the constraints which stem from 
the past and which are fairly immune from intentional intervention due to path-dependent qualities of 
their settings. Institutions, in the meaning of Elster et al, are characterized rather by the intentionality 
of a set of rules which are put into operation for reaching certain effects. Decisions are the direct 
products of the actors’ actions. Accordingly, the first group of “transition outcomes” is attributed to 
the variety of cultural and institutional structures (hence the term- structuralist approach) which are 
inherited from the earlier periods of history. The second group concentrates on the “institutionalized 
agency”- the configuration of actors, rules and procedures which emerged from the very process of 
change. The last group of outcomes is predetermined by the quality of decisions and policies of 
decision-makers.  
 
The “most significant variable” 
Having classified and conceptualized the variety of determinants, the challenge is to extract a valid 
proposition from the pool of numerous theories and explanations. For this, a scrupulous look at the 
mode of causality, through which the numerous mentioned factors impact the transformation, 
becomes necessary. Let us start by the premise that democratization is a matter of earning the 
fundamental support of democratic institutions by the basic constituency, the society in case, rather 
than a matter of sheer proclamations, intentions, and institutional approximation at the level of formal 
procedures, rules, etc. The process of democratic transformation, if genuine, is largely shaped by the 
process of democratic consolidation which is an artifact of the mental appreciation of the values of 
this regime. Larry Diamond calls the beliefs about “democratic legitimacy”- the public support of 
democracy- as the best possible form of government and the appreciation of its moral ideals as the 
“central factor” and the “defining feature” of democratic consolidation.63 The need for democratic 
consolidation is, generally speaking, absent in societies where the inner appreciation of its values and 
prospects is in place, whereas we long for democratic consolidation in those societies where exactly 
this sort of mental or moral appreciation by the local constituency is in deficit. While the appreciation 
of the legitimacy in consolidated democracies is internalized and deeply rooted, that is the sort of 
legitimacy at stake is intrinsic, in societies on their way to democratic consolidation the legitimacy of 
democracy is often largely conditional on the appreciation of the functional credentials of the 
democratic system and its effective performance- the so-called instrumental belief in democratic 
legitimacy, which is not the kind of legitimacy that leads to consolidation, as Diamond believes.64  
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Hence, the prospect of “real” democratic legitimacy, democratic consolidation, and democratization 
is chiefly a function of intrinsic beliefs and appreciation. Now, a number of individual factors, which 
we described in the previous section, do matter insofar as they support or discourage either the 
emergence or the maintenance of this state of appreciation among aspiring democracies. For example, 
economic success and industrialization contribute to the process of democratization to a large extent 
by the contribution to the society’s overall approval of the regime change for which the success of the 
economic reform is essential. On the other hand, economic success, in a more long-term perspective, 
might have contributed to democracy through the fruits of modernization: education, access to 
information, openness to the world and appreciation of humanistic values, as well as through civic 
virtues: tolerance, trust, efficacy, etc., which would result in the appreciation of “intrinsic 
legitimacy”. Both these modes of the influence of economic factors are indicative of the “cultural” 
elements of causality: the role of modernization (prior urbanization, industrialization and education) 
in fact can be integrated into the function of cultural capital in general together with a range of other 
individual determinants which are genetically the properties of the cultural domain: the political 
culture, prior democratic experiences, the civic background, and so forth. The element of functional 
appreciation is present in many explanations of the external factors as well: for example, the prospect 
of imminent accession to the European Union has probably largely predetermined the “loyalty” to 
democracy via appreciation of the concrete economic and political dividends of the accession. These 
types of determinants do not amount to intrinsic democratic consolidation but they do support 
democratic consolidation instrumentally, which however does not depreciate the importance of them.   
The sort of mental appreciation which builds “intrinsic legitimacy” has its inner structure. This 
structure is the institutional embodiment of the inherent norms of behavior, patterns of socialization 
and self-government, or in other words, the local culture of communal co-existence which the 
democratic form of government has in its core. The relationship between the civic culture and 
democratic government is like that of essence and form. In his very insightful comparison of civic 
traditions in different parts of modern Italy, Robert Putnam develops a theory of social capital as the 
key factor that “makes democracy work.”65 The study concentrates on the “civic virtues” of a society, 
such as civic engagement and participation, egalitarian patterns of politics, solidarity and trust, social 
structures of cooperation as the main features of civic community. The conclusions for this study go 
much farther than the borders of Italy: “virtually without exception, the more civic the context, the 
better the government.” In reference to institutional reform, which he advocates as an instrument of 
political change, Putnam highlights the constraints posed on institutional performance by the social 
context and history, which “profoundly condition the effectiveness of institutions” – so he defines his 
first lesson from the Italian experiment. 66   
                                                 
65 Putnam, supra note 47, at 182. 
66 Id., at 181. 
25 
 
The role of social capital is re-visited by Elster, Offe and Preuss in relation to post-communist 
transformations.67 Following on their in-depth analysis of institutional patterns in four post-
communist countries- the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria, these authors’ final 
conclusion seems to leave not much doubt about their position on the determinants of successful 
transitions: “we submit that the most significant variable for the success of transformation is the 
degree of compatibility of the inherited world views, patterns of behavior and basic social and 
political concepts with the functional necessities of a modern, partly industrial, partly already post-
industrial society.”68 And as if reaffirming their point in reply to the most frequently asked question 
about the force of determinants, they conclude: “Thus, what matters most is the social and cultural 
capital and its potential for adjusting the legacies of the past to the requirements of the present.”69 
 
Institutions in context: how they matter?  
How and in which way formal institutions matter? On the visible and functional level (or on the level 
of instrumental belief in democratic legitimacy), for a nation in transition the success of the 
institutional reforms constitutes a positive investment in the overall appreciation of the image of the 
new system, in the same way as the economic success is a good image-maker for the larger socio-
political reform. On a more essential level, however, institutions matter insofar as they contribute to 
the “inner appreciation” of the system, that is insofar as they transform the formal transplanted rules 
of democracy into internally accepted practices. In other words, institutions matter to the extent that 
they are received by their constituency, and this means that it is only through becoming part of local 
culture that institutions make change.  
If so, one might say that the ranking of institutions among the “central variables” is an overstatement 
of their role. The answer might be that the conceptualizations which identify the macro-variables are 
by themselves largely conditional and abstract. It is the relative rather than the absolute autonomy of 
the institutions, one should note, that places them in the macro-framework. This taxonomy, not to be 
a surprise, has provoked plenty of controversy. The institutions’ indirect classification as a major 
determinant of successful development in general has never been incontestable. The popular query 
“do institutions matter?” has with time grown to a well-liked academic orthodoxy despite its largely 
rhetoric nature and its failure to represent a narrowly defined line of argumentation. In this respect, 
the claim stands for the rather unrelated academic assertions which question the role of institutions 
from whichever perspective. This trend could not avoid the study of democratic transitions as well. 
While the analyses of different settings and combinations of political institutions proceeding from the 
methodological positions of “empirical institutionalism” have implicitly accepted the importance of 
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institutional design in the context of political regime change, the academic opposition to this 
conventional style has not hesitated to disagree even to the extent of rejecting the importance of 
institutions and their design in the process of transition.  
For example, in an article with a self-speaking title “The Structural Determinants of Democratic 
Consolidation”, political scientists Mark Gasiorowski and Timothy Power, having undertaken an 
empirical analysis of a number of variables of democratic consolidation, conclude that the choice of 
institutional design (such as the choice of presidential versus parliamentary regimes and the party 
fragmentation systems) has not been seminal for the outcomes of the consolidation in any significant 
way.70 Instead, their study identifies three other structural variables that affect the process of 
democratic consolidation which together have a “success rate of between 93-97% in predicting which 
democratic transitions resulted in consolidation and which resulted in breakdown”: these are (1) the 
socio-economic factors,  (2) the inflation, and (3) the “contagion effect of democratic neighbors”. 
Skipping through the basic method of analysis of this article, which is clearly beyond the scope of our 
work, a reservation should be made about the overall style of such “empiric” studies which in 
principal overpass the main conceptual insights about the institutional impact.  
At the conceptual level, the style of analysis presented above neglects the comprehensiveness of 
institutional intervention by highlighting only the formal impact of institutions, for example the 
choice of a particular macro-political design (presidential v. parliamentary) which is an important but 
not a self-sufficient part of the overall reform as I will try to clarify further in this work. At the same 
time, the work in a way fails to acknowledge that the institutional context is the underlying 
framework in which the assumed determinants operate and through which they impact the 
consolidation of new democratic institutions. Most importantly, this conventional trend in empirical 
institutionalism misrepresents the mode of institutional influence and the conceptual context of 
causality which is the core framework underneath the processes of institutional consolidation- 
something that forms the subject matter of the subsequent discussion in this chapter.  
If we abstain from expecting the kind of mechanical and “visual” effect of institutional reforms on the 
quality of democratization, which is supposed in such studies as the one of Gasiorowski and Power, 
the wisdom of institutional theories seems to be clear-cut: institutions do matter. Yet, it is now 
important to answer the question about the interaction of institutions with the other key variables and 
a variable’s relative prevalence at a specific place and a specific time, as well as to find out “to what 
extent, in what respects, through what processes, under what conditions, and why institutions make a 
difference”71, rather than to address such banal clichés about whether institutions matter or not. This 
complex interaction of determinants and the particular status of institutional factors in this context 
                                                 
70 Mark Gasiorowski and Timothy Power, “The Structural Determinants of Democratic Consolidation”, Comparative 
Political Studies 31/6 (1998). 
71 James March and Johan Olsen, “Elaborating the “New Institutionalism”, University of Oslo/Arena Working Paper 
Series 11 (2005), at 9. 
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with a heavy emphasis on “how, through what processes and under what conditions” institutions 
matter is the theme of the next section and the following discussion.   
 
The “conceptual framework” 
If I could afford to make an experiment and could borrow the constitutional model of a developing 
democracy with a weak civic background to function in a developed democracy with a highly civic 
tradition and the constitutional framework of the latter to function in the first country, I would expect 
that the democratic processes in both countries would not change in any substantial way. The main 
resource for the successful democratic performance is the society itself, its internal capacity of self-
organization and its patterns of social organization in general. Where the society is “gifted” with civic 
virtues, any experiments with “alien” or defective formal institutions will not result in a major 
deviation from its habitual way of social organization. Similarly, no ideal institutional design of a 
democratic constitution would likely produce an immediate effect on a non-civic ground.  
A similar suggestion is made by Putnam: “The president of Basilicata cannot move his government to 
Emilia, and the prime-minister of Azerbaijan cannot move his country to the Baltic.”72 Despite the 
commonplace simplicity behind such references, these imaginary experiments help us to see the 
critical differences between nations with and without a basic civic background on their way to 
democratic consolidation. Indeed, the overall impact of the civic background and social and cultural 
legacies is hard to underestimate.  
The basic features of the community strongly predetermine the way in which it reacts to major 
challenges of the transitional time, whether this is an imperative for fair elections, political 
participation, internal mechanisms of accountability, etc. Putnam’s comparison of Italy’s more civic 
north and less civic south offers a brilliant analogy with the post-communist world: through time, we 
can now follow the logic of the assorted reactions of particular countries and groups of countries to 
the largely identical political challenges of transformation. While the countries in Central Europe and 
the Baltic states have managed since the collapse of communism to demonstrate considerable 
achievements in almost all areas of political transformation, the majority of post-Soviet countries still 
“chronically” suffers from typical ills, such as the failure to hold fair and equal elections, corruption, 
weak judiciaries and a strong concentration of power with survived useless bureaucracy all over the 
public apparatus. It is no surprise, in this light, that the study of civic capital in the context of 
economic and democratic transition has been paid plenty of attention, supported and stimulated in 
part by surveys sponsored by the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
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Development.73 This larger tendency of relying on the analysis of civic traditions and virtues is 
noticed in the most recent studies of post-communist countries where the account of the cultural 
capital is considered for “generating insights into the prospects for democratic development and 
institutional change.”74  
But would this exposed tribute to the cultural factors not be a very strange preface to a study of the 
role of institutional design such as this work? Being sincerely convinced of the overwhelming impact 
of the social and cultural factors, I should still take a further step to keep away from accounts to 
cultural path-dependence of a deterministic sort. Indeed, cultural determinism, like any other form of 
determinism, is not my intention at all. Attributing a critical role to civic virtues and therefore ranking 
the democratic responsiveness of the social and cultural capital as the prime determinant in post-
Soviet societies, I am very far from “granting” any static quality to this phenomenon. Moreover, I 
appreciate that the capacity of the formal institutions to change the culture represents the principal 
opportunity for the aspiring democracies. It is largely relevant to the cultural context in general what 
Larry Diamond assigns to its very crucial component, the political culture: “The cognitive, attitudinal, 
and evolutional dimensions of political culture are fairly “plastic” and can change quite dramatically 
in response to regime performance, historical experience, and political socialization.”75 Douglas 
North mentions that steady institutional developments create path dependencies which are becoming 
self-reinforcing.76 Putnam defines his second major lesson from the Italian experiment in this way: 
“changing formal institutions can change political practice.”77  
I borrow from Elster et al78 a conceptual framework where the mutual linkages between the 
determinants play a decisive role in the process of democratic development. This framework offers a 
major contribution to the inquiry through its synthetic approach to the interplay between the variables 
and by persuasive argumentation and support for this account. It implies a harmonic and rational 
evaluation of each of legacies, institutions, and decisions in close interaction rather than separately. 
The excellent reference to backward and forward linkages explains the main logic of such 
interactions. Forward linkages spell out the impact of structural elements (e.g., culture and traditions) 
on institutions, and furthermore on decisions and policies. Backward linkages, in contrast, bring to 
motion the reverse dynamic from decisions and policies to institutions, and finally to structures. This 
framework enables identification of the principal interaction and interrelation between the elements 
involved that becomes crucial for a conceptual and realistic vision of the processes and is so far 
                                                 
73 Among these are the 1990 and1995 World Values Surveys (WWS), New Democracy Barometer (NDB), and the 
EBRD’s Business Environment Survey (BEEPS) which attempted at measurement and conceptualization of a range 
of civic phenomena such as societies’ moral attitudes, trust, participation, etc.  
74 John Dryzek and Leslie Holmes, Post-communist Democratization: Political Discourses across Thirteen 
Countries, Cambridge University Press (2002).  
75 Larry Diamond, “Political Culture and Democracy” in Political Culture and Developing Countries, supra note 48, 
at 9.  
76 Douglas North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, supra note 16, 93-94. 
77 Putnam, supra note 47, at 184. 
78 Elster et al, supra note 55.  
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crucial for the more narrow inquiry of this analytical undertaking: it is the force of backward and 
forward linkages that gives the utmost value to institutional arrangements by virtue of their capacity 
to “relativize the force of legacies” and “reverse the temporal structure of causality” which are 
possible (but not necessary) outcomes of institutional innovations.79 The considerations behind this 
framework are more than far-reaching. Among other virtues, it provides a conceptual guide to the 
science and practice of institutional engineering, something which I will try to explore further on.  
The framework of mutual interrelation and interaction between the determinants is critical to my 
inquiry. Without this, my account would remain a vulnerable tribute to determinism that does not fit 
my convictions. I anchor this analysis on the conceptual conclusion arrived at by Elster, Offe, and 
Preuss: “It appears that it is the formative impact of new institutions- i.e. their capacity to shape the 
frames, habits, routines, and expectations (and even memories) of citizens in convergent ways and 
thereby to render inherited fears, hostilities, and suspicions groundless- that is the critical determinant 
of consolidation.”80 This statement, more than any other, lucidly explains the crucial role of formal 
institutions from exactly the viewpoint of the structuralist approach.  
The cross-dependent link between the culture and formal institutions thus becomes my main 
argument for the importance of identifying optimal institutional choices since the chosen institutions 
will be crucial for bringing the political transitions to the stage of genuine democratic consolidation. 
The challenge for institution-makers is to identify ways how to break with the older legacies and 
create the right new institutions that would promote the type of social relationships which are friendly 
to democracy.  
 
 
C. Defining the concept of optimal institutional design for a post-Soviet country 
 
The fallacy in the core interpretation of the role of determinants and the lack of competency among 
the post-Soviet designers and policy-makers has brought two types of common misrepresentation of 
these roles and their interaction during the process of institution-building in the formerly communist 
countries of the former Soviet Union. One of them concerns the over-estimation of the role of formal 
institutions, which has resulted in praising of “ideal types”. This has paved a way for “idealistic 
design”.81 These designers have perhaps not taken enough consideration of the force of the key 
constraining factors: the importance of legacies and the interests of individual and collective players. 
                                                 
79 Id., at 296. 
80 Id.  
81 As it will be argued further on in Chapter 2, this style of designing largely characterized the constitutional-
building process of post-Soviet countries in the very beginning of the transition (1991-1993-4), resulting, among 
other things, in the emergence of strongly empowered constitutional courts.   
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Their designs have therefore portrayed ideal types. By this, the institutional designers of this 
conviction have neglected the essential principle of institutional design- the criteria of “fit”82- by 
ignoring the enormous authority of the local capital.  
The other popular misconception of the determinants and their interaction has over-emphasized the 
role of legacies and has attributed deterministic qualities to their power. The designers and policy-
makers of this “school” have declined introduction of proper institutional reforms by distrusting the 
capacity of new structures to produce change. Their main trust and faith has thus been rather in the 
evolutionary nature of the transformation.83 By this, the designers have neglected the core promise of 
transitional institutional design- the capacity of institutions to “relativize”84 the force of legacies and 
to start building new social and political capital.  
 
The core principle of transitional institutional design 
Where cultural constraints are still very strong and where they appear to be the main obstacle on the 
way to the proper functioning of the institutions of the new generation, as it is the case in the post-
Soviet Eurasia, institutional engineering should first of all consider the formation and promotion of 
institutions which can best break with the destructive legacies and facilitate the development of new 
patterns within societies in a longer term strategic perspective. I consider this the first and primary 
rule that an institutional designer should bear in mind. This suggestion spells out the basic axiom of 
the new-institutionalist wisdom in social science that political institutions not only reflect the 
environmental context but also create them.85   
The classics of institutional theory by March and Olsen also provide in part that political institutions’ 
major activity is “educating individuals into knowledgeable citizens.”86 This is an enormously 
important guide for institutional designing that aims at the production of intrinsic support for the 
democratic values. This role of institutions represents their fundamental responsibility in the regime 
change, in contrast to the “mechanical” impact of institutions on the level of political hardware. The 
virtue of institutions is in the ability to shape the “plastic” properties of the political culture through a 
long and routine process when institutions prove to get the support of the political constituency by 
providing it with the necessary legitimacy for consolidation. Respectively, the virtue of the 
institutional design is in giving the stage to the institutional programs that will guide the long routine 
of cultural transformation in the designated direction. The kind of software-oriented strategy, given 
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that it is receivable by the local context and proves to be efficient by its hardware, will enable a 
quality change in the learning of democratic institutions and values.    
In relation to the political organization of government- and this may sound very familiar- such logic 
is most likely to result in the preference of the parliamentary form of the government over the 
presidential simply because the former in a long-time perspective is more supportive to breaking with 
the embedded mentality of praising a strong authoritarian leadership and will help the creation of a 
party-based pluralist political culture which is essential to the consolidation of democratic 
institutions. This particular argument for preferring the parliamentary form over the presidential, 
elaborated by Juan Linz in his famous “anti-presidential campaign”,87 exactly stands for the kind of 
sustainable cultural change by the institutional performance that is advocated in this work. This runs 
in contrast with some other explanations of Linz which instead speak about the functional “perils” of 
the presidential government (such as the danger of the tension between the two elected bodies- the 
president and the legislature).88 The implied suggestion that the authoritarian tendencies are more 
likely to be preserved by strong presidential settings is confirmed by the earliest evidence from the 
post-Soviet political performance. One observer of the relationship between presidential government 
and democratic consolidation, for example, finds that the deficit of political freedoms and human 
rights in the post-communist countries in the period between 1993 and 1998 is associated with the 
existence of presidential power.89  
The basic implications of such “software-oriented” strategies for the construction of the constitutional 
review courts shall lead to a consideration of the typical ills of the political culture that the institution 
of judicial review could have cured. The particular configuration of the institutional settings of the 
constitutional review can have an impact on the patterns of political performance, which eventually 
flow from the legacies of the past institutional traditions. In the dimension of constitutional separation 
and balancing of powers, the configuration of judicial review can in one or another way affect the 
distribution of the political power and the tendencies towards concentration of the power in the hands 
of traditionally favored executives. Although not entirely conditioned by only the institutional design, 
the distribution and the balancing of powers is to a large extent dependent also on the power of the 
courts to check on the political branches. For example, the capacity of constitutional courts in this 
respect can be activated or deactivated, empowered or disempowered by such design alternatives as 
granting of the mandate to review disputes on the constitutional competencies of state bodies, 
electoral controversies, etc. Hence, in general, it can have a considerable effect on the status of 
constitutionalism in the concerned country.  
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Then, in the dimension of the rule of law, the institutional design of the judicial review can at some, 
often large extent predetermine the institutional capacity for building a rule of law-based political 
culture. In particular, the design of the institutions of judicial review can have this impact through its 
different dispositions towards strengthening or weakening the basic agencies concerned with the rule 
of law, first of all the general judiciary.90 As this work will argue, such an important aspect for the 
institutional capacity for rule of law building as the consolidation of the judiciary may be primarily 
affected by the choice of the model of judicial review. Furthermore, the choice of this or that 
institutional setting of the constitutional review court can have an impact on the development of 
constitutional political culture. The latter is largely predetermined by the institutional competency to 
deal with constitutional human rights cases at constitutional courts.  
In sum, the competency of constitutional review courts with respect to these opportunities for 
democratic contributions seems greatly conditioned by the particular design of judicial review and its 
association with such design options as the choice of the concentrated or diffuse systems, the political 
empowerment of constitutional courts, the scope of standing and access, and so on. These 
considerations and the deliberations on the variety of institutional settings of judicial review will 
proceed throughout the course of this work. Meanwhile, the issues of the political empowerment and 
the separation of the constitutional court will be the key subjects of the specific discussions in the 
subsequent chapters of this work.  
   
The hazards of idealistic design  
Having outlined the key features of the “core principle of transitional institutional design”, a warning 
about the danger of proposing “idealistic designs”- institutional interventions which derive the main 
inspiration from the respective ideal types- should be made. If only guided by the sole mission of 
introducing arrangements which correspond to the ideal forms, the institutional designer may arrive at 
proposing apparently perfect transplants with a perfect “record” of functional excellence elsewhere 
without a due regard of the range of factors which will resist the expected ideal performance on the 
new soil. In fact, the effect of institutions on culture, as well as on actors does not evolve in only one 
direction. The optimally worked-out design should consider the preexisting social and cultural 
capital, and only in this way it can expressly constitute a perfect design strategy as “the most 
promising starting point of a bottom-up process of institution founding.”91 The problem for a designer 
is in the potential controversy between the two essential standards which are advocated: the need for 
coming up with institutional models which are friendly to the democratic consolidation and the need 
to consider the constraints imposed by the existing capital in place. This potential hostility is, in fact, 
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the biggest challenge for the transition while the reconciliation with such hostility is the biggest 
challenge for the institutional designer. The virtue of an optimal design of institutions consequently is 
in finding the most workable compromise between the two important standards, and that is to say a 
compromise between ideal forms, represented by the very core ideal of the institution and its pure 
value system, and a number of considerations of local knowledge and culture which may constrain 
the emergence of ideal types.      
The evidence of idealistic designing is ample in the short history of post-Soviet regime 
transformation. By itself, this style of designing involves a widespread reliance on imitating, 
importing and transplanting available models.92 In a sense, the practice of transplanting by itself is not 
a ground for criticism since institutional borrowing and replication, given they have been worked out 
to fit in the local environments, provide for considerably better chances of producing optimal 
institutional design than the “invention” of new arrangements, which contains more dangers than 
opportunities. The troubles of replication and copying stem from rather different patterns which often 
accompany institutional transplanting and which definitely characterized institutional design in so 
many cases in post-Soviet countries.  
The first of such problems relates to the very choice of the transplant and the particular combination 
of institutional settings which are selected. The introduction of jury trials in several post-Soviet 
countries may serve as an appropriate illustration. This is not even because of the frequently 
discussed issues with the so to say common-law properties of the juries and the talks about fairly 
unclear prospects of juries in civil law traditions.93 This is rather because of the absolute reliance of 
the institution of jury trials on civic traditions, based on the social sense of public trust, fairness, 
impartiality and responsibility in the society, as Putnam describes the civic virtues.94 Whilst probably 
largely appropriate to especially the American society with its long-standing reputation of civicness,95 
this institution’s prospects seem more than vague in a country with very weak civic traditions, with a 
prevalence of informal networks, with a high level of distrust and with rampant corruption.96  
The defenders of juries in Russia may counter-argue that that the introduction of juries in post-Soviet 
Russia has been intended exactly at promotion of civic participation and civic virtues- a kind of 
rationale which relies on the strategic impact of the new institutions on collective attitudes- 
apparently a perfect consideration of the “core principle of institutional design” in the meaning of this 
theory. To what extent, though, this strategy has been sensitive to the local circumstances and how 
good a compromise it has been between the “core principle” and the other principles of institutional 
design? A number of recent court cases involving charges against xenophobia and crimes committed 
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on the ground of national hatred may lead us to an answer. In a series of such cases, the defendants 
were either acquitted or were charged with minor offences in opposition to the judges’ positions and 
thanks to the juries’ verdicts.97 A number of trials, where Russian nationalists were charged with 
racially motivated crimes, have resulted in acquittals by juries composed of ethnic Russians whereas 
similarly composed juries have consistently convicted Muslim defendants charged with the crimes of 
terrorism during the Chechen war.98    
Given the two propositions (1) about the highly civic context required for juries’ appropriate 
functioning and (2) about the quite low civic credentials of the post-Soviet societies, both of which 
seem to me pretty obvious, the prospects of juries’ success on the ex-Soviet ground do not show any 
strategic promise whatsoever in quite a long-time perspective unless one can “reeducate people so as 
to make them fit for their roles in the new institutions.”99 But the last possibility apparently can hardly 
be achieved in any close proximity insofar such deeply rooted social patterns are concerned. The 
conclusions about the failures of the jury in Russia may be similarly true about other post-Soviet 
republics which “experiment” with juries, such as Georgia. In Georgia, in addition to the Russian-
type standard weaknesses of civic traditions, the local society is better known for its even closer 
networks between relatives, neighbors and similar informal groups. The small number of the 
population in this country makes the likelihood of avoiding the impact of these networks almost 
impossible. In all this light, the experiment with juries seems perfectly to fall under the paradigm of 
“idealistic design” due to its remarkably underlined mismatch with the social background in place.  
By exactly the same token, other highly “Western” transplants, such as plea bargaining and 
alternative criminal sanctions might have good prospects due to their “proximity” to the local social 
capital and the Soviet legacies. For one, the institution of plea bargaining,100 which permits 
bargaining between criminal offenders and prosecutors, may be thought as having a perfect 
supporting capital in place in the post-Soviet societies where the informal bargaining between 
criminal offenders and law enforcement, prosecutorial and judicial officials has long been a common 
practice.101 Thus, the informal institution of plea bargaining, we may say, has long been the local 
tradition and should hardly encounter the problem of receptiveness while its formalization on the 
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highly sophisticated grounds of the Western model may be well a positive institutional improvement. 
Similarly, the introduction of some sound economic criminal penalties such as the day fines102 and an 
increased reliance on fines as major criminal sanctions might be a rational way of legitimate 
reproduction of the informal practices of paying bribes against criminal offenses which is the 
common practice in almost all post-Soviet countries.103 In sharp contrast with the experimentation 
with juries, these reforms would rather constitute “institutional design excellence” in the meaning of 
this work, as here the transplanted institutions would be perfectly supported by the local culture on 
one hand, and the new institutions would strongly “enforce” civic patterns on the other.  
From among the inquiries about the basic choice of the transplant concerning the design of 
constitutional review, the alternative between the two classical models- the concentrated form with a 
separated tribunal (the Kelsenian model) and the diffuse (American) model with the function of 
constitutional review delivered among the entire judiciary- is the most popular and probably the most 
important one. The choice of one or the other model and the particular dispositions of institutional 
settings related to the concentration of the function of judicial review or its alternatives has been one 
of the major discussions in the academic literature on constitutional review in post-communist 
countries.104 Strictly in line with the basic propositions of this particular section and the larger 
premises of this chapter, my position stands for the considerably “ideal-type” properties of both the 
Kelsenian and the American models, if the designer transplanted the “classical” models of either one 
or the other into the constitutional framework of our new democracies. Pretty much in the same way, 
this work stresses the idealistic form of the political empowerment105 of constitutional courts in the 
countries of this study due to the drastic mismatch between the very ideals of politically-responsive 
independent courts and the irresistible tendency to concentration of executive power in virtually all 
these countries- something that is soon to be discussed in the succeeding paragraphs and then to be 
elaborated at length in the following chapters.  
The other problem associated with copying and replicating institutions is rather in the mode of 
transplanting or the “technique” of institutional design. It is not enough only to pick up a capable 
institutional idea or a principle and have it function in a new environment, even when the institution 
shows a promise of being “accepted” by the local constituency. The institutional design should aim at 
a comprehensive intervention for making the transplantation a good fit by providing for the necessary 
sub-mechanisms to work out the core mechanism of the transplant. The failure to properly introduce 
and properly enforce the new institution is often of greater concern than the choice of a wrong 
institution. As the research on transplants of legal institutions from either the common or the civil law 
                                                 
102 See, for example, “Structured Fines: Day Fines as Fair and Collectable Punishment in American Courts”, 
published by the Vera Institute of Justice (January 1995), available online at www.vera.org. 
103 More insights on this can be offered by Alena Ledeneva, Russia’s Economy of Favors: Blat, Networking and 
Informal Exchange, Cambridge University Press (1998). 
104 Schwartz, supra note 5, p. 22; Sadurski, supra note 2, p. 1; Steinberger, supra note 20. See more in Chapter 5.  
105 For more on “political empowerment”, see Chapter 3.  
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families shows, for example, the “way the law was initially transplanted and received” is more 
important than the supply of law from any of the mentioned legal traditions.106    
The implementation of fundamental neo-liberal economic reforms in Russia is a perfect example of 
this paradigm. That reform, not being supported by necessary co-reforms of the bureaucracy, the 
judiciary, law enforcement and other arrangements required to maintain the rule of law, has resulted 
in an irreversible conversion of the intended capitalist economy into a concentrated and highly 
criminalized system that is “anything but a market order”.107 Idealistic institutional interventions of 
this kind have produced many other recognizable examples, such as the transplanting of western 
corporate governance models without a proper allocation of “lawmaking and law enforcement 
functions,”108 or- more related to the subject of this work- the introduction of separate constitutional 
tribunals without a due care of the supporting co-reforms that would clearly define the provinces of 
the constitutional and general judiciaries109 and the reforms providing working linkages between the 
two separated segments of the judiciary110.  
Except the disturbing need for institutional re-engineering and for reeducating the society, which 
Claus Offe mentions as the painful consequences of “imitating-importing-transplanting” of the alien 
institutions which are not fairly supported by the local capital,111 the described style of naïve 
institutional designing may be also suspected of another “evil”. That mode of institutional 
engineering may cause an abrupt counter-reaction on the part of the legacies and the political agents 
with their mentalities embedded in the cultures carrying the heavy influences of those legacies. Such 
reactions can take place in reply to both “macro-institutional” reforms, which involve a series of 
institutional interventions within the larger reform of the economic and political systems, and “micro-
institutional” reforms which concern a particular single political institution.  
Currently the extremely low credentials of the western-type liberal market economy and the 
democratic political system in modern Russia is perhaps a good example of a “macro-institutional” 
counter-reaction against the overall failure of the comprehensive reform agenda of the early and mid 
90-ies, which had factually resulted in an extremely concentrated proportion of wealth distribution, a 
completely criminalized economic system and a public order of a quasi-anarchic type. These reforms, 
distinguished especially by abrupt denunciation of existing formal institutions and an instantaneous 
shift to institutional arrangements of the new regime type in both the economic (quick privatization, 
                                                 
106 Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor, and Jean-Francois Richard, “Economic development, legality and the 
transplant effect,“ European Economic Review 47: 165-195 (2003). 
107 Laszlo Bruszt, “Heterarchies and Development Traps”, in Kontingenz und Krise: Institutionenpolitik in 
kapitalistischen und postsozialistichen Gesellschaften, edited by Karl Hinrichs, Herbert Kitschelt, and Helmut 
Wiesenthal, Campus 2000). 
108 Katharina Pistor and Chenggang Xu, “Fiduciary Duty in Transitional Civil Law Jurisdictions: Lessons from the 
Incomplete Law Theory”, ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 01/2002. 
109 See Chapter 5. 
110 See Chapters 4 and 5.  
111 Claus Offe, supra note 91, p. 212.  
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shock-therapy) and political (banning of the Communist party, significant decentralization of regional 
power) spheres, being implemented without much concern for the existing social capital in place and 
with no due care of supporting sub-reforms (rule of law and judicial reforms, for example), have 
produced destructive effects ranging from a series of counter-reactions against a number of individual 
“micro-institutional” reforms  to a major counter-reaction against the very regime change in general. 
As a result, a major destruction of basic elements of democratic solidarity, as Elster, Offe and 
Preuss112 frame this political consequence of reforms of the “shock therapy kind”, took place. Not 
surprisingly, the described counter-reaction to the liberal and democratic changes which were 
accompanied by ill-advised institutional reforms, has spontaneously resorted to the most inherent 
“instinct” of the existing social capital- the tendency to the concentration of political power. I 
strongly believe that this phenomenon has been among the most important causes of the overall 
failure of the democratic development and entailing concentration of the power in the number of 
countries of the post-Soviet area, in particular in Russia.    
This inherent tendency to the concentration of power, having its fairly different modes of 
manifestation, can be observed also in the cases of informal collective counter-reaction against the 
micro-institutional reform, where the tendency to the concentration of the power emerges as a reply 
to the “non-satisfactory” performance of a single (but not necessarily minor) institutional innovation. 
In my view, for example, the premature experimentation with the parliamentary system in post-Soviet 
Belarus might have an effect on producing a counter-democratic reaction in society, made use by 
Lukashenka. By the same token, the tragic fate of the first Russian constitutional court, dissolved by 
Boris Yeltzin in 1993, might well be a product of the excessively generous political empowerment of 
this institution that resulted in suicidal interferences of the Constitutional Court into unregulated 
political battles of the early 90-ies.113 In a sense, both the failure of the parliamentary system in 
Belarus, and the attack on the Constitutional Court in Russia have to be, in some extent at least, 
attributed to the inherent tendency to the concentration of power, which is, noticeably, a deep-rooted 
cultural phenomenon that has been demoanstrated all over the post-Soviet area. While it is hard to say 
that the institutional design of late 80-ies and early 90-ies could have ever predicted this tendency at 
all, the recognition of these typical “local legacies” should have been a guide for the next generation 
of institutional architecture and, obviously so, for the modern re-design of political institutions.  
 
Inviolability of the democratic standard 
The last propositions are obviously not intended to argue for the unsuitability of democratic 
institutions to post-communist or post-Soviet countries that might bring to conclusions about the 
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optimality of authoritarian or semi-authoritarian institutions.114 This is rather an argument for 
democratic but ultimately realistic institutions. For me, the inviolability of the democratic standard in 
institution-building is without substitutes; the diversity of the institutional options within this standard 
is rich enough to allow a reasonable variety of alternatives to be considered without unnecessary 
deviations from it. This richness of alternatives would obviously allow one to come up with a rational 
design of a democratic nature other than naive reproductions of ideal types. Meanwhile, it is not 
solely the wrong institutional choices that are to be blamed for the overall failure of the reform but 
rather the lack of comprehensive intervention in a range of dimensions for supporting the adopted 
institution. Democratic institutions, obviously enough, can hardly be enforced by a non-democratic 
bureaucracy and old-style procedures, routines, and policies. The supporting intervention on the level 
of sub-reforms and policies should also be essentially democratic, or the entire process is threatened 
to fail. The entire change should also essentially rely and be based on mechanisms of good 
governance and accountability which would seek to involve the public input into both the decision-
making and oversight processes: in this way only a full democracy can be attained.115       
In fact, the determinacy of local circumstances is often used as a handy argument for the justification 
of non-democratic institutions and policies. Template justifications stating that generation(s) have to 
change before democratic elections can become the common practice, or corruption is exterminated, 
or judges are independent, normally accompanying the failures to introduce proper institutional 
reforms, often lead to neglecting of the very strategic role which democratic institutions play- their 
gradual re-shaping of the existing mental capital and of the unfriendly cultural heritage of the past, 
which would itself be the most essential investment in the coming generation. If so, transformation 
and institution-designing inspired by cultural determinism,116 similar to the idealistic designing, is 
another extreme orthodoxy that substantially misinterprets the logic of institutional dynamics. This 
fallacy has in great part contributed to the legitimacy of existing non-democratic regimes, which in a 
highly significant way frustrates the process of democratic consolidation.  
The strategic way in which institutions can produce the desired change has a lot to do with 
persistence: stability and pervasiveness should be the main attributes of intention, if a consistent 
change is to be reached.117 Stability and pervasiveness of the democratic standard is quite obviously 
the unbreakable principle during the consolidation of democratic institutions, and while this chapter 
will later advocate the virtues of flexibility, revisability, and adaptability of designed institutions, the 
recognition that those features of institutional design should be persistently confined within the 
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boundaries of the democratic standard seems to be fairly without alternatives, if the prospect of 
sustainable democratic development is to be the goal.    
 
The importance of local circumstances 
As was fairly obvious from what was discussed above, this account of optimal design necessarily 
rests on the consideration of the variety of local circumstances. What do these local circumstances 
look like in the post-Soviet area and is it possible to arrive to any valid generalization of local factors 
in a fairly diverse and multi-cultural region such as the former Soviet Union?  
These special circumstances are to large extent legacies of the past which still strongly program the 
upcoming agenda in almost all the spheres of transformation. These legacies stem from both 
communist, pre-communist and already fairly enough- the post-communist experiences, and they are 
strongly conditioned by a variety of factors. The local factors have multiple sources: beyond the 
cultural properties which are common to the nations in the region, these are traits that may be 
attributed to strictly the local sources- ethnicity and confession, identity and ambitions, geopolitics 
and wars, resourcefulness and isolation. This work’s account of “local circumstances” is obviously a 
call for a due care of any factors which appear to perform as a constraint on the institutional change. 
These factors, obviously, make all and each of the respective countries and societies to be 
distinguished by a fairly unique cultural heritage and local context. 
However, what brings the post-Soviet countries together is probably the considerable sharing of the 
similar social capital which is in place due to the substantial likeness of both pre-communist and 
communist legacies. The social capital here, in spite of its inner diversity, can generally be 
characterized by the elements of a “vertical” social relationship which Putnam observes in the case of 
the Italian south and which he contrasts with the  type of social capital which is most friendly to the 
democratic governance- the civic capital.118 Being itself a product of the centuries-long experience of 
authoritarian government which might have allowed only a very little stock of social capital to 
emerge before the Bolshevik revolution and then even this shallow capital to be abused by the 
totalitarian communist rule,119 the type of social capital has with time developed a strong cultural 
environment of hierarchical political organization and individualistic provincial mentality of social 
interaction based on the “patron-client” relationship. Insofar, the kind of relationship is long of the 
                                                 
118 The under-developed status of civic capital in post-Soviet countries (in particular in Russia) has been the theme of 
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intrinsic pattern of equality which is the central feature of the civic community, while the other 
inherent features of the civic capital- active engagement in public life, norms of reciprocity and 
mutual trust- are likewise weak in these societies. Not surprisingly, the lack of these virtues at the 
local communities’ level has heavily predetermined the dispositions on the “macro” level of the 
central government: almost without exceptions, all the ex-Soviet countries under scrutiny in this work 
are distinguished by concentrated executive governments ranging from “moderately” semi-
democratic/semi-authoritarian systems to clearly patrimonial systems resembling sultanic regimes120 
with even a growing tendency towards further concentration of power in many of them.121 This is 
indicative of the “vertical” political culture distinguished by informal networks of often criminalized 
associations which dominate the elites in both the political and economic spheres,122 by widespread 
corruption in virtually all the spheres of public life- properly reminiscent of Putnam’s astute 
prediction about Palermo representing the future of Moscow123- and finally by stringent failures of the 
rule of law that expressly spell out the dominance of non-civic attitudes and “amoral familism, 
clientalism, and lawlessness” which was so typical to the Putnamian Mezziogiorno.  
The implications of political cultures based on vertical patron-client scheme (to mention only these) 
are considerable for design of the political institutions and the consideration of institutional 
interventions which need to cope with the kind of local capital based on such properties. This political 
culture is the major source of particular institutional capital with which one is to cope while designing 
the institutional change. Almost all and each of the social institutions emerged are in one way or 
another impacted by the heritage of this culture: beyond concentrated executives and corrupted public 
officials, these are non-functioning local self-government settings (lack of cooperation in the society), 
ineffective capital markets (lack of trust), and finally, what refers to the judiciary- the deficiency of 
independence and political abuse of the judicial office, the continuing practices of “telephone 
justice”, distrust of the judiciary, and so on- all products of the social capital based on the trust in the 
charisma of the political leaders, on the inherent patterns of clientalism, individualism, and legal 
nihilism.    
On this account, one should accept a fair portion of generalization behind the “regional” focus of this 
work. Fairly enough, institutional design is happening in a particular setting which is characterized by 
the mentioned patterns in general but is meanwhile fairly unique on the basis of the variety of other 
factors. But for our normative accounts and for our rather theoretical purposes, these generalizations 
may prove to be justified to the same (I should say- quite significant) extent to which the previously 
mentioned properties of political regimes are shared by these countries. It is exactly this 
conceptualization that enables a theoretical elaboration of “optimal design” based on characteristics 
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typical to a number of countries rather than a particular single local community- a design strategy 
which may be optimal for a particular country only as much as it has its sharing of the common 
heritage of a post-Soviet republic.   
 
Institutional design and dynamics of change 
The concept of the institutional design in the post-Soviet area should abstain from operating by such 
terms as “transition period” without a rational account of its own dynamics. The major terms and the 
observed patterns to which this study applies do not stay static during the time. While still strongly 
dependent on both pre-communist and communist legacies after more than 15 years of transition, the 
post-Soviet societies of 2008 are not the same as these of 1991 in any sense. To what extent, for 
example, it is justified today to preserve the institutional settings of the judiciary built on the 
considerations of strong distrust towards the Soviet-fashion courts? To what extent is it now correct, 
from the same considerations, to oppose the ordinary courts’ “political empowerment” (e.g., the 
courts’ mandate to review the results of elections, the processes of political impeachments, etc.)?124 
Obviously enough, the modern judiciaries, whether or not still carrying the influences of communist 
legacies, whether or not still corrupt, are not the same as 20 years ago, and this is an important factor 
for designers of judicial institutions to take into consideration. Hence, the optimal design of today 
may not be the same as that of yesterday, while the design for tomorrow may need to be absolutely 
different from that of today.  
This is obviously not to advocate a constitutional construction of considerable flexibility that would 
undermine one of the key values vested in constitutions- their stability. It is rather a tribute to the 
specific circumstances of a particular period, which need to be taken into consideration at whatever 
time a chance for institutional reconstruction is given. Thus, the challenge of the institutional design 
is in bringing together and finding a working compromise between the two often conflicting virtues: 
the “durability” of institutions and their capacity to adapt to changing circumstances.125  
Robert Goodin advocates “revisability” as an important principle of institutional design, which should 
be a response not only to the changing societies, but the human fallibility.126 This theory may appear 
to be very responsive to the legacies of institutional design in the ex-Soviet area, where the upshots of 
idealistic designing still remain uncured. Apparently, not so detrimental is the choice of a bad 
institution, as either its continuing functioning on the same weakly-founded grounds, or its equally 
abrupt substitution by a completely new and alien colleague in a time when the previous “bad” 
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institution had nevertheless been to some extent “received”. Institutions, good or bad, create their 
capital in one or another way. And to a large extent where not the very choice of institutions 
themselves, but the mode of their introduction is the main source of design mistakes, the “robustness” 
of the institutional design- institutions’ capability of “adapting to new situations”- should be praised 




Despite the existence of different views on the current status of the post-Soviet societies on their way 
to democracy, the respective institutional building is still in process. More over, the institutional 
construction has in a sense been reborn in many of them: while the institutional choices in the early 
transitional periods have largely been made spontaneously, often by copying existing classical models 
and frequently being bound by granted formulas due to a range of factors, such as lack of experience, 
expertise, empiric evidence and the demand of urgent incorporation of new institutions, recent events 
can bear witness to a need for more sophisticated approaches to designing institutions which can now 
be grounded on the abundance of existing local and comparative material and especially the ways the 
adopted institutions recommended themselves through the past time. In this view, the institutional 
building is still in process, and it is especially in our days that the science of institutional design 
should feed the policy-making minds with a renewed enthusiasm. To paraphrase the words of one of 
the most notable new institutionalists, currently the institutional choice and design are again high on 
the political agenda of developing democracies.128  
The primary aim of this chapter was to show that institutional choices are right or wrong depending 
strongly on the peculiarities of the particular local context in which they are intended to function. The 
role of institutions in furthering democratic consolidation varies in its task, form, and contents 
depending on the social and cultural context in the particular country. Although varying in its 
magnitude from one country to another, the strongest impact of different cultural legacies pre-dispose 
the local circumstances which significantly constrain the paths for democratic consolidation in post-
Soviet countries. In this situation, the primary task of institutions is to “relativize” the force of frames, 
habits and routines of legacies and to promote and develop civic virtues and political culture 
                                                 
127 In Goodin’s interpretation, “robustness” is a term combining both desired qualities- durability and revisability. 
Robust institutions, according to this account, are those which are capable of adapting to new situations, but only in 
such ways that are appropriate to the new properties of the fundamental change, while making only surface 
accommodation to the new environment where there has not been a fundamental change: Goodin, supra note 25, pp. 
40-41.   
128 James Olsen, “Institutional Design in Democratic Contexts”, The Journal of Political Philosophy 5, 203-229 
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favorable to democratic governance. These efforts, though, should be cautious enough so as not to 
result in the advocating of ideal types and should be grounded in local demands and circumstances.  
This chapter identified several principles of optimal design which should guide the responsible minds 
of the new generation of institutional (re)design in the struggling democracies of post-Soviet Eurasia. 
These principles are called for marking the new generation of institutional design which should make 
a clear step away from the institutional architecture of the past which was romantically aiming at 
production of ideal forms. It was argued that “optimal” rather than “ideal(istic)” design should be 1. 
intended at the strategic mission of development of civic capital and learning of the institutions of the 
constitutional democracy;  2. culture-sensitive; 3. timely; 4; democratic in form and in function. In 
combination with other necessary qualities, one should opt for institutional arrangements in any 
settings, i.e., their legitimacy and effectiveness, these features comprise the composite image of an 
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Between dictatorship and democracy129 
The assessment of democratic achievements in the post-Soviet area cannot be subject to a 
uniform and homogeneous overview. Neither have the achievements and failures on the way to 
democratic development been marked by any identical trajectories, nor have the countries 
involved in this research shown any close performance in their democratic indicators. Not only 
have the twelve post-Soviet countries taken a completely different path from their fellow East 
European post-communist countries (which mostly evolved into consolidated democracies 
without any considerable nostalgia and recession), but both the eventual political regimes to 
which our twelve countries arrived and the paths towards these final outcomes marked 
significant variations.  
The political regimes in the post-Soviet area range from “tenuous democracies” to “outright 
tyrannies”. 130 The regular annual survey for 2007, conducted by Freedom House131 and based 
on a composite evaluation of political rights and civil liberties, indicates still very modest 
achievements by the CIS countries in democratization. Among the countries in this list, only 
Ukraine scores as a free country (in the 2005 survey, Ukraine was still among the partly free 
countries). Four countries are partly free: Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova.  The 
rest are not free countries: Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
and Uzbekistan. In the multi-layered ranking of nations in transit, where the ratings are based 
on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level and 7 the lowest level of 
democratization, the CIS countries score on such criteria as electoral processes, civil society 
and independent media correspondingly in the following way: Armenia: 5.75, 3.50, 5.14; 
Azerbaijan: 6.50, 5.00, 5.93; Belarus: 7.00, 6.75, 6.71; Georgia: 4.75, 3.50, 4.86; Kazakhstan: 
6.50, 5.75, 6.39; Kyrgyzstan: 5.75, 4.50, 5,64; Moldova: 3.75, 4.00, 4.96; Russia: 6.25, 5.00, 
5.75; Tajikistan: 6.25, 5.0, 5.93; Turkmenistan: 7.00, 7.00, 6.96; Ukraine: 3.25, 2.75, 4.21; 
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Uzbekistan: 6.75, 7.00, 6.82. For comparison, by the same criteria Bulgaria scores 1.75, 2.75, 
and 3.25, Macedonia does 3.25, 3.25, 4.25, and Croatia 3.25, 2.75, 3.75. The scores of Estonia 
are 1.50, 2.00, 1.50, Lithuania: 1.75, 1.50, 1.75, Poland: 1, 75, 1.25, 1.75, Czech Republic: 
2.00, 1.50, 2.00. 
The divide between the political regimes across the region remains significant as of today. 
According to Larry Diamond, among the post-Soviet countries Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova 
are the most democratic countries, with Armenia and Kyrgyzstan “having some significant 
elements of civic space and electoral competition, but within a context that lacks the wider 
political freedom and electoral fairness of democracy.”132 The other countries are put by 
Diamond in varying levels of authoritarianism, with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan being on the 
extreme edge of this classification.133    
The paths to the existing regimes marked similarly inconsistent, though most probably fairly 
explainable trajectories. After the strong and widespread democratic euphoria that took place in 
the wake of and immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the democratic 
development lived several ups and downs in the majority of these countries, though some of 
them, particularly the Central Asian republics, signalized their authoritarian tendencies quite 
soon. Russia’s democratic rise in the 1990-ies, itself fairly unstable during the presidency of 
Boris Yeltsin, changed dramatically under Vladimir Putin. Since, the developments brought to 
the emergence of the contemporary regime which is characterized as a product of failed 
democratization134 where the trajectory of political development appears rather in the 
antidemocratic direction.135 The erosion of the initial pro-democratic change has been patently 
noticeably in 1990-ies also in Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine,136 and by the end of 
the 90-ies neither of these countries might be called a democracy. However, while Belarus kept 
further moving towards a concentrated authoritarian rule, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan 
pulled towards freer regimes between 2003 and 2005. The strong democratic movements in 
these three countries were pushed by what is commonly called “electoral” or “colored 
revolutions”137 where the traditionally flawed elections were protested by the public and where 
these protests had grown up massively to throw the incumbents away from their offices. The 
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fluctuations of democratic ups and downs were relatively less dramatic in Armenia and 
Moldova. However, while Moldova’s path was relatively unwavering, Armenia’s recession in 
1995-96 with further consolidation of the presidential power, as well as the recent political 
turmoil (2008), has been fairly visible. 
At the other end of the spectrum, the four Central Asian countries have signaled their complete 
ignorance of democratic reforms from almost the outset.138 The regimes in this region showed 
stable adherence to “sultanistic”139 patterns. By 2005, in all of Central Asian countries, 
including Kyrgyzstan, the same leaders who ruled the republics in the last years of the Soviet 
Union, remained in power. Quite early, since mid-90-ies and until 2005, Turkmenistan emerged 
as an extreme sample of a dictatorial tyranny.140 Uzbekistan’s tendency towards a strongly 
concentrated autocracy was apparently not so intelligible at first, but became obvious after 
2005, when President Karimov’s Government expressly turned away from its formal 
observation of democratic principles by firing on and killing hundreds of opposition 
protesters.141 So far, in the region of the Central Asia only Kyrgyzstan showed a strong 
deviation from “sultanism” in 2005, while the stability of the authoritarian rule headed by the 
former communist leaders142 in the other countries of the region leaves little doubts.  
The regime in Azerbaijan is reportedly tending to further authoritarian concentration with some 
elements of the political developments resembling rather the Central Asian sultanistic orders.143 
Still, it is hard to clearly classify Azerbaijan with either Central Asian or European 
“counterparts”,144 while the paths of political developments can eventually bring this country to 
either of the “camps”.  
This described variation in democratic performance most likely promises to preserve if not to 
widen its gap. Though unstable and not at all consolidated, some “new” post-Soviet 
democracies promise to deepen the democratic reforms. Meanwhile, the other group of 
countries, “especially Belarus and Central Asia, and most likely Russia itself”, are said to have 
more than vague prospects for substantial democratization in the foreseeable future.145  
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The common patterns of governance  
 
As mentioned in the introduction to the thesis, it is not the likeness of the democratic indicators 
and the political regimes of the CIS member-countries that allows for the generalization in this 
work. On the contrary, we have just seen that these indicators, as well as the emerged political 
regimes are not homogeneous at all. It is rather the homogeneity of the patterns, methods and 
styles of governance that enables a certain generalization in the discussion of the post-Soviet 
countries. Despite the divergence in the democratic credentials of the countries under research, 
one can attempt a conceptualization of common patterns of both democratic deviations, and 
democratic achievements. The commonality of the political characteristics in the formerly 
Soviet countries, despite the variations in regime types, is often emphasized in the academic 
literature. One study, for example, described the political regimes in Belarus, Russia, and 
Ukraine, three countries with quite differing democratic credentials, in the following way:  
All three countries, albeit to different extents, are characterized by electoral fraud, intimidation 
of the media, coercion, weak constitutional states and party systems, as well as weak horizontal 
control systems.146 
Concentration of power is probably the most emblematic pattern of governance in virtually all 
the countries of this research. Despite the unanimous adoption of constitutional designs of 
separation and balance of powers, this tendency has proved irreversible in virtually all countries 
of the region. Whether explained by path-dependent historical dispositions towards having a 
strong leader, or blamed on other causes, the institution of presidency has evolved to become 
the key and almost everywhere the exclusive address of the power, starkly following the 
blueprint of “strong individualized leadership” which enjoys a power exceeding in scope the 
one granted by the constitutional text.147 This is especially illustrative in light of the fact that 
among the twelve countries which are discussed in this work only two are formally presidential 
(Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan),148 while all others have different forms of semi-presidential 
constitutions.149 However, “super-presidents” emerged throughout the region despite the exact 
provisions of the respective constitutions. It is remarkable, furthermore, that the “strong 
individualized leadership” by and large preserves its positions and its basic modus vivendi even 
in those countries which relatively recently underwent fundamental political changes: Georgia, 
Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.  
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In Georgia, constitutional reforms to strengthen the presidential power were introduced 
immediately after the elections following the “Revolution of Roses”. The constitutional 
amendments resulted in the dominance of the President over the Parliament and in 
transformation of a once significantly strong Parliament to a “body loyal not only to the 
president but also to his government.”150 Other reforms followed to even further strengthen the 
presidency.151 Eventually, the President’s power increased so much that this led to the 
following doubts about the democratic credentials of the system: “Sahakashvili’s power is 
concentrated in his personal office to a degree that could well impede or reverse the country’s 
democratic development.”152 It is noteworthy that the concentration of the presidential power 
greatly followed the same patterns as employed by the other post-Soviet leaders; in essence, the 
post-revolution Georgia’s path in governance did not differ from the post-Soviet proto-type in 
substance. For example, the creation of the “party of power”, eventually bringing Georgia to 
become a “one-party democracy,”153 starkly followed the same root as was previously noticed 
throughout the region (see further the discussion in this chapter).  
In other “colored revolutions”, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan were apparently less “successful” in 
consolidating the sole executive power. In Ukraine, the quasi-permanent struggle between the 
two opposing political poles has resulted in a constantly tense relationship between the 
institutions of the President on one side and the Parliament and its majority-backed 
Government on the other. But the emergence of a “double-executive” system, with both the 
President and the Government having substantial powers, did not eliminate the informal 
concentration and abuse of power in each, but rather divided the scope of each and highlighted 
them, as neither the executive-president, nor the executive-government were able to resist the 
“temptation” to extend their power beyond the prescribed limits.154 Finally, in Kyrgyzstan, the 
concentration of presidential power started becoming strong since the end of 2007, by which 
time the fragmented leadership in the interim failed to adequately strengthen its rule. 
In view of these facts, concentration of power as a general phenomenon, as it may take 
different forms and lead to rather different political regimes, can be said to be the inherent and 
strongly rooted tendency in the entire region. This last assumption shall well be taken as a local 
condition rather than shall be contested when elaborating policy recommendations for 
democratization strategies and institutional (re)design. Instead, it makes sense to investigate 
and explore the composition, the internal structure and the mode of operation of this tendency 
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for predicting the further dynamics of its co-existence with the complex political processes in 
the post-Soviet region, as well as for elaborating sustainable strategies as to how to live and to 
cope with it.  
By its inner structure and the nature, the concentration of power is roughly characterized by a 
monopolization of the executive privileges by an individual holder of the chief executive office 
who further delivers the patronage to his close network of clients. In the next chapters and in 
different contexts this work will discuss the mechanisms of the concentration-maintenance-
reproduction of the political power inherent to the patrimonial political systems that emerged in 
formerly Soviet states. For the purposes of this chapter, we only need to mention the main 
instrumentality employed by the power-holding executives because these methods self-speak of 
the quality of democracy and constitutionalism and represent the particular patterns of 
governance discussed in this part. These are electoral fraud and supporting pre and post-
electoral abuse, mobilization of resources by direct regulation of big businesses, control of 
media and “creation of structures that can secure active support for the regime in the time of 
crisis”,155 preservation of formal democratic elections as the key legitimizing instrument for the 
power- holder, informal domination over and regulation of the other branches of the 
government from the central executive office, intimidation and persecution of oppositional 
political movements, free media and the institutions of civil society, and so on.  
Electoral fraud is probably the key institution in the maintenance of the concentrated system as 
the latter does not attempt to break with the formal democratic constitution but prefers to fine-
tune its meaning and procedures for the consumption of its elites. Elections are thus held but 
they are not intended at transfer of power but at its legitimization.156 The political technologies 
of electoral fraud include both sophisticated tools for the specific “material” circumvention on 
the day of elections at the sites of elections (including bulletin stuffing, rip-off vote counting, 
vote-bribing, etc),157 and supporting pre-electoral and post-electoral manipulations called to 
validation of desired electoral results. This last group of abusive technologies includes 
comprehensive intervention into the activities of state bodies and the civil organizations for the 
purposes of disguising the fraud: intimidation or bribing of election monitors, the media, and 
the judiciary, media campaign of clearing the “winner”, etc. The abuse of power is a principal 
resource for these technologies: the incumbent elite has the entire monolith power organism, 
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including both national and local authorities and law enforcement machinery, to serve its new 
electoral success by all legal and illegal means.  
The last point brings to the necessity of highlighting another key element in the entire structure 
of power concentration-maintenance-reproduction: mobilization of all resources in the nation to 
serve the interests of the incumbent ruling elite or “nationalization of elite” as this tendency is 
depicted in a paper. 158 Such recruitment to “power elite” takes place in various dimensions. The 
mobilization of the economic resources matches the label of “nationalization” in probably the 
most illustrative way, though the commas by which the term nationalization is accompanied 
clearly indicate that we do not speak about state ownership of the formerly privatized 
companies but about state, or to be more precise, political control of the businesses. Clearly 
enough, this enterprise is intended at obtaining control of the financial resources and directing 
them for the implementation of the objectives of the ruling elite.159 The project of mobilization, 
thus, does not tolerate the existence of business elites with alternative political interests and 
views. It rather uses or, more accurately, misuses the state power in order to deprive the 
oppositional business elites from the source of their income. These practices have been 
widespread all over the post-Soviet region, but perhaps the most illustrative and well-known of 
all examples is the persecution by the administration of Vladimir Putin of non-allying 
billionaires Boris Berezovski, Vladmimir Gusinsky and Mikhail Khodorkovsky. These 
“persecutions” normally take the form of legal proceedings, most popular among which are the 
tax motives. The project at the end results in removal of non-cooperating businesspeople from 
the economic and political space and in control over those who chose to cooperate.  
The mobilization of the regional elite is another key “project” in insuring the support of local 
constituency by means of securing the cooperation of local leaders. On the lower level of 
communities, the success of this is insured by the abuse of administrative power and due to 
clientalistic networks dominating the society. The burden of this project is put on the shoulders 
of local state officers who manipulate (through bribing, harassing, administrative leverages 
such as cutting of state funding or firing from the jobs etc.) the community for recruiting its 
most resourceful elites. On the higher level, the mobilization of the regional elite was done in 
Russia through institutional changes to “strengthen the vertical power” resulting in elimination 
of regional elections in 2004.160  
Finally, the mobilization of the political elite usually takes place through the institutionalization 
of the previously discussed resources, as a rule by manipulations in the party system through 
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creation of loyal and fake parties. This, as a rule, results in an emergence of one dominant party 
which brings together all major stakeholders from national and regional elites- a “party of 
power” (such as Russia’s Choice under Yeltsin and Edinaya Rossia under Putin in Russia, 
Party of Regions in Kuchma’s Ukraine, Republican Party in Armenia under much of 
Kocharyan’s presidency), as well as to emergence of other, often smaller parties which are 
called to creating of an illusion of competition and fake opposition (Spravedlivaja Rossia and 
Rodina in Russia, etc.).161  
The power reproduction projects throughout the region are supported by what can be called 
“political legalism”. The formal constitutional framework and the entailing laws become 
manipulated by the incumbent elites for their self-interest in reproduction. By reference to the 
letter of law which is in any case adjusted to serve them, the incumbents succeed in outlawing 
their political rivals from the larger electoral competition (for example, by declining the 
registration of an oppositional candidate as it was the case with Mikhail Kasyanov or earlier 
with Yuriy Skuratov in Russia, or banning oppositional rallies and gatherings by reference to 
public security as it has become the practice throughout the region),162 while ignoring the gross 
violations of constitutional law by the power favorites. The reference to the constitution and the 
law, to which the incumbent politicians resort in such cases, creates an additional value to the 
enterprise of power-reproduction: an external illusion of legitimacy of their action.   
The preservation of the formal constitutional structure of democracy and formal observance of 
its rituals, in this context, is intended at the function of legitimization of the status quo. This 
reality deserves a special attention for the purposes of this work, as the inter-relationship 
between formal democratic institutions and informal practices contrary to the spirit of 
democracy will be in the core of our discussion in subsequent chapters. This reality can well be 
considered as a common pattern in virtually all countries in the region. Including even 
Turkmenistan during the tenure of its President-for-life Niyazov, all these states chose to 
preserve their democratic constitutions and their procedures rather than to eliminate them, 
while the political practices in all of them openly deviated from democratic standards in one 
way or another. A due regard and knowledge of this apparently paradoxical political 
phenomenon are necessary for explaining the seemingly contradictory institutional preferences 
(for example, related to the question why constitutional designer politicians create 
constitutional courts though they perfectly understand that these courts can later decide against 
them?) and political practices which we will observe in the course of this work. Apprehension 
of the degree of respect and cynicism towards the democratic institutions and the exact 
incentives for keeping within the formal democratic boundaries in each particular sub-region or 
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country is a key to understanding of the political processes and design strategies there. More 
light can be spread on this by consideration of the typology which prior works developed by 
explaining the general attitudes towards and motivations for the formal adherence to the 
democratic standard.  
In a famous article, political scientists Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way distinguish between the 
following types of regimes which can characterize the political establishments in the former 
Soviet area: delegative democracy which was depicted by Guillermo O’Donnel,163 competitive 
authoritarian regimes, and façade electoral regimes.164 This typology can perfectly apply to the 
countries in our region, where most of the deliberation would most likely be between the two 
last types of regimes, while the label of “delegative democracy” would be granted to a post-
Soviet country only with some serious reservations. But the point behind recalling this 
particular study is not in the exercise of assigning types for its own sake but in consideration of 
the particular conclusions about the one or the other. Thus, according to the authors of this 
research, in façade electoral regimes the democratic institutions exist (on paper only, most 
probably) but they do not bring to any real contestation, and hence these are classified as fully 
authoritarian regimes.165 In contrast, in competitive authoritarian regimes, electoral institutions 
exist, and although the elections are mostly flawed, the democratic institutions create a 
possibility for the opposition to challenge, often significantly, the incumbent political 
leadership. The line between these two types is often difficult to draw, according to Levitsky 
and Way. However, it is important, they notice, “to distinguish regimes in which democratic 
institutions offer an important channel through which the opposition may seek power from 
those regimes in which democratic rules simply serve as to legitimate an existing autocratic 
leadership.”166  
This line is very important to be drawn in this work. Wherever the democratic institutions are 
said to be preserving the chance for the contestation, we will observe patterns of behavior of 
constitutional courts which are different from the ones in “full authoritarian regimes”. This 
work will subsequently show that the performance of constitutional courts considerably 
depends on the political situation and the predictability of the outcomes of electoral processes 
in a time. Wherever the regime type allows arising of such uncertainty, we may predict some 
distinctive patterns of judicial behavior which this work finds to be often pro-democratic.167 In 
contrast, in the regimes which never allow a meaningful contestation, neither uncertainty and 
nor pro-democratic performance by constitutional courts is likely to be expected. These 
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considerations may be high on the agenda of institutional designers, as it will be shown and 
discussed throughout this work.  
The fear of genuine democratic activism and “colored revolutions-style” transformations is 
another typical pattern of the post-Soviet manner of governance which deserves attention in this 
work. Popular revolts against concentration of power in the hands of a bunch of corrupt and 
ineffective politicians, which rise in the aftermath of elections and which in a number of cases 
resulted in fall of the regimes (2003 in Georgia, 2004 in Ukraine, and 2005 in Kyrgyzstan), 
have become tormenting alarms for the quasi-authoritarian presidents which since became 
worried about the fall of their own regimes in the same scenario. These worries may well be 
understandable: the growing frustration with the concentration of power and political abuse is 
as natural and inherent, as the concentration of power itself was said to be. In this sense, the rise 
of popular oppositional movements, called to liberalization of regimes, can be viewed as a 
direct outcome of the political phenomenon which we observed in the previous paragraphs, that 
is the co-existence of formal democratic constitutions with non-democratic political practices. 
This is also the price that post-Soviet autocrat leaders pay for enjoying the fruits of preserving 
formal democracy.  
The most fascinating outcome of the colored revolutions, from the perspective of a social 
scientist, is observation of the changes in the styles of political management and the general 
patterns of governance that these processes entailed. For the purposes of this work, the study of 
these patterns is important for the understanding of the nature and motivation behind political 
processes affecting, inter alia, constitutional courts and the executives’ attitudes towards them. 
Since the alarm about “colored technologies” and the threat of regime change was first heard by 
autocratic leaders all over the region, the patterns of governance, with which we are primarily 
concerned in this part of the work, have substantially changed, resulting in a new assault on 
political freedoms which are sought the be the main carriers of the revolutionary virus. With 
these new patterns, the regimes in our countries, we could say, entered a new phase of 
departure from democratic practices, which in this time acquired shades of defensive assault 
and return to Soviet-style fear of global conspiracy.   
The preventive “technologies” designed to counteract the “colored technologies” were 
intended, first of all, to preempt all possible symptoms of popular manifestations and organized 
political defiance. In Russia and in almost all other countries “in defense”, the governments 
recruited the resources of law enforcement to persecute all attempts at manifestations of 
political freedoms. These included restrictions against political demonstrators, arrests of 
oppositional political leaders and journalists, banning of political rallies, etc. The back-up 
“measures” included even further attacks on free media intended at depriving the potential 
opponents from the opportunity to spread their ideas. Russia’s “campaign” is typical and 
54 
 
famous also for its attack on non-governmental organizations and externally-funded assistance 
programs. Although the “threat” of electoral revolutions was least likely especially in the 
Central Asian states, the anti-revolutionary mobilization did not avoid these countries too. The 
authorities in Kazakhstan launched an offensive on the few existing oppositional outlets before 
the presidential elections in 2005.168 The authorities in Tajikistan adopted new laws restricting 
the interaction between foreign diplomats and the local civil society.169 The Uzbek-style 
prevention resulted in the massacre of Andijan in the same year. In Armenia, the regime had 
long before operated restrictions on freedom of movement and assemblies to reduce the effect 
of oppositional demonstrations,170 but the most outrageous manifestation of its panic against 
electoral unrest can be observed in its violent assaults on demonstrators on March 1 2008, in 
the aftermath of presidential elections with the “candidate of power” facing a political leader 
who managed to bring to the streets a number of oppositional parties. 
The developments after the presidential elections in Armenia in 2008 could become an 
illustrative case-study for observing the patterns of anti-revolutionary governance towards 
courts in general and constitutional courts in particular. The lessons from the Ukrainian 
electoral unrest, alarming that courts may ally with political opponents if there are signs of 
uncertainty about the future winner of the elections,171 should have been learnt well by the 
politicians in Armenia. Now we can say with a certain degree of confidence that the attack on 
the opposition demonstrators in 2008 (after the presidential elections, just a few days before the 
scheduled constitutional court hearings on the appeal of the results of presidential elections) 
was largely aimed at reducing the political uncertainty in which situation the constitutional 
judges might reverse the official results of elections as announced by pro-governmental 
electoral commission. By this and other references, we come to appreciating the importance of 
knowledge on the political ingredients of electoral revolutions and prevailing patterns of 
governance for the study of constitutional courts, their behavior and institutional design.    
In this part of the work, I skip through more detailed discussion of the patterns of governance 
concerning the harassment of constitutional courts by incumbent authorities, as these will be 
discussed in subsequent sub-chapters and then the chapters of the thesis.  
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B. Constitutionalism and constitutional courts 
 
From sham to pseudo constitutionalism 
The evolution of constitutionalism in the post-Soviet area has at best marked a trajectory from 
“sham to pseudo constitutionalism.”172  
As in the Soviet times, when constitutions in the federal state, as well as in each constituent 
republic of the Soviet Union existed without any evidence of genuine constitutionalism, 
constitutions without constitutionalism are the paradigm as of today in virtually each post-
Soviet country. The evolution from a sham to a pseudo constitutionalism, though, has fashioned 
an entirely different and unique constitutional reality, which has to be scrupulously observed 
because many answers to our inquiries are contained in the complexity of its structure. Some 
elements of this structure were to a certain extent discussed previously, namely the discrepancy 
between the formal constitutional institutions and actual political practices, as well as what I 
called “political legalism” where the incumbents were observed to create the illusion of 
following the letter of the constitutions for launching practices which are inherently anti-
constitutional in nature.  
Democratic constitutions emerged in the post-Soviet area following the demise of the Soviet 
Union in 1991. Inspired by the democratic euphoria of the epoch, these constitutions embodied 
the most progressive liberal ideas of the time, reflected in both the stipulation of rights and in 
stipulation of institutions of governance. The rights’ sections of these constitutions went to 
include the entire wide array of known freedoms and rights without a due care of the states’ 
capacity to stand for these and most probably sometimes without even a proper comprehension 
of these rights beyond their declaratory meaning. The macro-political institutions, provided by 
the constitutions, came as transplants from the existing western constitutions, and in many 
cases they appeared non-demanded, irrelevant and mostly non-functional. But the emergence of 
constitutions nevertheless had a tremendous importance, albeit symbolic. It marked a new 
political era; besides that of independence, this was an era of democratization - so strongly 
believed in at the beginning of 90-ies. Constitution-making, in this context, was largely a 
transitional instrument, and the new constitutions, as in many other cases of transitions, came to 
perform as road maps to highlight the trajectory from the past and to the future.173  
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With all this in mind, the erosion of democratic euphoria in the following years provides some 
confidence to say that even in the beginning of the new era the phenomena of democracy and 
constitutionalism were not clearly perceived in the formerly Soviet republics by either the 
polities, or the elites. These terms symbolized, rather abstractly, the path from a system to 
depart from and the one to aim towards, both represented as ideal types in the people’s minds. 
As transitional road-maps, the constitutions’ meaning was limited to framing the rules of the 
game by which the new social organism shall be guided.174 This perception of constitutions as 
merely collections of rules stayed embedded in the post-Soviet societies until now, whilst no 
sense of intrinsic constitutionalism did emerge or develop (see more on this in Chapter 4).  
In the first chapter I attempted to call the beginning of 90-ies as “epoch of democratic 
romanticism” in the post-Soviet area. The branding of this period as such looks justified as long 
as I succeed in demonstrating that whilst there was a tremendous emotional affection with 
liberal values, there was no substantial knowledge of democracy or constitutionalism either at 
the level of public, or at the level of their leaders. The decline in democratic support which 
resulted in manifest setbacks from democracy following the initial years of transitions is one 
obvious blueprint that leads to the suggestion. Now, having the retrospective picture, the 
affection with democracy and the same with constitutionalism in those years seems to be just as 
superficial, in the sense that it merely involved feelings, enthusiasm and hopes but not as much 
a rational comprehended choice grounded on the social experience of the polity, as the affection 
with bolshevism in the 20-ies, albeit, luckily, the parallel involves only the aspect of social 
knowledge of the new system.  
More to the point of this work, the absence of the knowledge about the system and even its 
fundamentals, largely also on the level of the elites, looks also quite obvious in light of the way 
in which institutions were trusted and treated. The generous empowerment of institutions of 
democracy in the fashion of the consolidated western democracies but with quite a weak sense 
of sustainability of the institutions and their imperviousness against unfriendly social 
tendencies is a stark indication of the statement. Plenty of evidence about this phenomenon was 
provided in the preceding chapter, showing how much the choice of institutions often 
conflicted with the existing patterns of social relations, which rendered the new institutions 
incompetent and sometimes detrimental. But more evidence may be derived from this chapter, 
as we may see how inconsistently and paradoxically the same leaders-designers reversed their 
institutional choices in a matter of couple of years as they had to face growing incompatibility 
between the ways of the society and its new constitution and because they needed to address 
their own self-centered preferences.   
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As far as the dynamics and the trajectories of constitutional developments are concerned, 
Russia’s constitutional history looks again to be very pointing as it may insightfully guide us 
through the most paradigmatic phases and the forms which the democratic recession took in the 
post-Soviet neighborhood. It was not long after the democratic era’s onset in Russia that both 
substantial segments in the elites and a huge part of the people signaled their strong nostalgia of 
the previous regime. Facing this growing setback, Yeltsin’s government had to cope with what 
is described as a “permanent state of insurgency”175 where constitutionalism, even if properly 
perceived, had to be sacrificed to transitional politics. By 1993, Russia had developed a decent 
body of what we might call a constitution, composed of several constitutional statutes enabling 
a fairly poliarchic state system with a super-strong constitutional court. Both the institutions of 
representative democracy, which eventually stood for neo-Bolshevik recession in 1993, and the 
constitutional court under this unwritten constitution then became victims of such transitional 
politics, as Yeltsin ordered shooting on the oppositional Parliament and suspended the 
Constitutional Court.  
The new generation of constitution-making had to address these challenges, hence not 
surprisingly, a strong presidential power was stipulated by the Constitution to dominate these 
institutions. Paradoxically, in this light, the new Russian Constitution of 1993 nevertheless 
provided for an effective Parliament176 and even a constitutional court. This might well be signs 
of resisting romanticism (still visible at the time, but living probably the last period of vigor) 
which were nonetheless limited to the bounds of rational choice. For a short time between the 
moments when democracy acquired its first substantial challenges and the phase when 
expressly non-democratic motivations and practices started to prevail, romantic democratic 
politics cohabited with emerging rationalistic politics, and by the time the latter would prevail 
acquiring ghastly corrupt practices, politics and designing were filled with patterns of both.   
This brief retro-view may reveal the notorious patterns of both democratic romanticism and its 
further fading, as well as the patterns of the new generation of post-romanticism designing. Is 
the fact of stipulation of an extremely poliarchic constitutional system, copying the systems in 
the most advanced democratic countries, itself not an indication of an idealistic view on 
democratic politics and strong belief in the country’s, including its elites’, commitment to the 
democratic values? What about the idealistic views of and expectations from the formal 
institutions that these can properly function as if not affected by the patterns of social 
interaction? Then, is the emergence of a super-presidentialism as the dominant form of 
government in the region not a typical sign of the new post-romanticism interim era, with the 
conflict in values and tendencies underlying the process of design? Sakwa’s following 
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reflection starkly demonstrates the growing contradiction- a contradiction resided at the time in 
the minds of the politicians and perhaps the entire polity then, a contradiction that I would 
phrase as being between the still struggling democratic romanticism and now already well-
exposed rationalist considerations:  
While the 1993 Constitution embodies the principles of liberalism, it is predicated on the 
assumption that the strong president will also be a liberal. In the event of this not being the case, 
the authoritative (if not authoritarian) elements in the Constitution come into contradiction with 
its liberal provisions.177 
The claim that it did not prove being the case can hardly be challenged. Yeltsin’s rule was 
overall described to be if not anti-constitutional, then at least “extra-constitutional”.178 But 
while Yeltsin’s assaults on constitutionalism were pursuing a meta-goal of building a new 
system and were thus largely seen as transitional measures (once again, “romanticism” comes 
to mind as a good characteristic), Putin’s Russia’s intolerance of constitutionalism was a result 
of a completely different agenda, a rather pragmatic statist program intended at enhancement of 
the state’s power and autonomy, often at the expense of fundamental rights. This new 
generation of governance is strikingly distinguished by its reference to law and order, a 
perception of constitutionalism of its own where the emphasis is put not on law as jus, but on 
law as lex.179 Sakwa’s meticulous review follows: 
During Putin’s presidency the practices of para-constitutionalism have been sharply 
accentuated. His regime has been careful not overtly to overstep the bounds of the letter of the 
Constitution, but the ability of the system of “managed democracy” to conduct itself with 
relative impunity and lack of effective accountability means that it is firmly located in the grey 
area of para-constitutionalism. … Putin’s system was legalistic but it often acted in a spirit 
contrary to that of constitutionalism. Putin’s sovereignty games- restoring the autonomy of the 
constitutional state, challenging the autonomy of regional bosses, weakening the ability of the 
oligarchs to impose their preferences on the government, and freeing the presidency from the 
administrative regime- neglected one important element: the sovereignty of the people in a 
federal state.180   
The way of the Russian constitutionalism marked a trajectory from extra-constitutionalism to 
para- constitutionalism if we consider the post-Soviet period. It went from sham to pseudo-
constitutionalism if the Soviet period is also considered. “Constitutionalism with adjectives” 
appears to be the indispensable companion of “democracy with adjectives”.181 Post-Soviet 
countries developed a vide array of “constitutionalisms”, and pretty much explicably, the types 
of constitutional regimes strictly followed their corresponding types of political ones. The 
Central Asian sultanistic regimes most likely made a trip from sham into sham 
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constitutionalism. More liberal regimes had rather ups and downs, but luckily for the majority 
of them at least sham constitutionalism was left far behind, though not any one country made a 




Emergence of constitutional courts and making of their institutional configuration 
 
The nearly famous speculation “As Russia goes, so goes the region”182 is appropriate to be 
recalled with respect to constitution-making in the post-Soviet area, aside the well-grounded 
“continuity” hypothesis that the constitutional institutions of Russia itself originally paralleled 
those in the last years of the Soviet Union.183 The spread of new macro-political institutions, in 
one country after the other, instantaneously repeated the major institutional choices made in 
Moscow under the pressure from contingent political realities. Strong parliaments which 
emerged immediately with the first signs of regime change and at first carried the entire burden 
of political power once gave a way to strong presidents in all post-Soviet countries. The 
institutions of vice-presidents, formerly popular among CIS countries, started bothering the 
emerging super-presidents since the Russian vice-president Rutskoy defected his boss Yeltsin 
in October 1993; by then, vice-presidents existed in most of the newly independent republics. 
The choice of the semi-presidential system of governance, as it proved “optimal” in Russia, 
hardly avoided the other countries. Among them, only the Kazakh and the Turkmen 
constitutions expressly announce presidential systems, though both countries chose, 
nevertheless, to have governments as separate institutions from that of the president. In 
Kazakhstan, despite the announced presidential form of government, the constitution provides 
also for a prime-minister. The parliamentary form of government, instead, was totally rejected, 
except that Moldova, uniquely, later made a move towards it.184  
This trend did not pass by the constitutional courts as these courts were created in all the post-
Soviet countries apart from Turkmenistan. The birth of constitutional courts, in the same way 
as in Central and Eastern Europe, came to symbolize the change and the arrival of the new era, 
manifested by constitutionalism as the fundamental ideology and constitutional courts as the 
key guarantors of constitutionalism, albeit, strongly so in some countries and not so much in 
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others, the choice of this institution might have more to do with the previously described 
“continuity” and transplanting from the Russian constitutional structure. The continuity in 
designation of separate tribunals was set up even earlier by the creation of the Constitutional 
Supervision Committee of the USSR and by the amendment in the Soviet Constitution allowing 
each Republic within the Union to establish its own body of constitutional supervision. The 
“path-dependency” created by the beginning of this new, in a way exotic institution involved 
one republic after the other. Some of them, Russia or Kyrgyzstan, for example, attempted the 
creation of a constitutional review body even before they became independent. The others 
opted for a separate court much later. It is noteworthy that there are no strong evidences of any 
significant debates about whether or not to designate the function of constitutional review as a 
separate institution. It rather seems that the originally taken path of constitution-making 
concerning the constitutional courts became “self-enforcing” once it was set up in the capital 
city of the Soviet Union- a status that Moscow would informally carry by the force of inertia 
well beyond the time it officially ceased being the capital of the other republics than Russia.     
The hypothesis about so-to-be-called “reflex constitution-making” receives another 
confirmation by the fact that constitutional courts became very popular in a number of 
autocratic regimes where despite the overwhelming prevalence of autocratic government styles 
and the absolutely symbolic importance of the constitutional review, constitutional courts still 
exist, though they do not matter. The paradox is observed by a student of post-Soviet Russian 
constitutional justice- Alexei Trochev- who has insightfully explored constitutional courts in 
the regions of the Russian Federation to find out that these courts persisted in the most 
autocratic regions while did not get rooted in the most liberal, competitive ones.185 Why these 
plainly undemocratic regimes, either in Russia or in other post-Soviet states, prefer to preserve 
the constitutional courts instead of getting rid of them? One rational, yet obvious, answer 
offered by Trochev himself is that rulers create and tolerate constitutional courts as long as the 
courts provide benefits for the incumbents and do not interfere with policy-making, otherwise- 
into the rulers’ sole province.186 This suggestion is both straightforward from the point of view 
of rational choice theories, and “well-documented” in a sense that there exist a number of 
studies endorsing the hypothesis through field research and ample case-studies.187 But non-
interference with policy-making is itself not a self-sufficient reason for bringing constitutional 
courts in. Meanwhile, what would be the benefits for autocrats in creating sham courts? It is 
true that constitutional courts in a number of post-Soviet regimes often play a role which is 
simply derogatory; they persist solely because their existence adds to the image of the political 
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entity as a suit and tie add to the image of a despotic ruler. But this particular argument more 
emphasizes the “path dependency” of the choice, than its pure rationality. Constitutional courts 
were opted for to be a part of the constitutional systems in the vast majority of post-Soviet 
countries very much because these courts then symbolized the spirit of the epoch, as previously 
noted, and for this specific inquiry it is rather irrelevant whether or not the particular states did 
make the choice out of respect towards that spirit or from the considerations of copying its 
conventional image.   
The paradox noticed in the fact of the popularity of constitutional courts in autocratic political 
regimes in the Russian Federations may be viewed as another manifestation of the phenomenon 
often observed through the apparently puzzling fact that the same designer-politicians “easily” 
shift their preferences by creating a strong constitutional court and then suspend it and then, 
again, re-open it.188 This phenomenon should be necessarily examined in the context of the 
multiplicity of factors predisposing the configuration of the constitutional forms. While 
democracy and constitutionalism might have meant an image and their institutions might have 
been intended as window-dressing in some places and in certain periods, this cannot be true of 
a large number of countries where the change from the previous regime towards democracy 
was originally treated with enthusiasm and euphoria. Perhaps not totally perceived and 
rationalized, the birth of constitutional justice, in the most part, was nevertheless a product of 
an honest belief in the values of constitutionalism. Once created, constitutional courts 
furthermore acquired a fair bulk of legitimacy among the polities, and while rational 
calculations did play a crucial role in their design, the existence of the body of constitutional 
review got deeply embedded in the political system in many societies. This bouquet of the 
different incentives- explained by both behavioralist and institutionalist paradigms- 
accompanied the path of constitutional courts throughout their entire route, and while some of 
these incentives could prevail over the others in particular times and epochs, neither of them 
can be excluded from the review at any juncture in the history of this institution in the post-
Soviet stage.  
The previously observed patterns of democratic romanticism, post-romanticism and then, fairly 
enough, the epoch of strongly rationalist paradigm may offer an intrinsically acute perspective 
on the study of institutional design of constitutional courts throughout the time. The mere fact 
of the appearance of constitutional courts itself symbolized the reign of the first, noblest, 
romantic period, but the look at the typical configurations of constitutional courts’ settings, 
created in that time, also can reveal the typical blueprints of the epoch’s influences. In Russia, a 
constitutional court was formed in 1991 which was ever the most powerful tribunal of its kind 
(furthermore, the First Russian Court). Its powers included both concrete and abstract review of 
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international agreements, laws and presidential and governmental acts, jurisdictional disputes, 
provision of expertise on impeachment of the highest state officials, constitutional review of 
suspension of political parties. The Court was famously empowered to review constitutional 
complaints- an institution which was so far known only in Germany.189 The Court also 
possessed a right to a legislative initiative in cases when it would identify a gap in the laws. 
Other unusual powers granted to the Court included the right to provide binding interpretations 
of the Constitution and the right to launch proceedings on its own initiative. To sum up, as a 
Russian constitutional judge remarked, the First Russian Court was assigned all possible 
responsibilities from every existing model in a way that “the law overbuilt the institution” and 
that the court “could not bear the weight of its own construction”.190  
The question about what was the foremost rationale behind creation of such an overwhelmingly 
authoritative court is not even much contested. Despite the evidence of the influence of several 
interest-groups on the designing process, the emergence of the First Russian Court is plainly 
attributed to the “messiah-like vision of the court” by the strongest advocates of a new 
constitutional system and the ones who can be called the fathers of that constitutional system, 
and first of all Boris Yeltsin and his team.191 In Ukraine, a constitutional court law was adopted 
as early as 1992 which likewise empowered a tribunal with “far reaching powers”.192 Although 
this tribunal never was effective and the formation of the constitutional court (with much more 
modest powers) was delayed up until the adoption of the Constitution in 1996, the fact speaks 
for itself.  
The shades of “post-romanticism”, a period which may have started after the 1993 Coup in 
Russia and following Yeltsin’s attack on the Parliament and suspension of the First Court, now 
shaped some new contours for any constitutional courts in the region. The courts of post-
romanticism are still the essential parts of the constitutional structures and they still bear 
responsibilities for separation of powers and constitutional check on the state of fundamental 
rights protection, but they are no longer overwhelmingly authoritative and do not have over-
reaching powers any more. The Second Russian Court, given a birth by Russia’s Constitution 
of 1993, came as a rather pragmatic compromise between the rationalistic leanings of the 
triumphant team of Yeltsin and the struggling idealists within the Constitutional Convention.193 
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The latter insisted that the constitutional court is necessary for Russia’s democracy and that it 
would enhance the democratic image of the country both within the country and in the eyes of 
the international community, in sharp contrast to the moods of Yeltsin and the rationalists who 
seemed to be for the elimination of the separate tribunal.194  
The fact that Yeltsin gave a way to the arguments by the later day democrats in 1993 speaks of 
the remaining democratic sentiments within the political elites in that time. The years to come 
marked the further movement away from the remaining sentiments both in Russia and 
elsewhere. Wherever strong constitutional courts were already created, they subsequently 
became latent either as the result of executives’ “attacks” as in Belarus and Kazakhstan,195 or as 
the result of rather silent domination of the presidents over these institutions. Where no 
constitutional courts were created yet, the new constitutions provided for substantially 
powerless bodies. Armenia’s Constitutional Court, provided for by the Constitution of 1995 
and the Law on the Constitutional Court of 1996, emerged as one of the weakest constitutional 
tribunals in the world. Ukraine’s Court, as already pointed out, also came in 1996 as a rather 
weak tribunal, with no right to review individual complaints and electoral disputes.  
But as paradoxical as it sounds, the rationalist paradigm proved not only fit to downgrade 
constitutional courts but also to empower them. As the ideological euphoria and the democratic 
pathos eventually faded away, the sole dominating rationale for institutional design remained 
the politicians’ self-interest, the latter conventionally observed as having multiple faces. The 
patterns of constitution-making in this epoch perfectly match the characteristics depicted in the 
rationalist stream of the theories of judicial review from Landes and Posner and to Ramseyer 
and Ginsburg.196 These theories, depicting the politician-designers as purely rational actors in a 
competitive electoral market, at some point suggest that constitutional courts emerge as weak 
institutions only if the incumbent politicians expect to stay in power after the upcoming 
elections. But if the incumbent politicians expect to lose, as Tom Ginsburg’s “insurance theory” 
puts forward, they stipulate strong constitutionals courts as insurance to shield their policy 
choices against the incoming political elite’s attempts to reverse their “contracts”.197  
The entire Landes-Posner-Ramseyer-Ginsburg rational-choice premise gets a perfectly accurate 
verification in the case of the Armenian Constitutional Court. Back in 1995, when the 
Constitution was adopted, the running political elite in Armenia and its leader, President Ter-
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Petrosyan,  had no serious worries about their political future, and the creation of a strong 
constitutional review body were not likely to be in their rational interests- brilliantly in line 
with the hypotheses by the above-mentioned authors. As a result, unlike all constitutional 
courts in the post-Soviet area designed in the preceding “era”, the Constitutional Court of 
Armenia emerged as a body with only a few powers and a very limited access. Only the 
political bodies- the President, the 1/3 of the Parliament, and the Government- could apply to 
the court with a request to review a law on the subject of its constitutionality; neither individual 
complaints, nor court referrals were then allowed.198 By the time the Constitution was amended 
in 2005, the overwhelming majority of the judgments by this tribunal- 91.8% of all decisions- 
were made on the compliance of international agreements of Armenia with the Constitution.199 
Another statistical number speaks about the status of the constitutional review and especially 
about the state of inter-institutional accountability in the country: 92.9% of all cases in the court 
were initiated by the President of the Republic.200After Ter-Petrosyan abruptly resigned in 1998 
(a development that was hardly believable in 1993-97), the new President-elect, Kocharyan, 
initiated constitutional reforms intended at shifting the balance of powers more towards a 
parliamentary form of government and at a better equilibrium between powers; these 
constitutional reforms envisaged a higher status and more powers for the constitutional court 
too.  
But this was somewhat populist rhetoric. Kocharyan was not a worse rational actor than his 
predecessor: the designing of a strong parliament and a strong constitutional court was not in 
his best interests since his powers tended towards increasing concentration after 1999. As a 
result, the referendum on constitutional amendments, held in the end of 2003, after a few month 
from Kocharyan’s re-election in the office, failed, and the failure since then was mostly blamed 
on the lack of enthusiasm from the authorities themselves.201 In 2003, President Kocharyan still 
had a full term of 5 years in office. The situation started changing closer to the end of his 
second term. As the presidential tenure in Armenia is limited to two terms only, Kocharyan had 
no more standing incentives for keeping the constitutional status-quo, and the amendments 
were passed on a referendum in 2005, this time thanks to overzealous propaganda by the 
authorities. The new Constitution brought about a completely new constitutional court. 
Standing was expanded to include individuals (individual complaints), general courts 
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(referrals), bodies of the local self-governance, as well as the ombudsman and the prosecutor 
general. Now the 1/5 of the members of the Parliament can apply to the court.202 
The overarching conclusion ensuing from the discussed patterns is easy to make: the court-
empowering rationalist paradigm is activated in the presence of a political competition allowing 
anticipation of electoral uncertainty. As we discussed already in this chapter, not in all of our 
countries could one find at least bare minimum of political competition, and the mere 
persistence of constitutional courts, often formally very strong ones, in countries such as 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Belarus or Azerbaijan should not mislead us as these courts modern 
profiles were likely shaped not by the conflict of political interests, as the latter simply did not 
survive in these countries, but rather by the force of continuity, formalism and the logistics of 
sham constitutionalism.  Meanwhile, as was the case in Armenia, political empowerment of 
constitutional courts may become high on the agenda  as soon as we can observe increasing 
tendencies toward more dynamic competitive political environments in a country- Moldova, 
Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan all being candidates as of now. The observations in this part 
of the work further support the essential methodological bias of this work that the study of 
institutional design of constitutional courts shall be inalienably linked with the study of 
political regimes in the target countries.   
 
  
C. Constitutional courts: institutional design 
 
Despite the variations in particular configurations of the institutional settings of post-Soviet 
constitutional courts, a generalization as regards to the common profiles of these courts can be 
sought. For these purposes, this work will follow Professor Sadurski’s attempt at describing a 
common model of constitutional tribunals in the Central and East European region. 203 This 
methodological “transplant” is not only convenient for practical reasons, but is also important 
for two substantive reasons. First, this exercise is called to further confirming this chapter’s 
prior generalization about the common patterns of political and institutional character, which 
justify the reference to the “post-Soviet region” as to a “kind of its own” for a scientific 
conceptualization. Second, this exercise is useful from comparative perspective as well, as it 
will expose stark commonalities also in between constitutional courts in the CEE and CIS 
regions as far as institutional design is concerned.  
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In both of these regions, the overwhelming majority of countries opted for a separate tribunal. 
As Estonia was traditionally recognized as the only country without a constitutional court in 
post-communist Europe, so Turkmenistan makes the only exception among the post-Soviet 
countries as regards emergence of a constitutional court. But while the absence of a 
constitutional tribunal in Estonia is only formal, as the function of constitutional justice is fully 
implemented in an alternative framework (to be discussed in Ch. 5), Turkmenistan’s 
constitution can be said to be the only case of a total rejection of the institution of constitutional 
review in the entire post-communist region. Furthermore, in the CIS space, as in the CEE, 
constitutional courts have roughly identical macro-settings as regards the main responsibilities, 
access, tenure, appointment, etc. Here and there, abstract review is set as the principal function 
of the courts, as it is present in all the system, while we have significant variations as to the 
other responsibilities (see Table 2 below). In all countries except Kazakhstan abstract review is 
ex-post. Appointments, as a rule, are made by political branches (presidents and parliaments), 
except that in Georgia some of the constitutional judges are appointed by the Supreme Court 
and in Ukraine and Moldova the Bar and the Magistracy (a constitutional body composed of 
higher judicial and officers and which is responsible for composition of the judiciary) 
respectively have this privilege. The tenure varies, but in the vast majority of the countries it is 
limited (life tenure exists in Armenia and Russia only). Access was customarily concentrated in 
the political branches, as only a few countries allowed individual complaints before 2004. 
Since, the introduction of the constitutional complaint has become the tendency. Actio 
popularis, instead, is extremely rare as of today. It exists in Georgia, but the law regulating it is 
rather vague. In Tajikistan, actio popularis was introduced recently,204 but the promise of this 
reform seems to be in doubt, given the state of civic culture and citizen activism in this country.  
For the ease of our analysis, two tables summarizing the entire range of institutional settings of 
all post-Soviet constitutional courts is attempted below. This empirical exercise, undertaken 
and carried out by the author of this thesis, presents so far the only systematic overview of the 
institutional settings of the constitutional courts in this region. Table 1 includes data on 
standard settings, such as tenure, number of judges, and access, but also columns (inception, 
major reforms, and democratic development) representing the dynamics of institutional changes 
and institutional empowerment/disempowerment in light of overall democratic development in 
a country. The section “inception” provides the years of the first inauguration of constitutional 
justice in the respective countries and not the date of the inception of the current courts: this 
serves the needs of tracing the patterns of institutional empowerment in light of the analysis in 
the historical perspective made in the preceding subsection. The column on access nominates 
                                                 




qualifications rather than lists the subjects of access in order to prevent misapprehension from 
the numerical indicators of access (how many subjects have access), as the qualifications are 
not necessarily and directly correlated with the number of subjects given access. Access is 
considered as “wide” if both political branches, and individuals, and lower courts have the right 
of initiating a review, and “limited” if only one of these categories is given access.  The word 
“rather” accompanies qualifications of systems with hybrid access which is neither wide nor 
limited: Moldova and Kazakhstan. In Moldova, the absence of the institutions of individual 
complaint and lower court referrals is “compensated” by the very wide list of officials having 
the access (even a single member of the Parliament, as well as the higher courts and the 
ombudsman have access), earning a qualification of a “rather wide”. In contrast, Kazakhstan’s 
grant of lower court referrals is diminished by the strictly limited access within the political 
bodies and failure to grant any access to the ombudsperson and the civil society organizations, 
earning a “rather limited”. The last column on democratic progress presents this work’s own 
assessment of the trajectories of democratic development in the post-Soviet countries since no 
consistent tracking of democratic paths of the countries is available which covers all the period 
since the emergence of first courts. The qualifications, then, rely on current assessments by the 
Freedom House, as well as a series of other sources mentioned previously in this chapter, and 
the available literature, reports and other materials witnessing the state of democratic 
governance in the historical perspective between 1991 and now.  
Table 2 presents data on the responsibilities of constitutional courts in the 11 countries having 
constitutional tribunals. The last column demonstrates the statistical score of each court in 
proportion to the 10 selected responsibilities. This data represents the formal institutional 
strength of the courts but itself it is not an evidence of respective courts’ actual weight in the 
countries’ political arena. Included in this table are all of the “major” responsibilities typical to 
continental constitutional tribunals, as well as some marginal functions which are rarely found 
elsewhere. Among the latter category are the actio popularis, the courts’ right to self-initiate 
cases, and their right to a legislative initiative. One responsibility which is not common in other 
countries but is rather popular in post-Soviet countries is the opportunity to deliver binding 
interpretations of the constitution and often also laws.  
Table 2 skips through abstract review of laws as this basic function is implemented in each 
jurisdiction, although in Kazakhstan, exclusively, this is done only before promulgation of laws 
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Azerbaijan no no yes, both No Yes yes yes yes no no 50% 
Armenia no no no No yes 
 
no yes yes yes no 40% 
Belarus no  no no 
 
no 
Yes no yes no no no 20% 
Georgia no no no 
no 
Yes yes yes yes yes 
yes 
60% 




Yes no yes yes no no 50% 
Kyrgyzstan no no 
yes, only 
Const. 
no No no yes yes no no 30% 




Yes no yes yes yes no 50% 
Russia no no yes, both no Yes yes yes no no no 40% 
Tajikistan yes yes no no Yes yes no no no 
yes  50% 
Ukraine no no yes, both 
no209 
Yes no yes no no no 30% 
Uzbekistan yes yes yes, both no Yes no no no no no 40% 
 
To conclude this section, a warning shall be made that the empirical data presented in these 
tables is not meant as a self-sufficient, comprehensive and anyhow precise tool for deductions 
and conclusions about the patterns of institutional empowerment of post-Soviet constitutional 
courts and neither about their real political weight. On the contrary, any consideration of the 
particular data may reveal the “paradoxes” of institutional empowerment, as discussed earlier, 
while any attempt at a quantitative analysis out of the previously discussed political context 
will not likely succeed in illuminating the puzzles. For example, the relatively recent court 
empowerments in Azerbaijan and Tajikistan shall not be interpreted as in necessary causal 
relationship with these countries’ democratic achievements and more over as direct effects of 
democratization, because, as it is evidenced also by the last column in the Table 1, the 
democratic development since the first inauguration of the courts has rather declined in both of 
these states. Meanwhile, the institutional disempowerments of constitutional courts in 
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Kazakhstan in 1995 and in Belarus in 1996 have been the immediate offshoots of democratic 
recessions in these respective countries. The data, therefore, should be utilized exclusively in 
the context of the previously highlighted patterns of political governance, having in mind the 
degree of constitutional formalism and the status of constitutional institutions in these 
countries, as long as one applies the empirical information for the purposes of conceptualizing 




Having this much analyzed, democratic development even in the freest countries of the post-
Soviet space still remains largely a work in progress. The two decades since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union have seen periods of democratic momentum and discouragement, and eventual 
democratic progress, if little, in some, and setback, often substantial, in other countries. Despite 
the variations, all countries share common patterns as regards both general style of governance 
and the status of constitutionalism and constitutional courts. The patterns concerning the 
constitutional courts include commonalities both in terms of the institutional profiles of these 
tribunals, and the status of constitutional adjudication in the political power-structures, the 
latter marked by relatively universal insolence of this institution, general control over and 
regular harassment of the courts by the dominant political power in the countries. The 
emergence and then the further path of the constitutional courts in the 11 post-Soviet countries 
have seen remarkable “paradoxes” of institutional empowerment of these tribunals, witnessing 
apparently puzzling phenomena, such as cohabitation of institutionally strong courts and clearly 
non-democratic regimes and, on the opposite, rather limited empowerment or decline of these 
courts in the more liberal political entities. These “paradoxes” may look striking only if we 
make our inquiries out of the larger political context discussed above but they  will no longer 
seem so puzzling if scrutinized in light of the peculiar style of political governance in the 
region, where the existence of constitutional institutions is shadowed by the dominance of 
informal political practices. The knowledge of these political practices is the key to the 
conceptualization of the status and the institutional standing of constitutional justice in the post-
Soviet land.   
So far, politics is portrayed as influencing the entire scope of issues related with constitutional 
courts, including the institutional design. But this obvious fact should not in any way diminish 
the entire meaning of our larger work. As it was elaborated in the previous chapter, democracy-
building is largely a function of institutional consolidation and development, where the role of 
new institutions- first of all in fostering the mechanisms of horizontal and vertical 
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accountability- acquires an especially crucial role.210 This effect of institutions would now seem 
immaterial, but only if we were as romantic, inexperienced and impatient as the institutional 
designers and political leaders in the beginning of 90-ies. In reality, the role of institutions is 
enormous and defining in the long run and in a more realistic vision of the political processes 
and the change. As the subsequent chapters will demonstrate, institutional empowerment of 
constitutional courts matters and matters greatly if we look at political processes in a dialectical 
perspective, from the point of view of the inevitable evolutionary change in the basic software 
of the social structure. The preceding decades may be called decades of failure and frustration 
only if we were to expect immediate change and development. They may well be decades of 
achievements if we judge by the degree of legitimacy earned by the new institutions, including 
this of constitutional justice, since this legitimacy will amount for the most important capital in 























                                                 
210 For the analysis of this in light of the recent political developments in the world’s developing democracies, see 





IN DEFENSE OF POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT: 
APPRAISING COURTS IN POLITICS OF DEMOCRATIZATION 
 
 
   A. Defining political empowerment 
 
This chapter seeks to answer a basic question whether or not one should opt for political 
empowerment of constitutional courts in post-Soviet environments if the aspiration of the 
designer is to promote democratic contributions by these tribunals. I suggest the term “political 
empowerment” for denoting a particular group of functions of post-communist constitutional 
courts which are “marginal”211 according to a leading student of post-communist constitutional 
courts or “alien to the role and the nature of constitutional courts”212 according to a 
constitutional judge from Armenia. Among these are the review of jurisdictional and other 
disputes between supreme bodies of the state (jurisdictional disputes), decisions on liability of 
top officials (impeachments), constitutionality of political parties (political parties), and review 
of electoral disputes (electoral disputes). These responsibilities seem to be indeed “marginal” 
and alien to constitutional tribunals’ nature if the review of constitutionality of laws is viewed 
as the central raison d’etre of these bodies. But they have been intended to considerably 
enhance the overall competence and the institutional strength of post-communist constitutional 
courts. 
To begin, “political empowerment” in the above-mentioned meaning can be said to be the 
common element of the institutional design in post-Soviet countries, though there are certain 
variations and peculiarities. The responsibility of constitutional review of jurisdictional disputes 
per se is found in the constitutional texts of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia, and Tajikistan.213 In 
Belarus, the Constitution provides for the responsibility of the Constitutional Court to “give its 
conclusion on the presence of instances of systematic or flagrant violation of the Constitution 
                                                 
211 Wojciech Sadurski, supra note 2, at 13. 
212 Felix Tokhyan, “Constitutional Control of the National Elections in Armenia,” in Russian, paper presented in the 
XI Yerevan International Conference “Role of Constitutional Courts in Ensuring Democratic Elections,” published 
in International Almanac: Constitutional Justice in the New Millennium, Yerevan (2006), at 113. Available online at 
the official website of the Constitutional Court of Armenia: <www.concourt.am>. 
213 Articles 30/III of the Constitution of Azerbaijan, 89/1 (b) of the Constitution of Georgia, 125/3 (a-c) of the 
Constitution of Russia, 89/2 of the Constitution of Tajikistan.   
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of the Republic of Belarus by the chambers of Parliament.”214 In Moldova, the Constitutional 
Court shall “ascertain the circumstances justifying the dissolution of the Parliament.”215  
The disputes between higher state bodies can alternatively reach constitutional courts through 
the procedure of challenging the particular legal act of one state body by the other. For 
example, the Ukrainian Parliament asked the Constitutional Court in 2007 to review the decree 
of the President on dissolution of the Rada (Parliament) even though the Constitution did not 
literally provide for the responsibility of the Court to review jurisdictional disputes or 
dissolution of the legislature by the president.     
Impeachments are part of the responsibilities of constitutional courts in Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine.216  
Review of constitutionality of political parties is assigned to constitutional courts in Armenia, 
Georgia, and Moldova.217 This function was among the responsibilities of the Constitutional 
Court of Russia- the “First Court”- before its dissolution in 1993. That “First Court” era was 
marked by the case of Communist Party, which will be discussed below.   
Finally, electoral disputes and disputes on the results of referenda are part of the task of the 
constitutional courts in Armenia (presidential and parliamentary elections and referenda), 
Azerbaijan (presidential and parliamentary elections), Georgia (elections and referenda), 
Kazakhstan (presidential and parliamentary elections and referenda), Kyrgyzstan (presidential 
elections), and Moldova (presidential and parliamentary elections and referenda).218        
The term “political empowerment” implies the deliberate choice of the designer to specifically 
authorize a certain type of responsibilities granted to constitutional review courts for enabling 
their intervention into politically sensitive cases. I endorse this deduction as the unambiguous 
implication of this research. The inclusion of these responsibilities in the list of functions of the 
newly introduced constitutional courts has clearly been targeted at creating a novel institution 
performing due check on political authority and restricting the abuse of constitution by the 
latter.219 While the mentioned task of checking on political authority and restricting the abuse 
of constitution can in theory perfectly abstain from associations with politics, I hereby 
                                                 
214 Art. 116 (10). 
215 Art. 135/1 (f) of the Constitution of Moldova. 
216 Art. 100 (5) of the Constitution of Armenia, Art. 107 of the Constitution of Azerbaijan, Art. 19/1 (h) of the Law 
on Constitutional Court, Art. 72/1 (5) of the Constitution of Kazakhstan, Art. 82/3 (4) of the Constitution of 
Kyrgyzstan, Art. 135/1 (f) of the Constitution of Moldova, Art. 125/7 of the Constitution of Russia, as well as Art. 
13 (3) of the Law on the Constitutional Court of Ukraine. 
217 Art. 100 (9) of the Constitution of Armenia, Art. 89/1 (c) of the Constitution of Georgia, Art. 82/3 (8) of the 
Constitution of Kyrgyzstan, Art. 135/1 (h) of the Constitution of Moldova.   
218 Art. 100 (3) and 100 (3.1) of the Constitution of Armenia, Art. 86 and 102 of the Constitution of Azerbaijan, Art. 
89/1 (d) of the Constitution of Georgia, Art. 72/1 (1) of the Constitution of Kazakhstan, Art. 82/3 (3) of the 
Constitution of Kyrgyzstan, Art. 135/1 ( d and e) of the Constitution of Moldova.  
219 This is to a large extent a part of the common knowledge, but  for the manner in which it is implied in major 
academic literature, see Herman Schwartz , supra note 5, pp. 22 and 241-242.   
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subscribe to a perspective of the term “political” which prefers its customary notion to the 
normative one.      
To provide an overview of the foregoing argument, the use of “political” with respect to courts 
and judicial review is in the core of debates and controversies in the scholarship and is 
definitely a strong irritator in use in politics. For the purposes of this chapter, I refer to 
“politics” in the most commonplace meaning of the term. As a criterion for assigning certain 
functions of constitutional courts as political I look at the fitness of these functions to involve 
the courts in the very process of allocation and distribution of political power. In this light, all 
the roles from among the series of political empowerment are political simply because by the 
virtue of their participation in the allocation and distribution of the state powers the courts 
unavoidably get involved in partisan affairs, in which case the stamp of “political” attaches to 
the courts with no major difficulty.  
A puzzling paradox might be suspected in my argument. It is exactly these types of roles, when 
courts are performing as “neutral umpires adjudicating between two parties,”220 that make up 
their legitimacy and support their opposition to being called “political.”221 Indeed, in all of 
these mentioned cases, courts are set to perform as mere intermediaries in situations where the 
parties appeal for the resolutions of a conflict. Unlike in cases with the review of laws on the 
subject of constitutionality where this very conflict is typically an abstract category (to which 
the term of “abstract review” itself submits) and therefore the neutrality of judges is largely an 
abstract idea because the pre-existing law on which this neutrality is dependent is itself subject 
to the courts’ judgment, the “political” disputes, such as electoral controversies, acquire a more 
genuine shape of conflicts. Here, at the same time, the neutrality of courts seems to acquire a 
more authentic meaning due to the expectation of a more clear-cut body of rules on which the 
discrepancy between the two parties is founded. Therefore, the function of courts here seems to 
be a way more native to their intermediary role, and the use of “political” in its conventional 
meaning of “policy-making” thus seems to be less relevant to this case.  
But this is still a largely normative account of the problem, to the virtue of which I do 
wholeheartedly subscribe myself. In reality, the proper performance of courts in line with their 
legitimate designation is often compromised by a range of factors resulting in voluntary or 
involuntary involvement in interest group politics and hence in erosion of the normative 
legitimacy of the judicial functions. This acknowledgment of the political-partisan nature of 
courts finds a perfect empirical verification through the examination of the political functions 
that courts are designed to perform in the formerly Soviet environments where the 
constitutional-judicial function inevitably has to find a path along the dominating tendency to 
                                                 
220 Sadurski supra note 2, Preface, XV. 
221 Martin Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis (University of Chicago Press, 1981).  
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reproduction of the concentrated political power systems. The evidence from the post-Soviet 
constitutional courts’ activities, either recent or more ancien, supports this hypothesis. Where 
the tendency towards the concentration of the executive power proved to be the major 
predisposition of the political culture and where the reproduction of the concentrated 
government chose the path of non-constitutional and anti-democratic mechanisms- and this has 
been true about all of the countries in the region- the politically empowered constitutional 
judicial review had to adopt one of the below styles, each submitting to a political disposition: 
1. explicitly support the existing non-constitutional regimes, eventually serving as a loyal 
agent of the existing power in place. This has been the dominant paradigm in the majority 
of countries in the post-Soviet area in most of the times and it possibly represents the most 
popular image of a constitutional court of a post-Soviet country. I refer to the political 
nature of such adjudicative style simply because of its affiliation with a concrete political 
agenda. In relation to the discussed functions of constitutional courts, the explicit support 
of the political regime by loyal agents-constitutional courts is called to validate the 
unconstitutional instrumentality of maintaining the incumbents’ power by endorsement of 
bogus elections, authentication of unconstitutional bans on oppositional political parties 
and associations, supporting the incumbents in impeachment cases, etc.  
2. support the existing non-constitutional regimes in a less explicit and ultimately a more 
strategic way (e.g. Armenia after 1998 and to a large extent the Russian Second Court). The 
political nature of this style still stems from its servitude to the dominant political program, 
but it is also distinguished by a rather strategic behavior of courts. In this style, courts 
behave in accordance with their long-term or short-term political calculations and their 
sense of expediency, but they keep formally showing due respect to incumbent politicians 
from the considerations of “institutional survival.” 222 
3. resist the non-constitutional actions of the government and hard-push on politicians to keep 
them in their constitutional orbits. Normatively, this is what one expects the courts to do 
ideally, but in fact, the evidence submits that the survival of the style is not realistic unless 
a substantial state of democratic freedoms is reached. In fact, exactly this style of judicial 
“politics” resulted in the fall of constitutional courts in Russia (1993), Kazakhstan (1995), 
and Belarus (1996). The evidence is rather speaking of the fact that constitutional courts’ 
activist pursuance of constitutionalism in modern post-Soviet political environments can 
take place only in situations of political uncertainty (such as electoral uncertainty, electoral 
revolutions, transitions from one political elite to the other, etc), if one does not count the 
initial years of democratic experience in this area (that is in early 90-ies) where the 
                                                 
222 The term “institutional survival” is borrowed from Robert Sharlet, “The Russian Constitutional Court: The First 
Term,” 9 Post-Soviet Affairs 1 (1993), at 17.  
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“romantic” constitutional courts did not yet experience realpolitik attacks from the rising 
super-presidential powers. A striking example currently comes from Kyrgyzstan where the 
constitutional court lives what is probably the first real momentum of judicial independence 
and constitutional significance since the emergence of this country in 1991, solely due to 
the relatively recent democratic “revolution” in the country which keeps the country’s 
political situation in a shaky transitional state for quite a long time. Meanwhile, although 
theoretically one could think of this style of constitutional courts’ behavior being capable 
of keeping a distance from partisan politics, the empirical record of judicial activism in 
post-Soviet countries submits to rather the contrary. The most paradigmatic cases where the 
higher courts “dared” to challenge the non-constitutional actions of higher officials (Russia 
1993 and Ukraine 2004 and 2007) submit ample evidence of political partisanship on the 
part of either the court as an institution, or its individual members and fractions.  
Each of these three paradigms of judicial behavior will be discussed more in detail further on in 
this work. For the purposes of this part of the work, the important testimonials to get derived 
from the cases refer to the predominantly politicized character behind each of these scenarios.  
The pattern of politicization of courts in the first two paradigms flows from the failure of 
constitutional review courts to perform as prescribed by law from the considerations of political 
attachments. In both cases, political attachment is in one or the other way a product of 
institutional survival concerns, though the first and the second scenario take different modes of 
political loyalty. In fact, these two paradigms are the representatives of the same family of 
judicial inadequacy: failure of due performance in a pursuance of a political agenda.  
The distinction between the first two types of performance is reflective of the political regimes 
in respective countries. The first category of judicial performance is more indicative of the 
political regimes with a stricter check on unwanted judicial opposition, representing the more 
concentrated and relatively less tolerant political systems, such as reportedly in the Central 
Asian Republics (with the exception of Kyrgyzstan after 2005), as well as in Belarus and 
Azerbaijan.223 The second type is more characteristic of political regimes where the 
concentration of the political power is contested relatively freely and where there is at least a 
formal respect of the constitutional separation of powers and judicial independence (e.g., in 
Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine; Russia would qualify for this group until its recent set-
back, and now it is likely to score somewhere in between the two groups).  
But this distinction is also largely formal because being dependent on the type of the political 
regime in place the distinction can alter together with the shifts in the regime type. For 
example, strategic performance of courts, typical to the second group sometimes even during 
                                                 
223 See Erik Herron and Kirk Randazzo, “The Relationship between Independence and Judicial Review in Post-
Communist Courts”, supra note 8. 
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the regular tenure of quasi-autocratic regimes, can be demonstrated also by courts in the first 
group if the political situation changes in respective countries. This was the case in Kyrgyzstan, 
for example, where the constitutional court could clearly be qualified as an explicit supporter of 
the political regime (performance falling in the orbits of the first group) before the “Tulips 
revolution” in 2005, while it showed a considerable degree of defiance to the executive after 
the regime change (typical to the second group).   
The political nature of the third type of judicial performance stems from purely empiric 
observations. In fact, the type of judicial behavior exactly supposes due performance by courts 
and it would ideally make them just apolitical, neutral and dependent on the constitutional law 
rather than on politics. But the politicization of courts in this case is due to the factual 
bankruptcy of rule of law in these political regimes and the impossibility of keeping the 
political powers in the constitutional orbits by constitutionally prescribed mechanisms in which 
case the courts have either to give up their struggle and hence become politically loyal agents 
of the government, or pursue their struggle in an extra-judicial space, hence necessarily 
involving in politics per se. This hypothesis is confirmed by a number of cases where 
constitutional courts tried to oppose the concentration of presidential power. The most striking 
of these examples is Russia’s First Court’s explicitly political behavior in 1991-1993.224   
The partisan-political predisposition of the “marginal” functions of constitutional courts is also 
confirmed by the empirical observation of their adjudication. The function of deciding upon 
disputes between governmental branches and agencies, in general terms, has been at the core of 
likely the most illustrious post-Soviet political battles which involved constitutional courts- the 
power struggles between the presidents and the parliaments in 1993 in Russia and in 2007 in 
Ukraine.225 The two cases are very similar in their political context, for in both cases the 
controversy represented nothing other than fight between political groups dominating the 
institution of the president and that of the parliament, and here and there the courts’ function to 
serve as arbiter were recalled. In the Russian case, the Court’s involvement in politics was 
rather voluntary and it did not go along with a conventional legal adjudicative process. In the 
Ukrainian case, the Court’s involvement was recalled on procedural legal grounds, but the 
Court simply failed to perform as an arbiter, and its failure to perform was in gross violation of 
the prescribed legal procedure. For the purposes of this section, the two cases validate the “test” 
by confirming the unavoidably politicized context in which courts have to respond to 
                                                 
224 See, for example, Robert Sharlet, supra note 222, Robert Ahdieh, supra note 183; Herman Schwartz, supra note 
5.  
225 I subscribe to a broader interpretation of “disputes between governmental agencies” as not only purely legal 
inquiries about the exact scope of the responsibilities of any of the parties but as involving any possible controversies 
between the authorities which mask a genuine political conflict underneath an apparently legal dispute on the extent 
of the rights given to either. 
78 
 
jurisdictional disputes and by evidencing two situations of classical political partisanship 
demonstrated by political courts.  
The political nature of the cases on political parties and associations before the constitutional 
courts stems from the dominant tendency of transforming this institution into an instrument of a 
partisan struggle for power by means of outlawing political opponents. In 1992 the Russian 
Constitutional Court was faced to decide on the status of the Communist Party in a political 
situation where the Court’s stance on President Yeltzin’s ban of the Communist party was 
perceived as nothing else than a “determining factor whether Russia would move forward or 
remain caught up in its past”.226 One should observe that Yeltzin’s extraordinary decree 
banning the Communist Party came up in circumstances of increasing political opposition from 
pro-communist political alliances, and that the decree was in fact served to disarm what would 
prove to become Boris Yeltzin’s major political challenger for the next 5-6 years. Not 
surprisingly, the Court’s decision took an entire year in a “political atmosphere which made 
neutral, effective decision-making by the court a mere impossibility”.227 The decision, called 
“Solomonic”228 for its remarkable grounding on the political expediency rather than law and for 
its achievement in avoiding making of a clear-cut decision in what was a plain “zero-sum 
game”,229 represented the first lucid demonstration of strategic behavior on the part of this 
Court, “catalyzing its descent into politics of the most partisan kind”.230 The mere titles of the 
chapters in an article, analyzing the case in details, submit to its political nature: “The CPSU231 
Case and the Politics of Law”, “Defining the Stakes: Backstage Maneuvering”, “Pro and Con: 
Political Combat in the Legal Arena”, “The Trial as Political Theater”, “Conclusion: the 
Verdict as Politics, Law, and History”.232  
Impeachment cases, like jurisdictional disputes and electoral appeals, contain the high 
probability of power struggles masked by constitutional inquiries; here too, the courts 
inevitably become a key party in the de-facto distribution of political power. However, 
impeachment cases, unlike electoral disputes, are relatively rarely found in the post-Soviet 
constitutional courts’ practice since as a political instrument impeachments can reach a court in 
a situation where there is a considerably powerful support of, for example, an anti-presidential 
coalition, whilst electoral appeals reach courts with the regularity of the electoral cycles and an 
appeal can be filed by a single electoral candidate and not necessarily a major political party or 
coalition.  
                                                 
226 Ahdieh, supra note 183, at 82. 
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The electoral cases’ political significance in the Soviet successor states is paramount due to 
both the predominant practice of electoral disguise of power reproduction, and the relatively 
recent emergence in the arena of “electoral revolutions” which substantially “activate” the 
constitutional review courts, as cases from Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan clearly suggest. The 
political sensitivity of electoral cases is also aggravated by their common zero-sum nature in 
which case courts get involved in uncompromised partisan power fights.   
One clarification should be made about the entire line of argumentation in this section. 
Although I subscribe to a style of analysis where courts and judges are portrayed as political 
and very often as strategic and partisan actors, my position and analysis strives for a 
comprehensive account of judicial behavior. My account attempts to stay away from the 
treatment of law and politics as mere “epiphenomena of self-interested individual and group 
behavior”, which is observed to be the dominant method in mainstream political science of 
behaviorist style, particularly in political jurisprudence.233 While a significant portion of truth 
about the judicial behavior should still be attributed to self-interest and personal considerations 
of individual judges especially in the subject countries where the share of political motivations 
in the process of decision-making prevails due to the constrained status of the judiciary and the 
higher probability of executive attacks on due performing courts, judicial decisions are so far 
largely conditional upon the organizational structures and formal rules of behavior, which 
impose their own autonomous constraints on the courts and which shape the very contours of 
strategic deviations. At the same time, even to the extent that attitudinal models are given 
space, my analysis avoids concentrating on mere personal self-interest and the utility of 
individual judges or courts as decisive elements of judicial decision-making.  
Paying special attention to the considerations of political expediency and utility of courts and 
judges as prevailing in the political regimes and contexts under discussion, I do not rule out 
and, to the extent of their applicability, I do include in the scope of my analysis a variety of 
other factors as constituents of judicial decision-making, including the institutional constraints, 
legal techniques and traditions of constitutional and statutory interpretation, bounded rationality 
and lack of adequate information, altruism, patriotic motivations, political orientations, tastes, 
ambitions, and normative beliefs and value systems as multiple causes of judicial decisions. 
The preference of this or that consideration is largely conditional on the reactions of the 
immediate addressees of judicial decisions, such as the political actors and the democratic 
constituency, but also on such factors as the personalities and ideological preferences of judges, 
as well as the timing and the political environment and context in which the decision is to be 
made.  
                                                 




As it will be observed later, constitutional justices in post-Soviet countries are more likely to 
stay loyal to the incumbent political regime for as long as the latter is expected to stay in charge 
of the political power. The likelihood of making decisions on merits increases in situations of 
political uncertainty and transition. So does the likelihood of exposure of pro-democratic 
ideological sentiments. The due examination of constitutional courts’ behavior, therefore, is 
very sensitive to both spatial and temporal parameters of the object of the research. While the 
beginning of 90-ies, for example, can be observed as being marked with widespread dominance 
of ideological motivations both in designing constitutional courts and in the courts’ activities in 
the majority of countries of this study (I called this “romantic” style), the succeeding years 
should rather be studied in line with the dominating tendencies of rational design and rational 
adjudication. In the same token, the transition to a more democratic regime, which may be 
observed to have started or soon to start in the post-Soviet world, will obviously mark another 
shift in the basic independent variables of judicial decision-making process. The gravity of 
emphasis on the dominance of self-interest in judicial behavior, thus, depends on the degree of 
democratic consolidation in a country (the more democratic the country, the less the portion of 
rational considerations) hence it is likewise subject to change with the transformations in 
regime types.  
The concern for “spatial and temporal parameters” in this study allows a generalization that 
constitutional-judicial decision-making in the post-Soviet countries of the time when this work 
is being written is dominated by the courts’ rational calculations of political expediency and 
their own self-interest (including the considerations of personal and professional security) 
which is mostly due to the constrained status of the judiciaries in these countries and the threats 
of attack coming from the concentrated executives. But a variety of other considerations, 
described above, take place in making judicial decisions. The presence of the latter 
considerations increases along with trends to democratization on one hand, and along with 
changes in the dispositions of political powers in particular times (such as in the times of 
transitions from one political leadership to another), on the other. The type of political regimes 
remains the basic independent variable for judicial behavior, with judges’ and courts’ 
motivations mainly being predetermined by the expected reaction of the political leadership on 
the decision. The study of the political regime and the political culture in the particular place 
and in particular time, the regime’s nature and the power-structure technologies inherent to it, 
the dynamics and qualities of changes and transformations- all this is therefore the key to the 






B. Appraising courts in post-Soviet politics (of democratization) 
 
The recent scholarship on post-Soviet democratization seems to pay little attention to the 
political significance of constitutional review courts and their role in democratization. In 
general, post-Soviet constitutional courts, unlike their Central European colleagues, have rarely 
appeared under scrutiny by English-language scholarship.234 The research on democratization 
in the former Soviet Union, most of which is of political science origin, has generally ignored 
constitutional courts as agents of political change.  
Meanwhile, growing attention has been paid to the phenomenon of global expansion of 
political judicial review or, to put it popularly, judicialization of politics worldwide.235 To 
roughly summarize some of the insights from the study of this universal trend, political 
intervention of judicial review courts represents nothing less than a triumph of 
constitutionalism, supremacy of higher law, and democratization across the globe.236  
Recent times have witnessed a new generation of democratic inspiration in the world. Ukraine, 
Burma, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, a group of countries as far from each other 
geographically as they are culturally, have undergone some form of democratic development in 
one way or another. In many cases, courts have been charged with providing a decisive say 
about the destiny of democratic processes. In Ukraine, the Constitutional Court was involved in 
deciding whether or not President Yushchenko’s decree to dissolve the Parliament was 
legitimate. In Kyrgyzstan, the Constitutional Court was central in deciding on the status of the 
constitutional amendments (a very politically-charged issue in the country at the time), and in 
general, the Court played an increasingly independent role in the political sphere after the 
demolition of Akayev’s rule. In Pakistan, the highest court was charged with deciding on 
presidential elections and the constitutionality of Musharraf’s next term. In Armenia, the 
Constitutional Court underwent just another review of complaints on presidential elections 
which reach this Court regularly after all presidential elections in this country.  
                                                 
234 The Russian Constitutional Court is the only one among its post-Soviet “colleagues” that has been relatively well 
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 Whether or not one is convinced of the democratic pedigree of the global expansion of judicial 
power, recent evidence submits that democracy and the political empowerment of courts go in 
parallel. However, while one has to admit that as a rule, it is democracy that brings courts to the 
arena, and not vice-versa, scrupulous attention should be paid to those rare cases and 
opportunities in which the reverse is true.  
 
Constitutional courts and democracy 
 
The study of the relationship between constitutional courts and democracy is traditionally 
dominated by the debate on the “counter-majoritarian difficulty”,237 which has led the 
normative discourse on judicial review in the United States. This line of argumentation has 
been successfully transplanted also into the most influential philosophical account of 
constitutional courts in the post-communist world.238  
I attempt to proceed from a different perspective. I take as a point of departure the position of 
Ronald Dworkin where the courts acquire their legitimacy not from the conventional normative 
constructions, but from their institutional virtue to contribute to the democratic conditions: by 
what means the democratic conditions are best met is an empirical, rather than a normative 
question.239  
My concern is the democratization of a group of countries where politically active courts seem 
to be well positioned to contribute to this process. In political environments where the 
government is dominated by a small group of corrupt politicians abusing power, this mission of 
courts acquires a righteous, though a different type of legitimacy. In this sense, I agree with 
Kim Lane Scheppele in that courts in post-communist countries can assume the role of 
democratic citizenries’ advocates against governments which break their promises to the 
public: in a real, as opposed to an “idealized” or “pure” political context, the courts appear to be 
better for democracy than the other, “democratic”, powers.240 Constitutional courts in these 
countries are respected by the public more than any of the other branches; constitutional courts, 
as far as they can, push the governments to stay within the limits imposed by constitutions; 
constitutional courts, through individual complaints, enable citizens to access policy issues 
while no such access, as a rule, is available through elected politicians- as a result, 
constitutional courts are more responsive to the public than the political branches. 
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Constitutional courts, therefore, are good for democratic governance. But more than that- as I 
want to argue here- constitutional courts in post-Soviet settings are not only good for 
democracy, but are also remarkably good for democratization, something that is the biggest of 
challenges in the countries of the former Soviet Union. My arguments follow. 
 
Conceptualizing democratic contributions by constitutional courts 
 
Instead of normative inquiries, I propose a framework of analysis where the issue of courts’ 
aptitude for democratic contribution is reviewed in the light of their institutional and 
ideological settings, as well as their predispositions in interest group politics. My hypothesis is 
that constitutional and other higher courts deciding politically sensitive issues in post-Soviet 
countries are pro-democratic agents, though this statement shall avoid clear-cut readings and 
shall be tried against the background of the enormous pressure to which these courts are subject 
from the side of super-executives. Normally, courts are weak and too constrained to be able to 
significantly impact the process of democratization. However, they become strong pro-
democratic actors in times of political transitions and uncertainty, when they are likely to ally 
with pro-democratic parties.  
My use of “democracy” in this work has a largely generic association, referring to the basic 
system of social and political organization distinguishing the western societies. This 
generalization seems to be justified from the perspectives of the common post-Soviet discourse 
where the emblematic term “democracy” is associated with political regimes based on free and 
equal access to political participation, respect for human rights, and adherence to rule of law in 
general. Being democratic or pro-democratic, in this perspective, denotes manifestation of any 
reasonable departure from and opposition to the anachronistic Soviet or post-Soviet style of 
government towards a political organization based on the principles mentioned.  
To examine the constitutional courts’ political orientation, I start by testing the arguments 
which support the courts pro-democratic predispositions. Furthermore, I proceed by looking at 
the causes and nuances of their constrained status and the anthropology of their apparent 
attachment to the existing non-democratic regimes in the formerly Soviet area. Finally, I extract 
my conclusions about the political status of these courts from the comprehensive analysis of the 
tradeoffs between the different predispositions, to a large extent relying on the examination of 
courts’ strategic behavior in the realpolitik of the tough post-Soviet power-structures.     
  
Democratic courts: institutional perspective 
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To begin with, the simple fact that the behavior of judges is impacted by a variety of factors 
other than law should be observed. It is very important, however, that the point is not 
overstated.  
In a study on the post-communist courts of Central and Eastern Europe, Herman Schwartz 
wrote: 
Admittedly, the notion that a judge is above the ordinary passions of the day and acts according 
to some abstract notion of the law is something of a myth. Judges read newspapers and watch 
television. But nations live by myth, and the myth of judicial objectivity actually has more truth 
to it than cynical conventional wisdom would have it.241     
The conventional wisdom about the post-Soviet higher courts may well be that they are hardly 
independent at all and that all their conceptual raison d'être is merely to endorse the power 
deals of incumbent or prospective political elites. It would be hard to disagree with this. 
Moreover, this reasonable generalization is offered as the key point of departure when 
analyzing the courts in post-Soviet politics. The memo for not overstating this point was made 
for taking the account of all the situations when objectivity and the “abstract notion of law” 
appear, as it should be normal, the principal driving force underneath judicial decisions.  
Observance of the law and professional responsibilities, ethics, morality, and civic commitment 
predispose one but not the most common of these situations. This is not to say that judges in 
these countries are less decent, patriotic or freedom-loving than elsewhere. It is just that they 
are more constrained and that the price for the defiance is not the same as what the judges in 
more mature democracies would pay. For the purposes of a realistic and eligible 
conceptualization, morality and civic responsibilities of post-Soviet judges should often be 
looked for in the hidden messages and manifestations behind the official judgments endorsing 
political incumbents. Objectivity in interpreting laws concerning distribution of political power 
in post-Soviet countries is not what can be exposed publicly in our days- a lesson that 
constitutional judges have learnt well since they or their colleagues were attacked by politicians 
in the early years of the democratic transition. Morality, professional ethics and patriotism are 
rather things that have to be carefully disguised, if they run contrary to the standard of loyalty 
to the incumbent or forthcoming executives. One of the most illustrative manifestations of this 
paradigm is the fairly popular practice where the courts somewhat implicitly disapprove of the 
violation and abuse of constitutional law by the incumbents in the non-binding part of their 
judgments, while silently endorsing the abuses in the binding part. This has been, for example, 
the preferred style of the Armenian Constitutional Court which has repeatedly conveyed its 
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approvals of corrupt and rigged elections with deliberately ambiguous non-binding statements 
of clearly pro-democratic nature.242      
Courts re-visit their primary institutional responsibilities also when the political constraints 
suddenly unchain them in certain political situations. This may happen, for example, in 
transitional periods of political regime change and in times of electoral uncertainty. Uncertainty 
gives courts a certain independence and enables greater self-expression. Also in these 
situations, objectivity takes precedence due to rational choice because courts choose legitimacy 
as a safeguard in a case where there is a difficulty in calculating the likely winner. The behavior 
of courts in such circumstances is analyzed in length in the following sections. 
Adherence to the “notion of law”, provided a “state of normalness” was arrived at, would 
predetermine constitutional courts’ liberal and pro-democratic position. Post-Soviet 
constitutions, almost without exception, formally provide for a wide range of fundamental 
liberties and rights and the principles of democratic governance. From the legal point of view, 
this is slightly aggravated by the culture of positivist legalism that dominates in the judicial 
mentality in the formerly Soviet civil law countries.  
Kasyanov v. Central Electoral Commission,243 a politically-charged case before the Russian 
Supreme Court at the beginning of 2008, can be an example. This fundamentally constitutional 
case of barring the key opposition candidate for the presidential elections in Russia ended up in 
a review of the compliance of the formal process of nomination of the candidate with the 
scrupulously detailed procedure provided by the law on presidential elections and by 
supplementary standards imposed by the Central Electoral Commission (CEC). In particular, 
the CEC refused to register the key opposition contender and former Prime Minister Mikhail 
Kasyanov as a candidate in presidential elections in Russia in 2008. In its decision, the CEC 
referred to irregularities in the procedure of the collection of pre-electoral signatures, which are 
required by the Russian legislation from a candidate for being promoted as a nominee, as 
grounds for voiding Kasyanov’s registration. The Law of Russia on the Elections of the 
President provides, in the best Soviet traditions, for detailed procedures for nomination and 
registration of the candidates, including highly technical description of each of the required 
procedures to be completed and “spravkas”244 to be supplied. The CEC’s arguments for 
disqualifying the potential presidential candidate because of some technical irregularities with 
the signatures sounded unjustifiably formalist. For example, one of the reasons for invalidating 
the signature-votes collected for the candidate was that the signatories failed to provide their 
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full address by not indicating the federal unit where they were registered, as required by a 
standard signature collection form stipulated by the CEC. It is worth mentioning that it was 
nevertheless admitted that the required number of signatures in favor of the candidate had in 
fact been supplied and that the signatories had personally signed; the violation was considered 
to be in the technical deviations in the process of signature collection.  
The decision of the CEC was reviewed twice by the Supreme Court of Russia, as the Russian 
Constitution does not provide for review of electoral disputes by the Constitutional Court. On 
both occasions, the Supreme Court (once in its plenary seating and then as the Supreme 
Cassation instance) declined Kasyanov’s appeal and confirmed CEC’s decision.245 Mikhail 
Kasyanov was the only liberal contender for presidency and President Putin’s staunchest critic. 
The CEC’s rejection of his registration was widely believed to be the Kremlin’s way for 
“legally” barring him from the campaign. 
All this said, the positivist legalism of this type is more an instrument of political partisanship 
rather than a true manifestation of the legal technique, especially when higher courts are 
concerned. In the case of Kasyanov, legalism was most probably exploited in order to produce 
a politically expedient decision.  
 
Democratic courts: political orientation and ideological leanings 
By virtue of the large public expectation from this newly created institution, post-communist 
constitutional courts obtained the most educated and professionally respected specialists or 
politicians in each nation at the time of emergence of this institution. In most of the cases, this 
took place during the first half of the 90-ies, a time that marked ideologically the most romantic 
period of post-communist democratic momentum. Most of the constitutional judges in a typical 
post-communist country are law professors and scholars of the democratic stream.  
The way these courts perceived their roles and the nature of their activism during the early 90-
ies is also be evidence of the democratic orientation of their members. Just as in Eastern 
Europe, in many countries of the post-Soviet region the entrance of the constitutional courts 
onto the scene was also marked by an earnest democratic activism. The anti-presidential 
activism of the first Russian Court has become legendary.246 The Constitutional Court of 
Belarus set up in 1994, had by 1996 ruled almost twenty acts of the dictatorial President to be 
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unconstitutional.247 In Kazakhstan, the Constitutional Court was involved in a serious political 
controversy by opposing the autocrat President and the Parliament in 1994.248 Although 
discontented politicians have in several cases “punished” the daring judges by either 
dismissing, or rotating them (rotation took place with the famous Solyom Court in Hungary),249 
in many countries the democratic romantics are still on the constitutional courts’ benches. As 
an example, as of the end of 2007, 11 members of the 19-member Constitutional Court in 
Russia were appointed before 1996 and the majority of them were members of the “legendary” 
First Court. 
The liberal orientation of constitutional courts is further confirmed by the fact that many of 
them, who are famous for their deference to the incumbent executives in sensitive cases, are 
perfectly objective and liberal in all those cases which do not interfere into the sphere of vital 
political interests, namely the majority of human rights cases. Not a surprise then, the Second 
Constitutional Courts in Russia, which is known as the “the fifth wheel of the carriage of 
Russian autocracy,”250 is fairly activist and assertive in its human rights cases.  
Very often, politically motivated constitutional court members are full of ambitions for 
personal political career. Constitutional judges are not career judges in the European sense. 
They are not selected from the pool of judicial candidates based on the results of routine 
juridical tests. As a rule, they are appointed to office by political bodies. Very often the 
selection is divided between presidents and parliaments, and only in a few cases do other 
bodies take part in the selection process. Appointment by parliaments is always associated with 
political parties’ interests and thus the process is subject to interest groups’ influence. Not in all 
countries do constitutional judges have to be lawyers.251  
A number of judges in the constitutional courts of these countries have a previous record of 
either political activism, career or ambitions in politics. The example of the first Chairman of 
the Constitutional Court in Russia, Valery Zorkin, now re-appointed as Chief Judge by Putin, is 
the most remarkable illustration of this. Consider, for example, such illuminating evidence as 
numerous cases of Zorkin’s public appearance on television during the First Court, when he, on 
behalf of the Court, often spoke with political assessments. In 1993, Zorkin personally involved 
in the political controversy between the President and the Parliament in an unusual capacity of 
a political mediator.252 Last but not least: after his resignation, in 1996 Zorkin ran for the post 
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of the President of the Russian Federation.253 Armenia’s Constitutional Court Chairman was 
Vice-President and Prime-Minister before he became the Chief Judge. The current Chairman of 
the Georgian Court previously held ministerial positions while his predecessor held the 
positions of Justice Minister, Secretary to the President and member of the National Security 
Council. In both Armenia and Georgia, the names of these judges have been constantly 
mentioned as probable candidates for higher political roles.   
Judicial activism, democratic pathos, and the promise of public appraisal are perfect 
opportunities for ambitious judges, but these may also become temptations for those who were 
not considering political career. As this analysis will show, judicial activism in particular 
political circumstances contains a high probability of gaining strong public support and 
legitimacy for the judges since by virtue of institutional design the courts often become the 
final instance for conflict resolution in political confrontations, which habitually involve a bold-
line division between incumbent political elites striving at reproduction of their power by 
means of abuse of public resources and pro-democratic parties.  
 
Democratic courts: legitimacy and public reputation  
Courts may often resort to pro-democratic decisions from considerations of legitimacy and 
public support.  
Scheppele shows how enormously the popularity of constitutional courts has grown in all 
countries where they have acted independently.254 The public support of constitutional courts 
was first of all predetermined by the designation of these institutions which were created to 
promote constitutional provisions of power-sharing and democratic governance, as well as 
basic freedoms and rights. Where the courts proved to be activist in implementing these 
functions, their public support has indeed been enormous like in Hungary.255 But even in those 
countries where the courts have not been capable of assuming the role of constitutional check 
on the government and have rather become devoted “agents” of the government, constitutional 
courts are still more popular than either the executive or legislative bodies, or even regular, 
general courts. First, these courts do not share the other bodies’ deserved reputation of totally 
corrupt institutions since they do not have functions related to allocation and distribution of 
resources. Second, as Scheppele emphasizes, the constitutional courts’ public reputation 
enhances due to their right-protective activity, especially in those countries which enable 
individual complaints, and in general, due to their being democratically more responsive than 
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the elected officials.256 Finally, pro-democratic decisions or, indeed, any decisions which 
contest the running government produce public support in any case and for any institution that 
challenges the highly discredited politicians and the government.  
Legitimacy and public support, on their own, are not sufficient assets for the courts during the 
regular tenure of super-strong politician-executives as discontented leaders are likely to attack 
them at the first sign of the courts’ dissent. In normal circumstances, legitimacy is the first 
thing to be sacrificed when important political considerations or the judges’ security is at stake. 
This changes when there emerges an approximate political balance between the ongoing 
government and an aspirant political alliance. In such cases, legitimacy transforms to a strategic 
factor. It is an important aspect to be considered by constitutional courts’ members-rational 
actors who are in trouble identifying the winners, when estimating their utility after the 
elections. Meanwhile, the factor of public appraisal becomes a central pressure on the courts in 
times of political crisis. It is widely believed that the public pressure was one of the main 
factors pushing the Ukrainian Supreme Court to decide for the pro-democratic candidate in the 
2004 presidential elections.257 It is also very likely that the fear of public pressure on the 
Constitutional Court led the Armenian President to use force to stop the ongoing 
demonstrations by the opposition only a few days before the Court hearings after the 
presidential elections in 2008.  
Reaching a pro-democratic decision is not a challenge from the purely legal perspective. Post-
communist constitutions formally meet the democratic standards, and it is technically possible 
to make decisions pleasing the pro-democratic parties either by a positivist interpretation, if the 
case is on merits, or by an activist interpretation of the constitution. If there is an apparent 
technical difficulty for deciding for the democrats from the point of view of the letter of law, 
the courts can apply the general democratic principles set in the foundations of the 
constitutions, in the manner of the Constitutional Court of Armenia, which proposed a 
“referendum of confidence” as a way of overcoming the hostility within the society that has 
been caused by controversial elections. The Constitutional Court made its submission in an 
activist way, which distinctively deviated from the conventional Soviet-type positivism of 
fellow courts, by directly applying the preamble to the Constitution and its nonspecific call for 
democratic governance and civic harmony.258 Last but not least, in the current political 
environments in the formerly Soviet countries, the likelihood of arriving at a decision on merits 
which please democratic parties is very high since these are the ruling political groups and 
leaders mostly who use circumventing electoral technologies and anti-constitutional and anti-
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democratic methods while their more democrat opponents hardly have the resources, if not the 
willingness, to resort to abusive technologies.    
 
Constrained courts: political pressure  
Courts naturally tend to be independent. Their independence, however, is threatened by existing 
anti-democratic regimes in post-Soviet countries because the political credo and the utility of 
presidents lie in their monopoly over government, while by the virtue of their institutional 
design post-Soviet constitutional courts are empowered with the duty of checking and 
balancing the other branches.  
The executives’ attack on constitutional courts in the first half of the 90’s has left little 
optimism for independent judicial review. The Constitutional Court in Russia was suspended 
by Yeltzin in 1993 after getting involved in the controversy between the assertive President and 
the retro-minded Parliament.259 The Constitutional Court in Kazakhstan, which “dared” to 
repeatedly decide against the will of the incumbent, was taken out of the Constitution by 
President Nazarbayev in 1995.260 The substitute institution, which is formally on the scene until 
our days, is a much weaker body called Constitutional Council. In Belarus, Lukashenka forced 
the resignation of justices starting in 1996, by when the Constitutional Court had actively 
involved in striking down anti-democratic legislation by the President.261 The new judges have 
kept loyal to the “Bat’ka.”262  
Being involved into electoral disputes and political games by the virtue of constitutional 
imposition of arbiters’ functions in electoral and other political matters (this was the designers’ 
irony), constitutional justices in post-Soviet countries have to release decisions coping with the 
interests of dominant political litigants who possess powerful instruments for influencing 
constitutional courts. These instruments range from banal trade off with courts’ and judges’ 
logistics and remuneration,263 removal of judges from office and misuse of law for their 
persecution,264 and to threats to personal and physical wellbeing, as well as physical abuse per 
se.265 After all, if the political culture allows poisoning of the key presidential candidate on the 
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eve of elections with the investigations of the incident suspecting involvement of secret 
services and foreign intelligence,266 how can constitutional judges be sure of their own security 
when the future of political power depends on their decision?     
The behavior of the Second Russian Court is typical to the courts’ performance in such 
circumstances. As Epstein, Knight and Shvetsova demonstrate, this Court prefers to avoid 
deciding on cases which clearly involve them in controversies between political actors, namely 
in the separation of powers dimension, while it is more active in the other areas, such as human 
rights, which appear to be safer for the Court to interfere.267 Similar observations have been 
made about the Ukrainian Constitutional Court too. It appears, in particular, that the Court had 
refrained from adjudicating matters affecting major political disputes; this was its “survival 
strategy” in the uneasy controversy between the political actors. In most of the cases, the Court 
had abstained in breach of its duty to decide. Clearly, avoidance of deciding on politically 
sensitive cases is often the only way for the courts to shield themselves from attacks by the 
politicians. This paradigm was certainly still the case in 2007 when the Ukrainian 
Constitutional Court failed to produce a decision when requested to review the constitutionality 
of the Presidents decree dissolving the Parliament; several judges reported pressure, the chief 
justice resigned and several others were dismissed, but in the end no decision was made.       
It is noteworthy that unlike the first Russian Constitutional Court, whose political activism is 
legendary, the second Court has not decided a single case which would seriously upset the 
Russian President. A survey of the Second Court’s case law would prove inconsistency in its 
ideological reasoning: while in the human rights dimension, which is as mentioned mostly 
“safe”, the Court enthusiastically protects the fundamental standards, proving the judges’ 
inherent democratic orientation, the “political” cases, in which the incumbent political 
leadership had important stakes, demonstrate the Court’s total loyalty to the politicians, very 
often at the expense of consistency with its own previous or analogous doctrines.   
In 2005, for example, the Constitutional Court was faced with deciding on perhaps one of the 
most controversial decisions of Putin’s administration: elimination of the elections of regional 
governors. Putin’s project was challenged before the Constitutional Court by an individual 
petitioner, and in December 2005 the Court decided268 for the President, holding the new rules 
to be in conformity with the Constitution, even though in 1996 the same Court had upheld the 
principle of regional elections.269 President Putin’s pursuit of banning regional democratic 
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elections was intended to strengthen the federal state (through “verticalization of state 
power”270) in Russia’s fight against terrorism after the Chechen attack on Beslan in 2004.271  
To the surprise and disappointment of many fans of the Constitutional Court, as well as the 
legendary activist chief justice Valery Zorkin, the Court upheld the President’s awkward 
reasoning. It would be hard to find consistency in the Court’s reasoning. The reality rather 
reflects the typical pattern in Russian-type post-Soviet countries where the courts are 
subservient to their political masters. Meanwhile, Epstein et al attribute such performance of 
the Court to its rational behavior aimed at creating a “reservoir of public support” and 
“ensuring the court’s legitimacy in the long run.”272 It is obvious that the rational calculations 
of the Russian judges of 2005, unlike in 1993, prevailed over their ideological orientations. 
This is a typical behavior of constrained courts where the judges are, in fact, confronted to 
guarantee the courts’ institutional survival,273 as well as their own personal security. Times 
have not significantly changed since 1993, and it is evident that a President who decides 
overnight to eliminate the election of governors in a federal state would not think twice before 
eliminating the constitutional court.   
  
Courts in partisan politics 
Courts are political actors whether we like it or not. According to Robert Dahl, courts are the 
agents of the dominant political alliance and an “essential part of the political leadership.”274 
Judges are the agents of the government in Shapiro’s “political jurisprudence”.275 Judges are 
not the politicians’ agents, they are “above politics”, as Landes and Posner put it in another 
influential essay.276 Courts advocate the will of political powers in place, Shapiro says. Courts 
are not the allies of the current political powers; rather, Landes and Posner argue, they enforce 
the “contracts” between the rule-enacting political alliances and their main partners, the interest 
groups. In all interpretations, however, courts appear as rational strategic actors.  
Courts are somewhat different strategic actors in post-Soviet countries than they are in 
developed market democracies. While the logic of Dahl and Shapiro reflects a political reality 
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in an established competitive democratic polity, and the logic of Landes and Posner of a 
competitive market polity, the post-Soviet political environment is neither of these. Courts in 
these formerly authoritarian countries are not even the agents of government; they are their 
servants.  
In ordinary circumstances in the region, courts’ political pragmatism prevails over all the other 
considerations. Surveys of the case-law may confirm that political expediency does not leave 
too much space for ideological or contractual alignment and partisanship if the latter goes 
against the incumbent or imminent political power. Judges of the Supreme Court in Ukraine, 
for instance, were generally expected to decide for the pro-governmental candidate in 2004, 
because they were the political appointees and the protégées of the running President and in 
general they were largely believed to have a stake in the reproduction of the political power.277 
At the end of the day, however, under a pressure from the public and timely estimating the 
shifts in political balance, they “breached the contract” by endorsing the oppositional candidate. 
In another review of presidential elections, the Constitutional Court of Armenia, which was 
largely expected to ally with the oppositional candidate for presidency in 2008, decided for the 
“candidate of the power” as the political expediency almost indubitably recommended to side 
with the latter. 278               
  
 Courts as rational actors 
Given so many factors predetermining judicial behavior, higher courts’ decision in a particular 
politically sensitive case is a product of a trade-off, strategic deliberation and maneuver 
allowing the judges to find the best compromise between the conflicting reasons.  
An important caveat should be kept in mind. Being powerless by themselves to impact the 
course of national public policy and thus “inevitably part of dominant national alliance,”279 as 
rational actors courts constantly seek a partnership with the most promising political power in 
place. Learning the lessons from their unpromising alliance with the losing party in 1993, 
constitutional judges in Russia are likely to remain loyal to the executive which seems to be 
unbeatable in the foreseeable future. Constitutional Courts acquire their momentum in the times 
of political uncertainty. Modern Russia, hence, is no longer a good case-study for our purposes. 
More promising are the other countries where the dominance of super-strong presidents in a 
long run seems not to be so obvious: Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and eventually Armenia.  
                                                 
277 MacKinon supra note 257, 203. 
278 Most of the sitting judges were appointed to the Court by at the time President Ter-Petrosyan, who was running 
as a candidate from the opposition in 2008. It is believed also that the Chairman of the Court kept very close 
relations with Ter-Petrosyan since he served as Vice-President for him and was the key member of Ter-Petrosyan’s 
team at the beginning of 90-ies. 
279 Dahl, supra note 274, p. 293. 
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Higher courts’ rational calculations unveil during times of political transition and crisis. If in a 
situation of political uncertainty a court has to decide on a case involving the interests of 
equally likely winners in future elections, the courts’ decision in most of the cases, such as 
disputes on the results of presidential elections, has to favor one of the players over the other, 
making them a party to a zero-sum game. This is the irony, the danger and the virtue of an 
institutional design that gives the constitutional courts a last say in political confrontations. 
From a purely game-theoretic perspective, where no other factors are considered except the 
clear rational analysis of the players, taking the side of either of the players promises about 
50% likelihood of pleasing the future winner. Given that we consider the attitude of the courts 
in case of political uncertainty when one of the players is a pro-democratic, or a relatively pro-
democratic, or a more pro-democratic party than the other, the rational actor-judges will choose 
to decide for the more pro-democratic candidate: the pro-democratic decision will promise 
legitimacy and public support as a last-harbor excuse and defense if the non-democrats win 
whereas no excuses at all would be there if a non-democratic decision was made and the 
democrats eventually won.   
The rationalist perspective may seem to undermine the statement about the democratic potential 
of courts. I argue to the contrary. Constitutional courts are pro-democratic exactly because they 
are rational actors. The courts do not like to be servants, but if have to be, they want to choose 
their masters. The rational long-term interest of judges is in the soonest possible departure of 
undemocratic government and in the advent of a friendlier one for their independence. This 
long-term interest of the judges represents their rational choice which is hidden deep while 
executives are strong and stable, and this is why I call them “Trojan horses of democracy.”    
 
Political uncertainty280  
The settings for our analysis are mainly underlined: post-Soviet constitutional courts, like all 
courts, are rational strategic players; alone, they are constrained and weak institutions which 
seek an alliance with the major political power in place. Dahl’s insightful essay provides in 
part: 
Except for short-lived transitional periods when the old alliance is disintegrating and the new 
one is struggling to take control of political institutions, the Supreme Court is inevitably a part 
of the dominant national alliance. As an element in the political leadership of the dominant 
                                                 
280 For the sake of avoiding confusion caused by the possible divergence in interpretation of this term, here and 
afterwards in this work “political uncertainty” shall mean an uncertainty within the society and the political groups 
about the outcomes of elections or other power-generating processes which determine the political leadership of the 
country for the nearest future.     
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alliance, the Court of course supports the major policies of the alliance. By itself, the Court is 
almost powerless to affect the course of national policy. 281  
Although “short-lived”, the transitional periods however need to be paid attention. Political 
uncertainty, as a rule, minimizes the dependence of the courts and better exposes the real 
orientations of the judges. Still, there is a big portion of rational analysis about future winners 
which may be found in constitutional courts’ decisions at the time of uncertainty. The relative 
uncertainty puts the courts against a dilemma as they experience hesitation about the winner. 
The complete uncertainty (e.g. at the peak of the 2004 post-electoral crisis in Kiev) leaves even 
less chance for accurate forecasts at all and grants unlimited independence to courts.  
It is nonetheless important to distinguish between political uncertainty in a one-off zero-sum 
setting, which can be found in most of the post-Soviet in-house political confrontations, and 
stable political uncertainty, which is rather exceptional and in a classical form has been so far 
observed only in Ukraine after 2006. In a one-off zero-sum setting the game is about gaining a 
single political competition- normally presidential election- where the winner takes all of the 
power. In this scenario, the uncertainty about the winner in the political competition exists only 
by the time when the official power game (election) is over, as afterwards the winner seizes the 
entire political authority and leaves little chances for the opposition to keep contesting its 
dominance. In contrast, one can observe a stable political uncertainty in regimes where the race 
for the political power is rather ongoing and is not entirely dependent on a single political 
contest (election), as the balance between the competing camps is relatively equal and neither 
of the parties is strong enough to attain a decisive gain which would considerably weaken or 
destroy the other.  
While the hypotheses of this analysis with respect to the patterns of judicial behavior are 
generally related to the common cases of political uncertainty of the zero-sum nature, stable 
uncertainty produces a completely different political situation, which deviates from the 
paradigm of “short-lived transitional periods” mentioned by Dahl.282 Judges’ behavior in stable 
uncertainties may no longer be subject to the conventional patterns. This paradigm is well-
illustrated by the comparison between the two Ukrainian cases which will be discussed later in 
this chapter.     
Let us project a typical case to appear in a constitutional court at a time of political uncertainty. 
The dispute on the results of presidential election is the most common and most illustrative of 
possible cases, hence we can conceptualize based on its paradigm. The situation of stable non-
transitional uncertainty can be ignored for the purposes of conceptualization because it is 
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282 Id.  
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exceptional in post-Soviet countries, as well as because of its relatively contingent nature which 
makes its patterns hard to conceptualize in essence.  
When there is a complete uncertainty, such as the Ukrainian case in 2004, the court becomes 
nearly the most crucial player of the time because given the absolute balance between the two 
conflicting parties, the court decides the winner. If this is the case, then there is an 
overwhelming likelihood that the court will decide for the more democratic litigant as the 
courts have the incentives to support the more democratic party. First, the more democratic 
power will, as mentioned before, allow more independence for the court. Second, the court and 
its members nurse ambitions to become a public champion. Third, the pro-democratic decision 
will raise the legitimacy of the court and will give judges a necessary minimum of guarantees 
in the worst scenario. All these have been discussed above. Ultimately, there are no factors in 
support of the non-democratic candidate, unless the latter is more preferable for particular 
strategic considerations, but this would probably be relevant to the situation of relative, rather 
than complete uncertainty. The Ukrainian case of 2004 supports the hypothesis of this part in 
relation to complete political uncertainty.  
The prevailing rationale of judges in a situation of relative uncertainty, when the courts’ 
position is unlikely to decide the winner, is to support the most probable future winner. 
Relative uncertainty, which is more likely compared to complete uncertainty, is a more 
complex situation to analyze. If the more democratic candidate seems to be stronger, the 
preferences of the judges will, for all the reasons given above, certainly be on the democrats’ 
side. The relative (about 60-40%) lead of the less democrat candidate is likely to place the court 
in a situation of a serious dilemma. As political expediency prevails, ideological sentiments 
running contrary to the political expediency are likely to take place only at the extent at which 
the judges’ predictions demonstrate survival of the existing uncertainty after the elections.  
One question arises though: why would courts prefer to decide against the interests of the more 
likely winner if their unequivocal partnering with the potential winner could even more 
strengthen the latter? It is highly probable that courts behave in such a way to demonstrate a 
more diplomatic attitude and not disappoint the political opposition, which can likely keep 
chances for a takeover if it was strong enough to challenge a semi-autocrat in a semi-autocratic 
political system. Meanwhile, the democratic takeover is increasingly the tendency in this 
region, illustrated by a good portion of evidence in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, and this 






Testing the hypotheses: post-Soviet courts in politics 
In this section, I intend to use the framework set earlier in this chapter for analyzing the 
performance of courts in cases involving considerable political controversy and a genuine clash 
for power. The selected case-study comes from Armenia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. This choice 
is not arbitrary.  
First, it is in these countries particularly that higher courts were involved in political power 
games, and the study of their performance can contribute to the conceptualization of judicial 
behavior undertaken in this work. It has been already pointed out that electoral and other 
political controversies do not always involve courts. In Georgia, for example, the political 
situation has been very tense since 2003 (when the Georgians throw the incumbents away 
during their “Revolution of Roses”), for some reason, no major controversy between the parties 
of the power and the opposition has resulted in judicial review. Yet, the Georgian Constitution 
allows review of constitutionality of elections in the Constitutional Court.283 
Second, the selection is done from the countries which offered cases where the behavior of 
constitutional or higher courts deviated, in one way or another, from the “standard of loyalty” 
to the incumbents. Not accidentally, these cases come from countries which allow more 
political pluralism and which have an overall better score in democracy. From this perspective, 
the case-study does not include Russia or the Central Asian states except for Kyrgyzstan, which 
underwent serious regime-change after its own “revolution” in 2005.   
Finally, the selection has been from the relatively recent cases, as these may better illustrate the 
contemporary tendencies in the performance of higher courts, especially those related to 
electoral and other political turmoil. Hence, the selection deliberately abstains from including 
cases from the “romantic democracy” epoch of the early 1990’s. This epoch was characterized 
by a substantially different motivational structure of judicial behavior and marked rather an era 
of idealistic judicial activism. The case selection starts from 1996, by when the most brutal 
attacks on constitutional courts took place. Since then, the status of constitutional courts has 
completely changed and has started taking the modern shape of subservience to the executives.  
 
Armenia. The saga of three presidential elections  
1998. The first test for democracy 
Since its creation in 1996 until 2005, the Constitutional Court of Armenia was institutionally 
the weakest court among its “colleagues” in the region. Adopted as late as in 1995, the 
Armenian Constitution allowed access to the Constitutional Court only to a select group of state 
                                                 
283 See Art. 89 (d) of the Georgian Constitution. 
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officials for matters of abstract review only.284 The general public, as well as political parties 
which could rely on the support of less than the 1/3 of the Parliament, were denied access. This 
evidence proves Tom Ginsburg’s logic, in line with Mark Ramseyer,285 that constitution-drafter 
politicians prefer judicial independence when they believe that they will lose future elections, 
whereas politician-designers prefer dependent courts that can be manipulated to achieve policy 
outcomes if they are confident in their success.286 However, according to the “standard” for the 
majority of constitutional courts in post-communist Europe, the Armenian Court was 
empowered with functions of a largely political nature, such as decisions on disputes resulting 
from presidential and parliamentary elections, on impeachments and on the constitutionality of 
political parties.  
The case of presidential election of 1996287 was the first major challenge before the Court. The 
elections saw a close competition between two principal contenders: the running President Ter-
Petrosyan and the candidate from the united opposition, Vazgen Manoukyan. The official 
results gave 51.75% to Ter-Petrosyan, now commonly recognized to be a product of count 
manipulation, and 41.29% to Manoukyan. This was ever the tensest presidential contest in 
Armenia which would most likely bring a first-round victory to Manoukyan if not the abuse of 
power by the incumbents.   
Before the case reached the Constitutional Court, the post-electoral developments had resulted 
in mass protests of the opposition flooding the streets of capital Yerevan. These were quickly 
suppressed rather soon by the tanks called in by the President’s military commanders. 
Demonstrations were banned, a number of oppositional candidates were arrested, and 
Manoukyan was wanted for arrest when the petition was filed to the Constitutional Court. 
Nobody doubted then that the authorities had succeeded in suppressing the protest for serving 
their reproduction. Indeed, the Constitutional Court was not given a real chance for defiance.  
As expected, the Court decided two months after the date of the elections to endorse the re-
election of Ter-Petrosyan. The legal technique applied by the Court to validate the perceptibly 
rigged ballot would later become a conventional tactic for imitating objective review: the Court 
recognized the facts of irregularities in a number of polling stations but considered these to be 
insufficient for invalidation of the elections. This technique was later applied to validate the 
                                                 
284 Constitutional Court’s powers and responsibilities were enlarged by the Constitutional amendments of 2005.   
285 Mark J. Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In) Dependence of Courts, supra note 196.   
286 Ginsburg, supra note 196. The logic of the insurance theory was once again confirmed during the two attempts at 
constitutional amendments in Armenia which intended, among other changes, at strengthening of the Constitutional 
Court. In the first time, in 2003, the constitutional referendum failed to endorse the amendments, as it was commonly 
believed because of the lack of support from the running President who expected to stay in office for another full 
presidential term; in the second time, at the end of 2005, the amendments were passed with the vigorous support of 
the same President who in this time was much closer to the end of his second, final term. In general, Armenia is a 
very illustrative case for this theory.     
287 See the decision DCC-26 of the Constitutional Court of Armenia of 22 November 1996.  
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presidential elections in 2003 and 2008, both times elections being reportedly rigged. 
Meanwhile, the defects in this tactics were obvious: the 1.75% margin bringing a first-round 
victory to the incumbent in 1996 was very small for ignoring the evidence of widespread 
violations, bulletin staffing and abuse of public resources. The reputation of the Court was thus 
gravely damaged in the very first year of its operation.        
 
2003. Referendum of confidence 
The appeal was submitted to the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia by the 
presidential candidate Stephan Demirchyan on the results of the second round of the elections. 
Preceding the petition, the second round of the presidential elections between the running 
President Robert Kocharyan and the candidate Demirchyan resulted in the former getting the 
support of 67 % of the voters, according to the official results. Neither Kocharyan nor 
Demirchyan received a sufficient number of votes for an immediate victory in the first round 
where several other candidates ran. 
In his petition, Demirchyan pointed out essential violations committed during the election 
process, including mass bulletin stuffing and abuse of public resources by Kocharyan, the 
incumbent President. The facts of widespread violations and circumventions during the 
elections were inter alia recognized by the different groups of observers, including 
international organizations, and were commonly believed by the public. It is important to note 
that the decision of the Constitutional Court was due in a situation where the results of the 
elections were officially upheld by the Central Electoral Commission, commonly viewed as the 
incumbent President Kocharyan’s proxy. By the time the Court decided, Kocharyan had been 
officially sworn in for his second term.  
Demirchyan appealed to have the second round of the Presidential elections announced invalid 
because of widespread violations. He claimed that the elections did not adhere to the 
constitutional principles of free, equal and secret ballot. The Constitutional Court 
acknowledged the cases of numerous violations submitted by the applicant and eventually 
declared that the results of elections in a number of polling station, where the violations were 
documented, were “unreliable“.288 In sum, having found that the elections in general fell short 
of the proper democratic standards due to the facts of violations “which in their nature are not 
compatible with future democratic developments of the country”, the Constitutional Court, 
nevertheless, ruled to leave the Central Electoral Commission’s decision unchanged, saying 
that the evidence of “duly legally formulated and evidentially justified electoral violations” has 
not been significant enough to have materially impacted the results of the elections. Thus, the 
                                                 
288 See the decision DCC-412 of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia of 16 April 2003.  
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ruling of the Constitutional Court upheld the results of the second round approving the re-
election of acting President Robert Kocharyan in the office.  
The decision of the Constitutional Court, however, contained another statement of a non-
binding nature which raised divergent reactions from almost all political segments and became 
a spectacular item of professional interest. In particular, the Constitutional Court provided: 
… considering that on the level of constitutional solutions, for institutions of representative 
democracy, not only the legality of their formation is important, but also important is the large 
continuous confidence of society in that process and a body of state power; 
emphasizing the importance of strengthening the constitutional order of the Republic of 
Armenia and the necessity for establishing civic harmony established in the Preamble of the 
Constitution; 
stating the fact that in the circumstances of the yet imperfect constitutional democracy, the 
election dispute, which is of crucial importance for the destiny of the state, also has a deep 
socio-political context based on lack of confidence and intolerance; 
giving high importance to referenda and plebiscites as a special significant form of immediate 
democracy and realization of people’s power, and of resolving issues of special importance for 
the state and establishing social confidence and people’s consent; 
to suggest to the newly elected RA National Assembly and the RA President, within one year, in 
the consonance to democracy and rule of law to bring the RA Law “On Referendum” in 
compliance with the requirements of the first part of unchangeable Article 2 of the RA 
Constitution and to select the organization of a referendum of confidence as an effective 
measure to overcome social resistance deepened during the presidential elections. 
From the formal legal perspective, the Constitutional Court was not authorized by the 
Constitution to make any such recommendations whatsoever. This fact was later used by the 
pro-Kocharyan political cluster to question the legitimacy of the Constitutional Court’s 
statement. In the meantime, the same argument was used by the pro-President Parliament to 
reject the opposition’s initiative on upholding the Court’s call for referendum.  
Eventually, the binding part of the decision was in line with the common expectation that the 
Court would endorse Kocharyan. Still, the Court’s unprecedented and creative call for a 
referendum resolving the political (rather than the legal) dispute between the two parties was 
unexpected and hard to be even imagined. Visibly, this call was unreservedly political and 
almost obviously intended at undermining, in an ambiguous way, the legitimacy of the 
“elected” President Kocharyan. Actually, in a situation where the political prospective of the 
pro-Kocharyan party at least for the nearest future was strong enough and where the Court 
would not invalidate Kocharyan’s electoral win without expectation of an attack from the latter, 
the type of remark formulated by the Court in its recommendation was in fact a non-formal 
objection to the existing state of affairs, opening, rather than closing the door of a political 
contest on the issue. What was the puzzle of this decision?  
Essentially, this case can be attributed to the rational behavior of the courts, as we earlier 
observed in this part of the thesis. If we look closely, the political situation of the electoral 
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season of 2003 was in fact near to a relative political uncertainty, even though the external 
signs were apparently for a clear predictability. The political situation was still marked by the 
tremendous volatility inherited from the dramatic reshuffle of the political framework in late 
1999 and 2000,289 on one hand, and the damaged reputation of the running authorities, on the 
other. Although it was not apparent, the emergence of a mass public protest after the unpopular 
and highly discredited presidential elections was not unlikely. The Constitutional Court’s 
controversial decision, thus, might have been a diplomatic and opportunistic way of pursuing 
two goals: official recognition of elections and a de jure approval of the incumbent President 
(who was most likely to stay in the near future but might be not strong enough to stay long), 
and giving a hand to the likely losers of today but potential prospective winners in the 
foreseeable future.  
The analysis, in this light, benefits from a comparison with the case of 1996. In 1996, the 
presidential elections registered an even smaller, basically razor-thin margin between the 
candidates, and the political situation was tenser than it was to be in 2003. But the political 
uncertainty at the time of Constitutional Court’s 1996 decision itself was less because the case 
was decided when the mass protest of opposition candidate’s supporters was suppressed by 
means of military intervention exercised by the authorities and few would really doubt the 
long-term running of the existing political leader. Thus, although the political uncertainty in 
time of elections in 1996 was tenser than in 2003, the political uncertainty at the time of the 
1996 court decision was already almost non-existent.  
The decision in 2003, unlike in 1996, was made in a situation of an apparent relative certainty, 
but complete political vagueness and a true societal crack and disbelief in long-standing of the 
status-quo. The decision of the Constitutional Court, thus, may be interpreted as being 
motivated by the constitutional judges’ keenness to support the official winners, but also to 
“give a hand” to the potential future winners. If so, the constitutional judges were brilliant 
political analysts. The Court must have calculated thoroughly before making this decision, as 
the decision appeared optimally suitable for both parties to the political confrontation: it was 
just masterly balanced in a way to allow a potential alignment with the opposition, but not 
sufficiently destructive for the incumbent to consider an attack on the Court.  
Another question is intriguing in this context: if the rational Court’s calculations showed even a 
relative prevalence of the President, why did this Court choose to create any potential 
partnership with the immediate loser at all if its unequivocal support of the winner would make 
the latter even more powerful? The political orientation explanation offers an answer. In line 
with the earlier assumptions, courts perform pro-democratically if the situation so allows. The 
                                                 
289 This was due to the terrorist attack on the Parliament where the leaders of the dominant political parties, 
respectively the Prime Minister and the Chairman of the Parliament, were assassinated.  
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Armenian Court’s decision was as pro-democratic as the Court would afford in the existing 
circumstances.  
More importantly, whichever consideration prevailed for deciding the case, the effect of the 
decision was eventually pro-democratic. In fact, the call for a referendum, despite its vulnerable 
legal competence, was used as a politically valid basis for raising subsequent democratic 
momentum. The call for the referendum of confidence has since been the centerpiece of the 
mass movement headed by the oppositional coalition. This political protest culminated in the 
year after the noteworthy ruling of the Court, when it became evident that the authorities did 
not intend to give a life to the referendum and that it will remain the sentimental yearning of the 
Constitutional Court or the political interests emerged out of its recommendation.  
The political manifestation of the Constitutional Court, although not given a green light, 
produced an enormous democratic effect by instigating a mass public movement and probably 
seriously shaking the political monsters’ self-confidence in the almightiness of their power. 
However, what is especially crucial for the conceptual framework of this discussion, the 
analysis of this decision gives us a chance to defend the suggestion about the political 
effectiveness of constitutional review and its pro-democratic orientation. Whether acting as 
strategic actors or guided solely by ideological and altruistic motivations, the Court members in 
this case produced a pro-democratic decision, something which seems to be the most likely 
outcome of judicial review in a time of political uncertainty where the pro-democratic prospect 
clashes with a typical post-Soviet quasi-authoritarianism. 
 
2008. A response to Maidan290   
Presidential elections were held on February 19, and on February 24 the Armenian Central 
Electoral Commission announced the official results giving victory to Serzh Sarkissyan, the 
incumbent Prime Minister and a close ally of President Kocharyan. The CEC counted slightly 
more than 52% of all votes given to Sarkissyan and 21.4% to his major contender Levon Ter-
Petrosyan, the first Armenian President and the key contestant and running President in 1996.  
The latter filed a petition in the Constitutional Court challenging the constitutionality of the 
electoral practice, asserting ample abuse of power and irregularities during the voting process.  
                                                 
290 Maidan is a central square in Ukraine’s capital Kiev where the opposition held its mass manifestations leading to 
the Orange Revolution in 2004. The word has now become a symbol of any electoral revolutions of the “colored” 
style (see Chapter 2). It is now my conviction that the Armenian incumbents’ actions in 2008 were especially 
prepared to prevent the developments that once led to the defeat of the power-holders in Georgia, Ukraine and 
Kyrgyzstan. In particular, as it will be made explicit later in the text, the authorities were especially keen to prevent 
the Constitutional Court from leaning towards the opposition by eliminating any reasonable signs of political 
uncertainty. From this, I will argue, we can clearly deduct that the authorities had especially studied the case of 
Ukraine where the final decision in the confrontation was made by the Supreme Court under the pressure from the 
growing public protest and facing a complete political uncertainty. Here is why I call the actions of the Armenian 
government in 2009 to be a reaction to Maidan.    
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The case291 was decided by the Constitutional Court on March 8, and the Court endorsed the 
election of Sarkissyan as President.  Preceding the hearings, the political confrontation 
transmuted into continuous mass protests, largely imitating the familiar pattern of successful 
takeovers in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. The actions culminated in the dispersion of 
Ter-Petrosyan’s round-the-clock demonstration by security forces and in entailing clashes 
between the protesters and the police, resulting in violent actions, reportedly from both sides, 
taking the lives of several people and resulting in the arrests of many oppositional activists. 
These circumstances, evidently, heavily influenced the outcome of the review by the 
Constitutional Court.  
To begin, it needs to be mentioned that the judicial review of presidential elections in 2008 
involved two episodes, which differ substantially by the degree of political uncertainty and 
hence they represent completely different patterns of rational behavior by the Constitutional 
Court. The first episode involved Ter-Petrosyan’s pre-electoral petition to the Court,292 
challenging the constitutionality of the campaign run by the public television and other state-
controlled media against him and requesting the Court to recognize these facts as an 
insurmountable obstacle for a presidential candidate. In particular, the candidate argued that the 
National Tele-Radio Company and especially the “Hailur” news program violated the 
legislation by regularly and consistently broadcasting materials against him during the three 
preceding months. This petition preceded the date of the elections and was filed in a typical 
situation of relative uncertainty where the lead of Sarkissyan was confirmed by a number of 
opinion polls, but where Ter-Petrosyan was overwhelmingly successful in mobilizing the 
oppositional parties and the resources of the huge protesting electorate.  
The decision of the Constitutional Court in this case confirms the earlier developed hypothesis 
about the patterns of judicial behavior in a situation of relative uncertainty in which courts 
strive to officially endorse the expected winner but also to uphold, in a more equivocal manner, 
the other candidate. Specifically, the Court turned down Ter-Petrosyan’s request to consider the 
biased media campaign an insurmountable obstacle, but acknowledged, in a roundabout way, 
the illegality of abuse of public media resources for the purposes of one of the candidates. By 
doing so, the Court in fact recognized the intrinsic validity of the applicant’s argument in the 
case and the facts of violation of fundamental standards of equality by certain state bodies. 
Nevertheless, the Court abstained from properly adjudicating these (recognized) violations, 
referring to the limitations imposed on the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court by the law.     
The second episode, concerning the proper review of elections, represented a different political 
situation, where there was much less uncertainty.  This was for several reasons. First, as 
                                                 
291 See the decision DCC-736 of the Constitutional Court of Armenia of 8 March 2008.  
292 See the decision DCC-734 of the Constitutional Court of Armenia of 11 February 2008.  
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mentioned, the post-electoral developments ended up in the dispersion of demonstrations, mass 
arrests of Ter-Petrosyan’s supporters, and the imposition of an emergency rule banning further 
demonstrations, as well as the activities of several opposition parties and mass media. These 
actions allowed the authorities to get rid of any expected opposition movements by the time the 
case was tried in the Constitutional Court. At the same time, these actions prevented the public 
pressure on the Court through continuous mass demonstrations a few steps from the building of 
the Court on the eve of the decision, an impact which was observed to be crucial in 2004 in 
Ukraine.  
Second, the elections of 2008, unlike the earlier Armenian elections and those in other post-
Soviet countries, were overall positively assessed by the international observers. By the time 
the Court decided, Sarkissyan also received a great number of fellow congratulations from 
abroad. These facts significantly enhanced the political legitimacy of the elections and equally 
undermined the legitimacy of further actions by Ter-Petrosyan, notably contributing to 
shrinking of political uncertainty. No less important is that in 2008 the democratic slogans were 
employed and the pro-democratic electorate was mobilized by Levon Ter-Petrosyan, the same 
politician who, being the President in 1996, tolerated the electoral fraud and ordered 
suppression of the democratic protest. This fact undermined the democratic credentials of the 
public movement in 2008 and apparently negatively impacted support of the movement by the 
international community.293  
Finally, the actions undertaken by the authorities against the protests confirmed the readiness of 
the incumbents to commit to an oppressive rule for maintenance of their power. The political 
uncertainty suffered as it became obvious that the sitting political elite will stay either through 
democratic means or by terror. The Constitutional Court, exactly as in 1996, did not have a 
chance of defiance.       
The saga of the three Armenian elections allows for consistent conceptualization of judicial 
behavior during political confrontations. The second episode of 2008 and the case of 1996 
clearly represent the courts’ attitude in a time of certainty about the future holder of the key 
political office. Here courts plainly support the expected winners. The case of 2003 and the first 
(pre-electoral) episode of 2008 represent judicial behavior in a time of relative uncertainty, 
distinguished by an ambivalent diplomatic stance of courts which are trying to please both sides 
of the contest and are leaving room for prospective alignment in the case of a takeover.       
 
                                                 
293 For example, New York Times (see Dark Days in Armenia, N.Y. Times, March 7, 2008) wrote:”This is not a case 
of pure democratic virtue against pure authoritarian evil. The defeated opposition leader, Levon Ter-Petrossian, is a 




Ukraine. From politics of revolution to politics of survival 
 
Ukraine offers two particularly noteworthy cases of higher court involvement in bitter political 
confrontations. Remarkably, the two cases were decided by different courts as the Ukrainian 
Constitution does not empower the Constitutional Court to review electoral disputes. This fact, 
however, does not undermine our key hypotheses since the observed patterns relate to all higher 
courts, whether constitutional or general, in relation to their review of politically sensitive 
cases.  
The first case to be considered concerned the presidential elections in 2004.294 To jump ahead, 
the case has earned the reputation of being the milestone pattern of judicial bravery in the post-
Soviet area. An observer has called it “the landmark decision coming out of any judiciary in the 
former Soviet Union in the last thirteen years.”295 One US judge on the Court of Federal Claims 
in Washington compared the decision with Marbury296 and said that “the Supreme Court 
unequivocally restored the dignity of the entire judiciary and instilled hope in democracy.”297 
The pre-electoral and post-electoral developments during these presidential elections have 
become the theme of numerous volumes298 but to briefly summarize, the chronological 
narrative of the major developments is as follows. The outgoing president is implicated in 
corruption and murder, and in line with the best post-Soviet traditions, he backs his favorite 
“candidate of the power,” Viktor Yanukovych. The latter is also backed by Russia’s Putin. The 
opposition unites around the joint candidate, Viktor Yushchenko, supported by democratic 
countries. The pre-electoral competition witnesses cheating and widespread manipulation of the 
ballot. On the eve of the elections Yuschenko is poisoned. As it was observed to be the pattern 
in the region, the elections process was flawed and the results were bitterly contested by the 
opposition. The official figures in the first round gave about equal 39% to both Yanukovych 
and Yushchenko, while after the second round Yanukovych was given 49.42% against 
Yushchenko’s 46.69%. The results were denounced as rigged by the opposition and a number 
of international observers, and Yushchenko challenged these in the Supreme Court. The 
Supreme Court decided to appoint a re-run of the second round finding that the widespread 
electoral violations gave no chance for an accurate recount. In the re-run, Yushchenko received 
52% of votes, which brought him to the presidential office.       
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To review the behavior of the Ukrainian Supreme Court in 2004, several observations made 
earlier in this chapter merit attention. It needs to be observed, first of all, that the political 
situation at the time of the decision can uniquely represent a state of complete uncertainty in 
which case a pro-democratic attitude by courts was predicted. Not only did the official results 
show an approximate balance, but there was also an evident equal division of strategic 
resources, with the Eastern part of the country and Russia clearly standing for Yanukovych and 
the Western regions of the country, coupled with the democratic world, predominantly backing 
Yushchenko. Legitimacy might well be the concern and the best prospect for defense for the 
judges in this situation. At some point, the judges might well have felt that the evidence of 
violations, confirmed almost unanimously by all democratic observers, was too strong and the 
margin between the official results between the two candidates too small for affording a flawed 
judgment that would rank them among the anti-heroes of the national-democratic movement in 
the case of Yushchenko’s triumph. The factor of civic accountability makes the point more 
instructive. The situation when the Supreme Court was expected to decide on the case was 
described by a student in the following way: 
When the opposition brought its hundreds of individual complaints of election fraud to the 
court, the regime paid no notice; judges on the top bench were political appointees who owed 
their career to Kuchma and his chief of staff, Medvedchuk. As a result, when Polish president 
Alexander Kwasniewski suggested during the round-table talks that the Supreme Court hearing 
should be televised, Kuchma agreed. But the instant Poroshenko’s 5th Channel started 
broadcasting the hearings to the crowds on Maidan, the judges became as accountable to the 
people outside as they were to Kuchma and Medvedchuk.299  
Evidently, the authorities in Kiev were overly confident about the Court’s loyalty to them- an 
aspect which also merits attention in the context of our analysis.300 Their “court-project” should 
have been based on trust in the political partisanship of their appointees on one hand, and on 
the judges’ fear of an attack on the other. Apparently, the project of power-reproduction by the 
Ukrainian ruling elite had cautiously launched a pre-electoral campaign of harassing judges to 
make sure that control over them could be assured.301 But as we previously observed, the 
factors predetermining courts’ agency to the incumbent power, absolutely effective during the 
regular tenure of incumbents, may no longer constrain the judges in times of political transition 
and uncertainty when the address of the power on the next day of the court’s decision is not 
easy to guess or when the future power holder is decided by the courts themselves. The 
situation of political uncertainty, evidently, created its own rules and incentives for the 
Ukrainian players.  
This entire analysis can be further tested by the next case from Ukraine. In April 2007, after the 
“orange” President Yushchenko’s controversial decree dissolving the Supreme Rada (the 
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Parliament)302 was appealed by the “blue” camp of then Prime Minister Yanukovych who 
enjoyed the support of parliamentary majority, the Constitutional Court justices found 
themselves unable to issue any judgment on the case. The developments with the long expected 
decision of the Court recalled a Hollywood thriller: constitutional justices, arguably loyal to 
either one of the camps, reported pressure from political powers; several judges reported 
threats; the Chief Justice filed resignation immediately after the Presidential decree was issued; 
the Parliament, which was meant to be dissolved, accused the President of putting pressure on 
the Constitutional Court; one of the justices was immediately accused of corruption by the 
President’s camp.303 Some other developments crossed the borders between reality (even the 
Ukrainian political reality) and the genre of blockbuster fantasy: at one point, some of the 
constitutional judges were physically prevented from entering the Court house by the 
supporters of one of the parties. Furthermore, Yushchenko dismisses three judges arguably 
loyal to the Yanukovych camp even before the expected verdict was released. As a reply, the 
Parliament issues an order dismissing five pro-Presidential judges. Not the end yet: the 
Presidential decree dismissing the three non-loyal justices gets invalidated by a provincial court 
of first instance; one of these three judges then becomes Chief Justice after the former Head of 
the Court finally resigns. At the end of the day, the Constitutional Court fails to decide on the 
case, and the conflict was resolved through out-of-court conflict settlement resulting in a 
political compromise on new elections.  
At first glance, the case defects the earlier hypotheses of this analysis. In a new situation 
resembling political uncertainty, a court abstained from the supposed pro-democratic attitude, 
practically damaging its own legitimate mandate at the expense of its standing and reputation. 
This may, however, turn out to be a premature conclusion if we apply the observed patterns of 
judicial behavior to the political context accurately. To begin, necessary shifts in the paradigms, 
creating considerable differences between the political contexts in 2004 and 2007, have to be 
observed.  
First, it is essential to differentiate between the types of political uncertainty in these cases for 
correctly predicting the fundamental construction of judicial behavior. The political uncertainty 
of 2004 was due to a contest based predominantly on a zero-sum setting of presidential 
elections where “the winner takes all” logic is embedded in the structure of the political game 
and its players’ psychology. On the contrary, the case of 2007 was to be decided in a political 
situation which was due to a long-running and predictably enduring political confrontation 
which involved a more comprehensive struggle for political dominance than a single campaign 
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for the presidential office. Between 2004 and 2007, Ukrainian political life was dominated by 
the continuing consolidation of rivalry between the “orange” and the “blue” camps with the 
technologies of political contest now diverging from the presidential elections’ one-off zero-
sum style. In particular, these developments witnessed a crackdown in the post-electoral 
“orange” camp, which allowed a further consolidation of the “blue”, with the latter gaining 
control over the Parliament, making President Yushchenko to appoint his earlier rival 
Yanukovych to the post of Prime Minister. In sum, the situation in 2004 was a complete 
political uncertainty related to the one-off political game of presidential elections, while the 
confrontation in 2007 culminated as a long-standing comprehensive political battle creating 
anticipation of a stable long-standing uncertainty. The newly-observed phenomenon of a 
predictably long-standing uncertainty reverses the paradigm of political opportunism typical of 
the uncertainty of zero-sum settings as in these new circumstances, as opposed to presidential 
elections, the expected winner of tomorrow will not necessarily coincide with the winner of the 
day after.            
Another shift was due to the blurring of the democratic credentials of the rival camps. In 
comparison to 2004 when the game was constructed on a clear-cut delineation between the 
“orange” side as a pro-democratic liberal movement and the “blue” one as a rather moderate in 
its democratic programs, the confrontation in 2007 somewhat reversed the democratic 
paradigm with the blue camp now acting from the positions of the majority and in quite 
principal observance of democratic procedures and the constitution, while President 
Yushchenko was now attacked as the one abusing the power. This impression was especially 
strengthened by vulnerability of the constitutional grounds for dissolution of the Rada by the 
President.304 Evidently, the actions of the incumbents- in this particular situation the both 
camps holding a portion of executive functions- did not abstain from putting pressure and 
attempting attacks on the Court, of which the reports about threats, accusations, and dismissals 
of judges are proof.   
Overall, the shifts in the major paradigms disable the key rational factors which would 
predetermine a specific conduct by a judiciary during most of the classic situations arising in 
post-Soviet states: political opportunism based on a rational evaluation of the political situation 
and prediction of the future winner, and legitimacy and public championing. Being deprived of 
these two major orientations, Ukrainian constitutional judges most likely faced a situation of 
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contingency where their choice was to resort to non-alignment through simple abstention 
guaranteeing survival but sacrificing reputation and legitimacy.    
 
 
Kyrgyzstan. Non-consolidation of the executive and judicial defiance  
 
Both noteworthy cases of higher court involvement in the politics of Kyrgyzstan took place in 
the few last months of 2007. In September, the Constitutional Court of this country ruled that 
the constitutional reforms adopted during the severe political turmoil in the months of 
November and December of 2006 were null and void. Three months later, several days after the 
parliamentary elections, its fellow Supreme Court overturned the ruling of the Central Electoral 
Commission that would let only one, pro-presidential, party to sit in the Parliament. Both cases 
were embedded in the leitmotiv of the long-standing political turbulence which was shaking the 
country for more than two years.    
The Republic of Kyrgyzstan- reportedly the most progressive regional player in Central 
Asia305- never saw such political turmoil as the one which started in 2005. In this year, the 
formerly Soviet republic’s first and only President since the independence, Askar Akayev, had 
to flee the country after an upraising caused by rigged parliamentary elections.306 Since, the 
newly elected President, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, had failed to steadily consolidate the executive 
power, being involved over and over in numerous standoffs with the country’s Parliament and 
strong oppositional movements. In the recent times, these confrontations especially reflected in 
the cause over the constitutional reforms which each of the parties pushed to echo their own 
political interests. In November 2006, the Parliament’s majority had voted for constitutional 
amendments considerably shifting the country’s political organization towards a parliamentary 
system that would heavily destroy the incumbent President’s power. In only a month, however, 
the Parliament had adopted some new changes somewhat restoring the presidential 
prerogatives. While these political standoffs underwent yet another revival throughout 2007, 
the Constitutional Court suddenly decided to annul both reforms of 2006, restoring the 
constitutional status quo of the pre-revolutionary period.307 The Court soundly motivated its 
decision by the fundamental procedural requirement that constitutional changes be made only 
by a referendum thus finding the Parliament exceeding its capacity.  
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This decision by the Constitutional Court, arguably giving new additional opportunities for the 
opposition to resist the consolidation of the executive power, met the angry reaction of the 
fragmented Parliament which voted “no confidence” in the Court. The reaction from the 
President was more balanced and more constructive. He simply complied with the ruling by 
putting his own new project of constitutional reforms on referendum to be held in a month. 
Meanwhile, Bakiyev diplomatically used the moment for getting rid of the turbulent legislature 
by dissolving it for failing to resolve the ongoing standoff and stagnation. The new 
Constitution, voted for at the referendum, introduced at least one substantial change- a shift to a 
party-based electoral system which eventually would help the President to consolidate.  
The new elections, held in December, proved Bakiyev’s acumen. The fragmented opposition 
failed to strongly mobilize in a short period before the elections. As a result, the pro-
presidential party appeared to be the only contender which clearly passed the barrier, getting 
almost 50% of the votes. While its overall win was without doubt, the strongest oppositional 
parties were about to be excluded from the legislature at all though they passed the national 
barrier of 5%. This was due to an extravagant interpretation of the electoral code by the Central 
Electoral Commission which insisted on a regional barrier of 0.5% of all votes to be received in 
a single region, in addition to the main national barrier. The supposed regional barrier was not 
passed by any political party except the pro-presidential one. The Supreme Court over-ruled the 
decision of the Central Electoral Commission upon the petition by an oppositional party giving 
it a green light to the Parliament.308  
The two cases confirm the premises of our analytical exercise. The political situation with a 
non-consolidated executive allowed the Courts to demonstrate considerably independent 
position deviating from the optimal outcome sought by the incumbent. This situation 
essentially departs from the earlier discussed Ukrainian pattern of stable contingent uncertainty 
which disabled rather than enabled the Constitutional Court. Unlike the situation in Kyrgyzstan, 
where the executive failed to consolidate but retained its monopoly on the government, the 
Ukrainian case shall be rather characterized by a consolidated double-executive where the 
executive power was divided between the President and the Prime Minister representing rival 
political camps and each holding considerable decision-making functions. This “double-
executive” paradigm did not lift the constraints on the courts, but only doubled them.  
In contrast, the single non-consolidated executive in Kyrgyzstan was just not strong enough for 
constraining higher courts in a way that it would not deteriorate its own shaky status. The 
relatively long-standing survival of the Kyrgyz political turbulence and the weak executive 
since 2005 had uniquely enabled a considerably free regime with a somewhat strong sense of 
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constitutionality, where the players had apparently adhered to the separation of powers and the 
democratic rules of the game. This observation supports the underlying thesis of this work that 
constitutional courts demonstrate due behavior unless they are subject to improper constraints 
from the political branches.  
Another observation is in line with the conceptual framework drawn before. While the behavior 
of courts in both Kyrgyz cases deviated from the standard of dumb loyalty to the dominant 
political alliance, the deeper analysis of these cases may nevertheless confirm an archetypal 
performance typical to the situation of a relative political uncertainty. In the situation of a 
relative uncertainty the behavior of courts was observed to be balanced; the courts may decide 
contrary to the politicians’ interests only in a way that is not destructive for the political agenda 
of the dominant party. The study of the political outcomes of both cases proves that these 
decision were not only not destructive for the President, but were also mostly in line with his 
main political plans. For example, one paper, written in the pre-electoral period, comments on 
the political consequences of the decision of the Constitutional Court in the following way:  
Some conclusions can already be drawn out of the current political crisis: First, President 
Bakiyev has now the possibility to provide for a new parliament, which will be more obedient 
than the old one. He is likely to influence the referendum, the preparations for the elections, the 
elections themselves, or all of them. … Secondly, and emerging from the first conclusion, the 
political scene in Kyrgyzstan might see some stabilization if the newly elected parliament would 
adopt a more conciliatory stand towards the government.309  
The accuracy of this analysis can be confirmed by the very outcomes of the elections and by the 
post-electoral state of stability and consolidation of the executive that took place in the country. 
In fact, the decision of the Constitutional Court, apparently defiant, was well in the interests of 
the President Bakiyev. Not to be a surprise, the influential Chairwoman of the Court ended up 
leading the pro-presidential party’s list in the parliamentary elections and was afterwards 
elected as the Vice Speaker of the Parliament. The decision of the Supreme Court, diluting the 
monopoly of the pro-presidential political party, did not undermine the party’s forthcoming 
dominance and hence hardly posed any serious damages to the President’s political interests 
either.        
Strikingly, both decisions were intended to produce legitimacy and public appraisal for the 
courts. An analyst observed that by responding to the petition on the validity of constitutional 
reforms, the Constitutional Court and its Chair received a positive approval from the public.”310 
Both decision were also largely in line with the best standards of constitutional democracy as 
one held the partisan constitutional reforms void and the other banned the one-party 
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representation in parliament. This is also in line with the observation of typical patterns of 
judicial behavior during the time of a relative uncertainty.      
The Kyrgyz cases confirm the hypotheses of this work but these cases originate from a so far 
unprecedented political regime tolerating judicial independence and respect for basic 
institutions of constitutional democracy. Although likely due to the failures in timely 
consolidation of the executive power, the atmosphere of constitutionalism and of a culture of 
political interaction enabling the judiciary as a relatively independent segment of the power is 
highly unusual in post-Soviet area. Whether or not this atmosphere becomes sustainable or it 
proves having lived only a short transitional period will get tested by the pending performance 
of Kyrgyz courts under by now an increasingly consolidating presidential authority. 
 
 
C. Should there be political empowerment? 
 
In April of 2007, after the “orange” President Yushchenko’s controversial decree dissolving the 
Supreme Rada (the Parliament) was appealed by the “blue” camp of Prime-Minister 
Yanukovich in Ukraine, the Constitutional Court justices found themselves unable to issue any 
judgment on the case.311  
The “thriller” with the Constitutional Court’s judges would perhaps not become a wanted 
chronicle for political and constitutional analysts so much if the exciting developments ended 
up in the most essential deliverable that the court was expected to produce in the situation of 
political deadlock: a decision resolving the legal controversy over the constitutionality of the 
Presidential decree dissolving the Rada.  Finally, was this not the primary responsibility of the 
Court? 
The above narrative is paradigmatic for our discussion. In fact, it relates to issues which should 
be high on the agenda of constitutional scholars and which involve important items for 
constitutional designers. The reluctance of constitutional judges to come up with any decision 
and their readiness even to resign, sacrificing their career of chief judicial officers in the 
country, rather than to issue any decision, is not as anecdotal and accidental as it may seem. 
The record of political involvement of constitutional courts in post-Soviet countries proves to 
be not very encouraging for constitutional judges: as mentioned once or twice elsewhere in this 
work, the Constitutional Court in Russia was suspended by Yeltzin in 1993 after its overly 
activist interference into the severe battle between the President and the Parliament; the Court 
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in Kazakhstan, thanks to its political activism, was abolished by President Nazarbayev in 1995; 
in Belarus, Lukashenka forced the Court to resign in 1996. After all, how can the constitutional 
judges be sure of their own security when they witness widespread harassment, murders, plots, 
conspiracy and even poisoning312 of dissenting politicians and activists and when the future of 
political power, often so crucial for regional geopolitical fights, depends upon their mere 
decision?     
Is it then a surprise that the judges in Ukraine do prefer to abstain from deciding on the case 
when any decision of the court would unavoidably upset one of the two influential and 
powerful sides to the confrontation? As already mentioned, avoiding politically sensitive cases 
was observed to be typical to the Russian Constitutional Court in its second incarnation.313 
Similar observations were made about the Ukrainian Constitutional Court too. It was said, in 
particular, that the Court had refrained from adjudication of matters containing major political 
disputes in the pursuance of its “survival strategy” in the uneasy controversy between the 
political actors.314  
There is another perspective on the discussion. Whether or not one should be too critical to 
such “strange” behavior of constitutional courts, “abstentionism” is in fact often the only way 
out for constitutional courts which find themselves confined in between their primary 
responsibilities imposed by constitutions and the considerations of personal well-being or 
political expediency. The paradox of the situation is formed by the massive mismatch between 
the institutional ideals of politically strong courts and the political environment in which these 
courts would need to operate. This political environment, as already emphasized in Chapter 2, 
proved to be distinguished by an intrinsic tendency to concentration of political power where 
any opposition to the self of the sole power center would be oppressed by any possible ways. 
The constitutional courts, in this context, largely stay constrained by politicians all over the 
region. Their status has not changed too much even in those countries where the democratic 
development got a political sponsorship, to which the Ukrainian case discussed above is a very 
good illustration.   
The institutional design of politically powerful courts brings these tribunals close to the orbits 
of the vital interests of the super-strong politicians, which makes due performance of these 
functions by courts unrealistic. Being incapable to duly respond to political inquiries, courts 
face erosion of their legitimacy as a result of necessitated abstention from their responsibilities. 
Hence, the functions which were granted to constitutional courts to precisely make them strong 
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eventually became the cause for their major weakness. I call this the “paradox of political 
empowerment”. 
In light of the nearly axiomatic fact that the concentration of power and the imperatives for its 
reproduction proved to be and still remain the main independent variable impacting the 
relationship between state bodies, was it wise in the past and is it still wise now to insist on the 
political empowerment of post-Soviet constitutional courts? 
Although not ever becoming a central theme of academic discussion, the question whether or 
not one should have opted for such generous political empowerment of constitutional courts in 
such vulnerable political environments as in post-Soviet countries has nevertheless been 
addressed by students of post-communist courts. Thus, having in mind especially the “sad” 
experience of the first Russian Court, which found itself in a trouble when involved in the 
political controversy between President Yeltzin and the retro-minded Parliament in 1993, 
Herman Schwartz warned against continuous insistence on both judicial activism and an 
institutional design of constitutional courts enabling unavoidable clashes with super-strong 
presidents (in particular, he argued against granting to constitutional courts a power to resolve 
electoral disputes and especially to verify the results of presidential election that is always 
associated with partisan politics and is full of a danger of the loss of the courts’ reputation and 
public standing).315 An analogous argument comes from Epstein, Knight and Shvetsova who 
appreciate Russia’s “second” Constitutional Court’s way for becoming legitimate and strong 
actor by sustaining its legitimacy through a long process of compromises, abstention from 
deciding on issues which are within the limits of “tolerance intervals” of stronger political 
branches and thus avoidance of conflicts with them.316 The opposition to the “political” 
responsibilities has been explicitly voiced also by several constitutional judges. For one, a 
justice from Armenia reported in a paper: 
Certainly, during adjudication of these (political) cases the Constitutional Court gets 
involuntarily involved into politics. Constitutional courts have been used and they will be used 
as an instrument of political struggles. Despite their impartiality and objectivity, constitutional 
courts are obliged to act in between the provinces of law and politics. In such cases, any 
decision is having a negative impact on the reputation of courts and raises unavoidable political 
accusations. It is especially dangerous for young democracies where the institutions of 
constitutional justice are in the stage of consolidation, they are still very fragile and they do not 
enjoy the support of the citizens of the country who have not reached a sufficient level of 
constitutionality and legal and political culture.317  
The rationale behind these positions may be well-graspable: political empowerment of 
constitutional courts often makes them find a compromise between the real merits of a case and 
                                                 
315 Schwartz, supra note 5, p. 244-245. Eventually, Schwartz suggested that “constitutional court should not have to 
deal with any nonconstitutional question except perhaps for the impeachment of the president.” It is, however, not 
made clear by him why should impeachments especially stay under constitutional courts’ jurisdiction and in which 
way are the impeachment cases less “dangerous” for these tribunals than the other politically sensitive cases.   
316 Epstein et al, supra note 187.  
317 Felix Tokhyan, supra note 212.  
115 
 
the need to please politically powerful litigants, and while the latter considerations 
predominantly take over due to the existing political reality, as previously described, the courts 
often have to sacrifice nothing less than their legitimacy and reputation by staying subservient 
to their political masters. Herman Schwartz’s position stands for exactly keeping the courts 
away from political involvement which necessarily brings to either of destructive consequences 
for the constitutional courts: “commit a suicide” by sustaining their independence stance in a 
political question (and then get dissolved, or fall under the risk of personal attack), or lose their 
reputation and public standing by staying “loyal” to the existing political masters. The lesson 
for institutional designers might sound straightforward: let the constitutional courts be free 
from the duty to decide on the results of elections, conflicts between political branches and 
other “politically dangerous” cases by removing such “political questions” from the 
constitutional courts’ agendas. 
I hesitate for two major reasons. While the point about saving the constitutional courts 
reputation and standing by removing the political items from their agenda by means of 
institutional design is pretty much perceived, I consider the negative, destructive effects of 
designating politically disempowered courts on the prospects of contribution by constitutional 
courts to the process of democratic consolidation in post-Soviet countries.  
Firstly, I respect constitutional courts’ separation of powers responsibility as a key 
indispensable agency in consolidation of the institutions of constitutionalism.  
In the first chapter we observed that genuine consolidation is a matter of fundamental support 
of respective institutions by the basic constituency, the society in case. The important 
determinant of the transition towards the desired political regime is the mental appreciation of 
the values of that regime, rather than a formal institutional transformation. How and in what 
way do the formal institutions matter? They do matter as far as they contribute to the intrinsic 
appreciation of the system: as far as the formal institutions transform the formal transplanted 
rules (of democracy or constitutional democracy) into internally accepted practices or, in other 
words, only to the extent that they are received by their constituency. Institutions thus make a 
change by becoming part of the local (political) culture.  
We also observed that the capacity of formal institutions to change the culture is the principal 
opportunity for the aspiring democracies. Formal institutions become part of that culture 
through stable and legitimate performance, by shaping the “plastic” properties of the political 
culture. Their persisting performance generates path dependent inertia, which is then self-
evolving or self-reinforcing.318  
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The lessons from institutionalist studies are easy to get translated into the language of our 
discussion. While the old structures pose the main limitation to the proper functioning of the 
institutions of the new generation in the post-Soviet countries (as we observed to be the case 
with let’s say the tendency to concentration of power- a clear heritage of either pre-Bolshevik 
or Bolshevik legacies), the institutional engineering should in the first instance consider the 
formation and promotion of institutions of pluralistic government and power sharing which can 
in the best way break with the destructive legacies and facilitate the development of necessary 
new patterns within the societies in a long-term perspective. I consider this the first and 
foremost mission an institutional designer should bear in mind. This approach spells out the 
basic axiom of new institutional wisdom in social science that political institutions not only 
reflect the environmental context but also create them.319   
The classics of institutional theory by March and Olsen also provides in part that political 
institutions’ major activity is “educating individuals into knowledgeable citizens.”320 This 
overall logic is an enormously crucial guide for institutional design aiming at production of 
intrinsic support of a new regime. This role of institutions represents their fundamental 
responsibility in the regime change, in contrast to the “mechanical” impact of institutions on the 
level of political hardware. The virtue of institutions is in the ability to shape the “plastic” 
properties of political culture through a long and routine process when institutions prove to 
obtain the support of the political constituency enabling it with the necessary legitimacy for 
consolidation. Respectively, the virtue of the institutional design is in giving the stage to the 
institutional programs that will guide the long routine of cultural transformation in the 
designated direction. The kind of software-oriented strategy, given it is sustainable at the local 
context and functional by its hardware, shall entail a quality change in the level of support for 
democratic institutions and values that are the core of democratic consolidation. 
The basic implication of such “software-oriented” strategies for the construction of the judicial 
review courts shall induce to consideration of the typical and well-represented political-cultural 
ills that the institution of judicial review could have cured, to mentioned but a few most 
destructive ones: inherent concentration of power as a typical heritage of older soviet and pre-
soviet legacies of authoritarianism, lack of balancing by the separated branches of the 
government, ignorance of the judiciary as a guarantor of the constitutional power structures, 
and lack of respect for fundamental human freedoms and rights. And while the point on saving 
the constitutional courts’ reputation by exempting them from the review of political questions 
has its obvious merits, in the larger context it stays unclear who should replace these courts, as 
key agents which are responsible for constitutionalism in general and controlling separation of 
                                                 
319 James March and Johan Olsen, supra note 14, at 162.  
320 March and Olsen, id., at 161. 
117 
 
powers in particular, in their important role of shaping the “plastic”321 properties of political 
culture and “educating individuals into knowledgeable citizens”322.  
The capacity of institutions to educate individuals- and first of all the individuals in charge of 
political power- into knowledgeable citizens is the major promise of institution-building. Let 
me refer to President Yeltzin- the same man who suspended a constitutional court in 1993, 
saying only after five years that the ruling of the Constitutional Court is binding upon him even 
though he dislikes it.323 Indeed, what would educate Yeltzin into a knowledgeable citizen and a 
constitution-abiding president if one opted for a politically weak court?  
Secondly, political empowerment of constitutional courts is the only institutional format that 
allows significant democratic contributions by these tribunals in the strategic “Trojan-horse” 
fashion. This perspective was comprehensively discussed above in this chapter. Apparently 
perfect agents of the existing political regimes in such cases, in reality constitutional courts are 
genuinely discontent with the non-democratic state of affairs in their respective countries. 
Being aligned with dominant political parties by the force of informal constraints imposed on 
them, these courts are likely to become the Trojan horses of new, pro-democratic political 
parties if the political situation approaches equilibrium between the anti-democratic and pro-
democratic candidates for the future government.  
This strategic style of democratic contributions is especially related to the implementation of 
the political responsibilities. Electoral cases, referenda, cases on political parties and 
jurisdictional disputes appear to be the most sensitive and politically charged items in the list of 
functions of constitutional tribunals. Yet, these are the ones which especially allow investing of 
the inherent democratic potential of constitutional courts into the business of democratization.  
However, the opposition to the political disempowerment does not itself address the paradox of 
political empowerment. How should the latter be resolved? Should we ignore the drawbacks of 
political empowerment for the sake of preserving the potential for democratic contributions by 
constitutional courts? 
I offer an alternative perspective where the solution to the paradox of political empowerment is 
not seen in the abandonment of political responsibilities, but in revision of the constitutional 
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It was argued in this chapter that the political disempowerment of constitutional courts in post-
Soviet countries would deprive these societies in transition of two main ways in which their 
constitutional courts can impact the democratic development. First, without mandates to resolve 
political questions, the courts would not be involved in the resolution of electoral and other 
conflicts in times of political uncertainty when they promise to become the allies of more pro-
democratic parties. Second, the designers of the constitutions would deprive the countries of 
their strongest instrument of constitutionalism, which, although apparently not often effective 
due to executive monopolization of power, could ultimately prove to have its subtle albeit 
substantial impact on the political culture in the long-run institutional change that is brought 
about by the persistent functioning of formal institutions.  
Regardless of how strong the position against political responsibilities of constitutional courts 
is, the two above-mentioned arguments should convince to look for other solutions to the 
drawbacks of political empowerment than eliminating it. Two points merit attention in this 
regard. Firstly, it is fairly obvious that politically empowered post-Soviet constitutional courts, 
though often discredited, are nevertheless better for democratic development than they would 
be if deprived of political functions and performed merely formal roles. Secondly, an 
institutional solution to a problem such as elimination of the responsibilities which cause this 
problem looks to be a resolution as simplistic and straightforward as the pulling of a tooth after 
the first signs of it causing pain. In a way, this approach assumes incapacity of institutions to 
adjust to the environments through modification and implantation, submitting to the bankruptcy 
of designer arsenal. In our epoch of institutional globalization, where the borrowings, 
transplants, hybrids and know-how dominate the agenda of institutional designers, this point of 
view does not sound convincing. The next chapter will attempt to offer an alternative to 
constitutional courts’ political disempowerment which is instigated by the search for sound 
experimentalism in a quest to cure, adjust and implant this important institution instead of 













PROJECTING AN OPTIMAL DESIGN OF POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT 
 
   A. Targeting the constitutionalization of politics 
 
In the previous chapter, it was mentioned that judicialization of politics is one of the most 
overwhelming trends throughout the world.324 This tendency proves innate wherever countries 
and societies make steps towards democracy. Whether in Asia, or the post-Soviet Eurasia, or 
still in Europe, democracy brings courts to politics which turn to become considerably bound 
by constitution and the courts: recently we witnessed the judiciary in Pakistan playing an 
important role in political developments in this country;325 the Kyrgyz Constitutional and 
Supreme Courts actively involved in the democratic processes in this country;326 higher courts 
in Central and East European countries, from Hungary to Ukraine, have to some considerable 
extent determined the course of  political processes in post-communist Europe since the 
collapse of the communist regime.327 Against this background, it seems that the inferences 
about the democratic potential of the global spread of judicialization are well grounded,328 
though the students of courts and politics hardly have only one opinion about this statement.329  
That judicialization, or to be more precise, “judicial constitutionalization”330 of politics would 
be good for democratic development in post-authoritarian countries of my research, where the 
regimes used to tend and still keep tending to abusive concentration, is suggested by a strong 
intuition. After all, the political practice in these countries is so corrupt and discredited that any 
subordination of politics to a law or rules of game would be a great improvement. In light of the 
degree of lawlessness and political abuse in many of the subject countries since the beginning 
of the 90-ies and often up until now, this statement sounds convincing enough. However, if the 
                                                 
324 Supra note 235-236.  
325 In particular, in 2007 the Supreme Court of Pakistan entered into a standing opposition to the country’s President 
Pervez Musharraf and assumed the interim leadership of the resistance to Musharraf’s growing authoritarian rule. 
The conflict between the Court and the President culminated in the same year after the latter made an attempt to 
resign the Chief Justice of the Court. But more to the point, the Supreme Court played an especially decisive role 
when it reserved the last word in Musharraf’s plan to impose an emergency rule and to get reelected as president 
while staying the chief commander of the army. See Whit Mason, “Order v. Law in Pakistan”, World Policy Journal, 
Spring 2008, Vol. 25, N 1, 59-71.    
326 As discussed in the preceding chapter.  
327 For Hungary, see footnote 5. For Ukraine, see the discussion on this country in the previous chapter.  
328 Tom Ginsburg, supra note 196.   
329 Ran Hirschl (see Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism, supra note 
235, is probably the most vigorous critique of the statements about democratic credentials of the widespread 
judicialization in our days. In Towards Juristocracy, he rejects the “mainstream” appraisal of the democratic nature 
of the worldwide expansion of judicial review by examining the political aspects of constitutional judicial review in 
Canada, New Zealand, Israel and South Africa, which brings him to a conclusion about the political origins of and 
strategic considerations underneath the trend towards juristocracy all over the world.    
330 See Richard Pildes, “The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics-The Supreme Court, 2003 Term”, 118 
Harvard Law Review 29 (2004), at 34. 
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need of these societies was merely constitutionalism as order, one could observe a certain 
degree of “constitutionalism” being achieved in many of these countries. As an example, 
Richard Sakwa, a famous student of Russian politics, shows that the authorities in modern 
Russia are to a large degree bound by the frames of the Russian Constitution and that “the letter 
of the Constitution is the ground over which much of politics in contemporary Russia is 
fought.”331  
If so, what type of constitutionalism do we want for these countries? In essence, if we reduce 
constitutionalism to simply an order and if we reduce rule of law to simply effective law 
enforcement, one could speak of constitutionalism in present-day Russia and rule of law in the 
Soviet Union. I think of a completely different, a genuine image of constitutionalism, and I 
argue that praising formal constitutionalism, which one finds in many post-Soviet countries, 
does not make any sense because the type of “constitutionalism” in case is both misleading of 
the legitimate democratic value-system and is instrumentally accommodating for non-
democratic abuse of power. As opposed to it, the desired order to arrive at should be the one 
based not on a nominal or a façade constitution,332 but a constitution proper- a frame of 
political society for the purpose of restraining arbitrary power.333  
In which mode of judicial interpretation can the judges better serve the needs of genuine 
constitutionalism and democratic development? To jump forward, my position shall be 
anchored on Ronald Dworkin’s ideal of constitution as a theoretical framework embodying 
moral rights against the state.334 If so, any one who is familiar with this theory will easily guess 
the leaning of my court project towards a compliment to activist judging by means of which the 
judiciary “must be prepared to frame and answer questions of political morality.”335  
This chapter will start by arguing that when the existing legal culture “requires” judges to 
strictly follow the rules and procedures put down in laws and when these rules and procedures 
are fine-tuned to serve the needs of incumbent political elites- and plenty of evidence will be 
submitted to show that this is what we have in post-Soviet countries until now- the norms of 
democracy can not be upheld but only if judges activate the genuine meaning of the 
constitutions which are written in the language of modern democratic standards. Among the 
constitutional court cases discussed in the previous chapter, two are striking by the language 
and reasoning of courts which derive from the concepts and principles of constitutional 
democracy rather than from the rules and norms micro-regulating the activity of these courts 
and the outcome of their decisions. First, this is the case of the 2003 presidential elections in 
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334 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth 1977), at 147. 
335 Id.  
121 
 
Armenia and the judgment of the Constitution Court concerning the controversy over the 
results of the elections.336 As discussed at length, the Court, having upheld the results of 
presidential elections, submitted a non-binding recommendation addressed to the major 
political forces with a call to hold a “referendum of confidence” for overcoming the results of 
the social stand-off. Neither was the Court authorized per se to deliver such recommendations, 
nor did the laws of the country provide for the institution of the “referendum of confidence”. 
The Court’s manifestation was based on an inventive and creative interpretation of the 
Constitution, particularly of the Preamble to the Constitution with its general statements about 
civic harmony and democratic principles, though neither did the Preamble expressly provide for 
the option of the referendum as a means to overcome political confrontation. Second, it is the 
2007 decision of the Constitutional Court of Kyrgyzstan invalidating the constitutional 
amendments passed by the Parliament of this country.337 Here too, the Constitutional Court was 
not expressly given a right by the Constitution or the laws to act in such a manner.  
In an essay reflecting on the issue of judicial independence,338 Kim Lane Scheppele mentions 
the two techniques applied in these cases among the tools which courts in different countries 
are using for reacting to political pressure which often comes in the form of explicitly detailed 
laws: activating constitutional preambles,339 declaring constitutional amendments 
unconstitutional,340 changing the accepted rules of procedure and standing of the court,341 
recalling general principles of law or morality which are not mentioned in the text of the 
constitution.342 Obviously, these adjudicative instruments contain a fair portion of constitutional 
lawmaking as they entail “modification of the constitution through adjudication (interpretation 
or application)”.343  
Judicial activism comes to the fore, whether or not one is comfortable with the degree of 
controversy related with this phenomenon. To begin, the reactions of the politicians, the public, 
or the academics have not always been complimentary of it. There are perhaps not so many 
issues about the judiciary and its organization more controversial than the issue of judicial 
activism. The debate and controversy involve not only the normative questions about the 
legitimacy of this style of judicial practice, but also the term’s definition and its exact 
                                                 
336 Supra note 288.  
337 Supra note 307.  
338 Kim Lane Scheppele, “Declaration of Independence: Judicial Reaction to Political Pressure,” in Judicial 
Independence at the Crossroads; An Interdisciplinary Approach, edited by Stephen Burbank and Barry Friedman 
(CUP 2002). 
339 Id. at 248. The landmark 1971 case of the French Conseil Constitutionnel (Décision n° 71-44 du 16 juillet 1971), 
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meaning.344 In this work I should avoid attending the debate and its intricacies as this would 
obviously be beyond our intentions. In light of the observed variety of definitions of the phrase 
“judicial activism” and their divergence, the term, standing alone, does not mean anything 
unless one discloses the exact meaning in which it is going to be used.   
For the purposes of this research, I will exclusively adhere to an understanding of the term 
“judicial activism” as a style of judicial interpretation which is intended at protection of 
constitutional principles and for this reason can depart from the existing precedent or the 
accepted interpretation of the original constitutional meaning- a perspective on judicial activism 
which has exclusively positive connotations related with the judicial protection of constitutional 
rights.345 At the same time, as a substitute to the term “judicial activism” in the mentioned 
meaning and in reference to what I want to advocate for post-Soviet constitutional review 
courts, I will interchangeably pass to alternative explications of the judicial interpretative 
method, these alternatives being the conceptual “moral reading” of Ronald Dworkin346 and the 
more specific but spatially relevant “taking critical distance on the statutes” of Kim Lane 
Scheppele.347 I will advocate a constitutional reading of a style which accepts a main line of 
understanding the essence of constitutions as basic, higher law, law of principles and moral 
values preceding the written law and the mere will of majorities.  
My attempt, further on, will be to advocate the thick notion of constitution and 
constitutionalism and the respective interpretative methods from the perspective of the 
functional needs of transitions. Hence, I campaign that constitutionalization proper of politics 
through judicial activism is absolutely desired in post-Soviet societies for at least two essential 
functions that it could perform in a transition: it could indeed empower courts, strengthen their 
independence and promote separation of powers, but also, and perhaps above all, it would in 
effect help activating the genuine meaning of democracy and hence contribute to the core 
institutional learning and appreciation of democracy which we observed earlier to be the most 
essential pre-requisite for democratic consolidation.  
 
Activating democracy 
                                                 
344 It is even impossible to give any comprehensive reference to the most noteworthy or important theories or 
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This paradigm takes us back to the discussion in the first chapter and to the most important, 
educational, aspect of democratic consolidation to which I referred elsewhere in this work. We 
discussed that democracy is new to the countries of this study, and that democratic 
consolidation depends on the intrinsic and inner learning, understanding and appreciation of the 
democratic value system and the democratic principles at the first place. The transition from 
communism in these countries has so far resulted in incorporation of the formal structures of 
the democratic system, its basic engineering and the written constitution, while little progress 
has been made in understanding the very core molecular structure to be underneath the formal 
democratic constitutions. As a result, democracy here has come to be understood mostly as a 
rough method of power generation and governmental empowerment, while the role of 
constitutions is understood to be in providing for essentially the crude rules of that process. Not 
being a surprise, in this light, the science of constitutional law in post-Soviet universities often 
remains to be “state law”, as in Soviet times, instead of “constitutional law”, or the two terms 
appear to be virtually synonymous and are used interchangeably as identical terms for defining 
the subject.     
My criticism does not intend to claim that constitutions should be viewed only as collections of 
moral values and fundamental rights. The authority of the alternative statement that 
constitutions do and that they likely have to draw the contours of governments is not what I 
intend to challenge. Even the highly convincing anthropological analysis of Giovanni Sartori, 
having underlined the essential historical and institutional designation of a constitution being a 
fundamental set of principles which restrict the political power, suggests subsequently that the 
ideal of the constitution has turned to degenerate with time and that what the constitution means 
now is not only its original and essentially the most important element of bill of rights, but also 
simply a plan of government.348 What I suggest is rather that the constitution’s designation as 
an organizational chart for a government should not be viewed as its sole valid raison d’etre, as 
it is predominantly the main line of understanding of constitutions in post-Soviet societies, and 
that whenever we think of constitutions as organizational charts, the other, the “nuclear 
meaning”349 and the “telos”350 of constitutions should never be forgotten and should essentially 
be the proper underlying ideological framework for the government. I argue that this is exactly 
the mentality that is in a big deficit in the post-Soviet constitutional culture.  
Where the democratic-constitutional culture is missing its basic grassroots understanding and 
where the ideal of the constitution ends up denoting a plan, chart or a procedure, the very 
fundamental principles of constitutions acquire a static declaratory function. Absent the mores 
of judicial elaboration on these principles, the substantial reading of fundamental law is left to 
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the sole responsibility of statutory explication. But can the allegedly explicit statutes fully 
express the genuine meaning of a constitutional principle which longs for a substantive 
evaluation in each specific situation? Hereby I will argue that the prospect of democracy in our 
countries is severely undermined by the incapacity of the legal order in place to perceive and 
make sense of such substantive evaluation, the “moral reading”. Instead, we will see that the 
“moral reading”, that is the reading of constitutions based on the essential value-system 
represented by the document, is replaced by what I would call “procedural reading”, which 
misinterprets the genuine meaning of democracy and constitution in several ways.  
Let me elaborate on this a little more. To start, one should understand the enormously positivist 
and legalistic vision of the constitution and the law in general in post-communist 
environments.351 In this legal culture the law has never been perceived as an objective virtue: 
jus, but solely as a man-made rule: lex, and the perception of the latter is said to have “seriously 
complicated the development of post-Soviet constitutional systems.”352 As such, the law-lex 
should have never performed as an integral part of a concept, constitution, or any supra-
statutory authority, but only as a procedure. In Soviet times, these procedures were put to 
describe how the state program of housing or the rules of inheritance, or the marriage and 
divorce, for example, work. By the strong and invisible force of cultural dependency, the higher 
principles of democracy, expressed in modern written constitutions, are given a solely 
procedural extension through the laws on, let us say, demonstrations and political 
manifestations, where the provision on the freedom of expression and freedom of assemblies of 
the written constitution is given merely a ceremonial shape: demonstrations and rallies can be 
held in this or that time, in this or that place, in this or that way and so on. The meaning of the 
law of assemblies ends up here.  
Consider a case, A v. B,353 where the applicant A, a political party, goes to a general court with 
a complaint against the municipal body (B). B has repeatedly violated its constitutional 
freedom of assembly by refusing, for different reasons, to allow a demonstration organized by 
A to be held in the capital city. For several consecutive days, B had found different reasons to 
disallow the demonstration in the traditional place for political assemblies known as “Our Hyde 
Park”. After all, when no more “valid” reasons for refusing the demonstration could be thought 
of, B had authorized the demonstration to be held in another location while allowing the pro-
governmental party’s demonstration to be held in “Our Hyde Park”. For the demonstration of 
A, B had “allocated” one semi-constructed square in a remote district, on the outskirts of the 
city and a nearby village. That square is still under construction, and the bulk of heavy 
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construction machinery is occupying most of the area in a way that no big crowd can gather 
there.  
In the complaint, A argues in part that allowing its pre-electoral public assembly only in a 
remote district of the capital city and in a square which is not appropriate for a political 
assembly is in breach of the fundamental constitutional provision on freedom of assembly.  
Meanwhile, A argues that the principle of equality is violated by the fact that “Our Hyde Park” 
was given to the pro-governmental party while it was refused to A.  
The general court (GC), reviewing the complaint, finds that there is no violation, referring to an 
article in the law on assemblies which provides that the municipal body (B) can refuse holding 
of a political rally in a particular area if the latter is reserved for another public event. The GC 
also says that the law provides that if the requested area is already reserved for another 
demonstration, the municipal body can provide an alternative area for a demonstration. A 
argues that the article of the elections law implies that the “alternative area” should be an 
equally good place for demonstration but not a remote place on the brink of the city and the 
neighboring village and that the place needs to be appropriate for public gatherings. GC rejects 
this argument saying that the law does not expressly provide for this in which case B was free 
to assign any free area for the demonstration.  
Through this pattern of legal formalism, the substantive constitutional law of political processes 
gets a status of a routine administrative law, which is governed by the letter of the statutory 
law, but never by the spirit of the law, not even speaking of higher law. Here, constitutionalism 
and democracy are reduced to the level of a procedure. I call this phenomenon the “procedural 
concept of democracy” and I consider it to be in the core of the “post-Soviet concept of 
constitutionalism”.  
The depreciation of constitutional law to the level of a routine procedure was clearly the case in 
Kasyanov v. Central Electoral Commission354 which will be discussed in more details later in 
this chapter. In this case which came before the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, the 
fundamentally constitutional and politically very sensitive and important case of barring the 
key oppositional candidate for the presidential elections in Russia ended up in a review of 
compliance of the formal process of nomination of the candidate with the scrupulously detailed 
routine provided by the law on presidential elections and by supplementary standards imposed 
by the Central Electoral Commission. In particular, the case was largely reviewed under the 
Law on the Elections of the President which provides for a detailed procedure for nomination 
of the candidates, including a list of bureaucratic and highly formalistic requirements. The 
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Central Electoral Commission, in its turn, has issued further standards for the procedure of 
compiling the required documents, and these also governed the case.  
When the case of barring the candidate, who was accused in failing to properly comply with the 
formalities of the procedure for nomination, reached the Supreme Court of Russia, the judicial 
discourse concentrated entirely on the procedures stipulated by the law and the normative acts 
of the electoral commission in a complete detachment from the constitutional domain.355 In this 
way, the essentially constitutional province gets reduced to the level of routine procedures.   
This “procedural legalism,” what is obvious, reduces democracy to a mere prescribed routine. 
The judiciary, and here, especially the constitutional judiciary, has an important mission to 
accomplish, if it is guided by the “spirit”, rather than by the “letter” of the law. Surprisingly 
enough, when a post-authoritarian society is missing its own insights and the inner sense of 
democracy or the rights discourse and when the new regime is failing to duly inject these 
virtues, an important mission of learning of the democratic way and the essential rights 
mentality is accomplished by (not to be a surprise!) courts. However, these are the foreign, 
mostly American courts, which spread a culture of rule of law through Hollywood action 
movies with their common references to the courtroom procedures.   
The essential virtue of this mode of learning via judicial explication, as opposed to the inactive 
learning through familiarization with the formal institutional construction, is that the 
fundamental constitutional principles and rights come into view not in their original static and 
declaratory shape as they appear in the constitutional text or the laws (formal institutions), but 
they emerge as elaborated systems of conceptual judgments, applied to concrete life situations. 
Influenced by an integral reading of the higher law, spread via the TV, an individual facing a 
violation of his or her essential procedural rights is not solely declaring that he or she has a 
right to due process356 (one of few constitutional principles which strike by their 
“abstractness”)357 or that no search can be done without a probable cause,358 but that he or she 
has a right not to be arrested or detained without a reasonable belief that a person has 
committed a crime359 and that a mandatory warning has to be given when getting arrested, 
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etc.360 In other words, this doctrinal rather than textual discourse, better than any other, teaches 
the people what the real constitution should mean- limitation of power and unacceptability of 
unduly interference in the liberty of the people.  
This is equally relevant to the political domain. The decisions of constitutional courts must be 
the key sources of advancing a perception of a political constitution proper: constitution against 
a political abuse, one which would certainly consider improper hindrance of the political rally 
as an arbitrary interference in the political freedom of the people. Otherwise, the procedural 
treatment of democracy transforms into a handy instrument of unconstitutional reproduction 
and concentration of the political power. In the absence of the essential interpretation of what is 
fair or not, or what is equal or not in the process, the crude electoral law is being abused by the 
elites in possession of the political power for reproduction of their power through the electoral 
process, which is fine-tuned to produce the wanted results by sophisticated electoral 
technologies which apparently seem legitimate. For example, the incumbent authorities in 
Russia in the case of Mikhail Kasyanov, which we discussed recently, used the procedural 
treatment of elections law as a commode instrument for ruling their main oppositional rival out 
of the elections.  Paradoxically and to the amusement of democratic theorists, this particular 
technology of power reproduction, which is unconstitutional in its core, is absolutely 
constitutional under the procedural-positivist reading of democracy.  
This “politics of legalism”361 has to do with the same one-sided proceduralist interpretation of 
the constitutional democratic process, according to which the political power is distributed in 
the results of elections, the process of which is explicitly described by the written constitutions 
and the laws. This line of argumentation is as simplistic and degenerating for genuine 
democracy as it is “legitimate” under the procedural reading: the constitutional prescription of 
the process says “take the power if you get more votes”, as simple as it is, without the due care 
of the fair and equal process with the due mechanisms of horizontal or vertical checks and 
limitations on the abuse of resources and power in the electoral process. In the minds of 
proceduralist constitutional readers, the major democratic principle is simply “take the power if 
you receive more votes”,362 while the process of elections and the described violations, when 
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revealed, are assigned to a different, non-constitutional, or sub-constitutional area, which is 
treated in a surprising detachment from the key constitutional domain.  
In fact, here the positive law and the positivist legal culture are being used by incumbent 
political leadership for the purposes of its preservation and reproduction. The techniques of 
power preservation and reproduction in these scenarios rely not only on the immense abuse of 
power and use of administrative resources, but on the employment of a law-enforcement 
machinery based on a crude and legalistic treatment of a statutory law created by the same 
leadership. Interestingly, this practice, as a rule, tries to avoid political trials,363 as these are too 
obviously associated with terror and repression,364 while in line with the logic of imitation 
rather than denunciation of democratic practices,365 post-Soviet leaders avoid openly 
oppressing their opponents. Instead, they prefer to covertly undermine them. The typical 
“technologies” for the latter include banning opposition demonstrations and rallies because they 
are not authorized or did not comply with the procedures prescribed by law,366 closing down 
oppositional TV channels and other media referring to different instances of violation of law by 
them or by their owners,367 excluding candidates from elections because of non-compliance 
with the routines of the electoral process,368 prosecuting, on the grounds of tax law, business 
entities which are sympathetic to opposition parties, 369 etc.370 - all these being done with the 
excuse of the letter of law which creates the illusion of “legitimacy” of these actions in the eyes 
of the people. This is what I call “political legalism”.  
The above-mentioned case, A v B, illustrates how politicians resort to political legalism for the 
purposes of undermining the rival political movements. In A v. B, political legalism is reflected 
                                                 
363 With the exception of the most concentrated regimes (in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and partly in Azerbaijan but 
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with reasonable reservations: to say that most of the governments avoid political repression and trials does not mean 
to say that in respective countries no political trials have taken place. For example, the statement is generally true 
about Russia where not even the leaders of the 1993 Coup were subject to political oppression in the present 
meaning, but yet one can find random cases of what we could call a “political trial” (the case of Mikhail 
Khodorkovsi, for example).  
364 Judith Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals and Political Trials, Harvard University Press (1964), p. 149. 
365 See “The common patterns of governance” in Chapter 2. 
366 This happens regularly in every country in the post-Soviet area. For one, the opposition in Armenia was refused 
to hold any public gatherings for as long as 45 days in the aftermath of the presidential elections in 2008.  
367 Independent media was muted in Russia by means of persecuting the owners of the TV stations with biggest 
national audience after Vladimir Putin became President (see, Michael McFaul, “Sovereign Democracy and 
Shrinking Political Space”, Russia Business Watch, Vol. 14, N 2, April-June 2006); A1+TV barred before the 
presidential elections in Armenia in 2003 and Gala TV closed before the presidential elections of 2008; “Imedi TV” 
temporarily barred in Georgia right before the presidential elections of 2007.  
368 See Kasyanov . CEC (supra note 354) discussed further in this chapter. See also Skuratov v Russia, 21396/04, 
ECHR, 2007.  
369 The Yukos Oil Company is believed to be subject to responsibility for “tax evasion” and other charges for the 
reasons of its opposition to the incumbent political elite in Russia; “Sil Group”, one of the biggest corporations in 
Armenia, acquired tax problems immediately after backing the oppositional presidential candidate in the elections of 
2008.  
370 For one, see Gusinskiy v Russia, 70276/01, ECHR, 2004, where the European Court of Human Rights 
acknowledged that the prosecution of Vladimir Gusinskiy, one of Russia’s richest men who controlled the most 
influential independent media group, was used to intimidate him rather than for bringing him before the court for 
committing a crime.     
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in B’s actions and reasoning. B, the political agent of the incumbent power-holders, finds a 
number of “legalistic” excuses for reducing the effect of the expected demonstration of the 
political party A. Firstly, B rejects A’s application to hold a demonstration in “Our Hyde Park” 
justifying its rejection by invalidity of the application submitted by A which is due to technical 
omissions in the application form to be submitted prior to the demonstration. Next, on the 
following day, B refuses to allow a demonstration in “Our Hyde Park” because the Park has 
been reserved for a public recreational show to be held on the requested day- worth to note that 
the recreational show has been initiated and approved by B itself right on the same day. Finally, 
A’s is being refused access to “Our Hyde Park” on the last day of the pre-electoral campaign 
because the square is now reserved for the political rally of the pro-governmental party. The 
“alternative place” in which B allows A’s demonstration, as mentioned, is not good for 
gatherings.     
One way of reaching the same political end, that is making obstacles to effective political 
campaign by a rival political group, would be to ban the opponent’s demonstration in an 
obvious violation of constitutional and statutory requirements. However, the legalistic 
technologies, to which the incumbent politicians resort, create an additional value to the 
enterprise of power-holding: an external illusion of legitimacy of the action. This legalistic 
reasoning gets the compassionate support of the judiciary which is generally well-familiar with 
and is used to the same style of formalist legal reasoning.  
However, the legal formalism of this type is primarily exploited by the political elites in power 
for their partisan purposes, while their reference to these methods presents a signal to courts 
about the preferred way of interpretation of the concerned law in case of a potential complaint. 
This habit represents a typical pattern of Soviet-time practices of political instruction on the 
outcome of judicial cases, commonly referred to by the term “telephone justice”.      
One way or the other, the legalistic constitutional culture here performs an immoral role of the 
involuntary agent of political abuse. The prospect for democratization is aggravated by a 
perception of the legitimacy of such abuse by the public, which can often be persuaded by the 
apparent constitutionality and legitimacy of the political power reproduction. This makes clear 
for us that the type of constitutionalism, which we are witnessing in the part of world in case, 
exactly exemplifies the opposite of what genuine constitutionalism should mean: limitation on 
power.  In effect, the described, post-Soviet, vision of constitutions and constitutionalism does 
not mean restricting, but right the contrary- enabling the power.  
What I call the abuse of political power through a procedural vision of constitution would 
probably be noticed by Sartori as an essential feature of nominal constitutions - the ones which 
serve as merely “collection of rules which organize but do not restrain the exercise of political 
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power in a given polity”.371 Disclosing the nature of “nominal constitutions”, Sartori refers to 
the following definition, found in another work: “The constitution is fully applied and 
activated, but its ontological reality is nothing but the formalization of the existing location of 
political power for the exclusive benefit of actual power holders.”372  
Perhaps I would not be able to find a better definition for what I was portraying in the 
proceeding paragraphs and what I consider to be a substantial threat to democratic 
development. In such circumstances, any written law, including written constitutions, are 
subject to manipulation by self-selecting political elites for the purposes of reproduction of their 
power. Obviously enough, this obstacle to democracy is hard to fight until some stronger agents 
pursue activating of democratic constitutions in genuine meaning- objective democratic 
constitutions which exist regardless or beyond the written law. The courts, and constitutional 
courts in the first place, have a crucial role to perform here, I believe. 
I do not argue that courts are the only or the best promoters of the genuine contents of the 
democratic way. But I argue that they are one of them, if not the most effective one. The 2003 
decision of the Constitutional Court of Armenia373 and the 2004 decision by the Ukrainian 
Supreme Court374 (discussed in the previous chapter) should have had an enormously educative 
effect on the society. They were among the rare sources of insight opening for the public that 
democracy is not only about who gets the majority of the electoral vouchers with his or her 
name marked on them- because democracy is not something that we may reduce to mere 
arithmetic- but that democracy is essentially about the fairness of the entire process, legitimacy, 
confidence, and support of the political power by its principal, the people.  
 
Separation of powers 
 
My next argument- that judicial activism empowers courts- may be tested in a range of ways. 
For one, the assumption flows from the reflect statement that positivist legal orders disempower 
courts as they provide little room for judicial independence because, in a nutshell, courts in 
these cases do nothing more than follow the directions of political branches which take forms 
of laws.375  
One should be inherently aware of the degree of illegitimacy of many political regimes in post-
Soviet countries to let this argument proceed despite the apparently enormous vulnerability of 
                                                 
371 Sartori, supra note 332. 
372 Sartori, supra note 332, p. 861. 
373 Supra note 288.  
374 Supra note 294. 
375 Kim Lane Scheppele, supre note 338. 
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this statement from the point of view of normative democratic theory. According to democratic 
theory, the laws are exactly supposed to be produced by a political branch representing the 
electorate and the way in which these laws get legitimacy is their emergence through a 
democratic legislative process. But here, as once previously in this discussion, we can see that 
the normative question at stake would be better answered by an empirical investigation. If 
“positivism binds law to politics”376 in a way that it is difficult to make sense of the core 
democratic process as such, then the validity of the democratic pre-condition turns to be 
dependent on the empirical material to such an extent that one of its core normative 
propositions (if the counter-majoritarian difficulty can ever be qualified as such) has to give 
precedence to alternative conceptions. Being bound to American, European or Russian politics 
is something of huge difference here, and the discussed practice of political abuse of the 
positivist legal culture in Russia and elsewhere in the region may serve as a clear illustration for 
this case. If the law shall be bound by politics at all, then one should pre-suppose the politics to 
be necessarily legitimate.   
But this elaboration, though relevant, seems to depart from what Kim Scheppele wants to 
emphasize at first place: whether or not we approve of law’s subordination to the political 
branches or to politics, the main insight remains that the judiciary which is used to positivist 
attachment to that law is more dependent on these politicians and politics than the judiciary 
which “takes a critical distance on statues.” The talk here is about judicial independence, and 
this is the line of argumentation that I now need to advance after having the essential normative 
problems somehow left behind. The dependence on the explicitness of the law produced by 
another branch of government leaves not much at the disposal of judges for challenging the 
political authority and the validity of its action. The judge in this case transforms into a simple 
endorsing function.   
A new perspective on the question may open from the angle of judicial politics, though the two 
perspectives often intermingle. The courts’ interpretative discretion creates uncertainty for 
those affected by their decisions. Constitutional courts’ interpretative discretion thus empowers 
judges by making the concerned politicians dependent on them. In this way, it is argued, judges 
acquire power- a political power.377 This point merits elaboration in light of the described 
mechanisms of post-Soviet reproduction of power where the incumbent politicians employ 
apparently legitimate legal instruments for reaching essentially illegitimate, unconstitutional 
purposes. The confidence of the politicians in the rational validity of such enterprises has to be 
fully reliant on the rule-centric legal culture in the judiciary which is not thought to challenge 
these laws based on an integral reading of the constitution. In fact, the politicians do not even 
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need to bother to attack the courts for reaching their ends: the courts’ dependence on the 
politicians is pre-set by the deeply positivist order in place.  
But let us now suppose that the politicians would be aware of the courts’ predisposition to 
subject the laws in case to a critical, extended and integral constitutional review. This would 
certainly lead not only to politization of courts, which I would argue is unavoidable in any case, 
but also to their political empowerment and greater independence.  
The two essentially different perspectives about how judicial activism may empower courts 
confirm the strong intuition that “creative” judges are obviously more independent than the 
ones which are not. What is really essential for this work in what was suggested by both of 
these extraordinary positions is the clear indication of the limitations of the roman-style, 
positivist, explicitly regulative law and its destructive consequences for judicial independence. 
But the two positions represent the different ends of the same argument: positivism 
disempowers and activism empowers the courts. This hypothesis will guide the discussion 
further, in a more applied context, throughout the next section.   
 
   B. Designing constitution of principles 
 
I take the earlier reflection on the limitations of the roman-style “explicit” law and positivist 
legal culture in general as a starting point and hereby proceed to advocate the virtues of a 
constitution to be primarily written in the language of principles, not rules and procedures. This 
basic proposition shall ensure to avoid potential misreading from the very beginning. Arguing 
only that constitutions should contain written provisions as abstract as possible would be 
potentially not that constructive, and possibly unprofessional as well. I would think in stead 
designing a constitution-principle (as opposed to a constitution-puzzle that an “abstract” 
constitution would become for a society that only starts making sense of the basic democratic 
phenomena) should envisage principles laying down not merely some potentially controversial 
axioms, but politically valid concepts which are backed by a certain institutional vision.  
To say that this position refers to the paradigmatic American Constitution will be possibly 
correct, but not wholly sufficient. It is believed by many people that the American Constitution 
is written in an unclear or vague language. Apparently, this seems to be obvious when reading 
especially the Bill of Rights. But what one intuitively suggests when referring to the words 
“unclear” of “vague” in relation to constitutions is a rather negative connotation, since the 
intuitive proposition about the constitutional law, as any other law, is that it ought to be clear 
and straightforward in defining the foundations on which to build a society. However, a critical 
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analysis may offer that what one may think as carrying those described negative connotations 
can, in fact, be attributed to the greatest virtues of this Constitution.  
In my view, this latter perspective is more than persuasively demonstrated by Ronald Dworkin, 
who, once again in this chapter, offers indispensable insights for my project. His elaboration on 
the virtues of the language of the American Constitution proceeds by a subtle analysis of 
constitutional concepts as opposed to conceptions- the two representing a crucial distinction 
which, in his words, has not been properly appreciated by constitutional lawyers.378 Concepts, 
according to Dworkin, appeal to moral virtues, such as fairness, equality, and so on. 
Conceptions, rather, explicate the meaning of concepts. For example, conceptions could 
provide that the concept of equality means the same school for both white and black children 
and not school segregation, and that the ban on carrying head-scarves in schools is not 
discriminatory and is not jeopardizing the concept of freedom or if it does, then it is for the 
purposes of protecting some other important values and only in a way that the key concerned 
values coexist in a harmonic balance. In this context, the apparently vague constitutional 
clauses of the American Constitutions are, as Dworkin puts it, “appeals” to moral concepts, 
which, as I think to be suggested by the logic of this theory, should not be made explicit by 
constitutions for the clear reasons that they are unfeasible for unilateral and uniform 
explication. If so, Dworkin says, the abstract constitutional concepts cannot be “more precise 
by being more detailed.”379  
This theory denotes a tremendous wisdom for the science of constitutional law and 
constitutional engineering by its delicate and philosophically prudent reference to the pluralism, 
on one hand, and dynamism, on the other, of the human society and its ideological tendencies, 
beliefs and moral judgments. The soundness of such statements can be illustratively confirmed 
by recalling the same, American, constitutional history and the great many instances of 
controversy proving the virtue of the Constitution being written in the language of concepts, not 
conceptions- the problem of race being perhaps the most illustrative indication of the 
remarkable movement in the American conception of equality since the birth of the 
Constitution. The design of a constitution-concept, as opposed to a constitution- conception, 
thus, for the most part can also be a valid answer to what might be viewed as one of the most 
profound oppositions to the moral justification of constitutions and constitutionalism- the 
conflict between the “ancients” and the “moderns”, the paradox of “precommitment” and the 
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natural reluctance of the modern generations to live under and be guided by constitutions 
created by their passed predecessors.380 
I attempt an analogous application of Ronald Dworkin’s theory to the domain of government 
and its constitutional design. Just as Dworkin draws the border between concepts and 
conceptions in relation to constitutional human rights- certainly the key part of a constitution, I 
offer a similar distinction of constitutional provisions for the institutional design of the 
government. A necessary introduction needs to be drawn about the distinction between 
principles on one hand and procedures and rules on the other. Principles, in this context, 
represent the substantial notion and meaning of either concepts (mega-principles) or 
conceptions (principles), while procedures and rules represent the particular configuration and 
the mechanism of concrete conceptions.  
Earlier, in the first chapter, we observed that one of the greatest virtues of institutional design, 
especially in a transitional country, is its responsiveness to change. In particular, we tried to 
argue that optimality of institutional design requires dynamism: what may seem to be optimal 
today can appear to be no longer so tomorrow. This is, above all, due to the recognition of such 
phenomena of human societies as their constant evolution or being otherwise subject to 
continuous changes, as well as their fallibility.381 It was observed, in addition, that transitional 
societies and countries are subject to these in a much more intensive way.  
At the same time, I have also discussed the apparent conflict between the two desired attributes 
put for optimality of the institutional design in these countries: durability and capacity to adapt 
to changing circumstances. The paradox of this supposed conflict, which we only 
hypothetically mentioned previously, is getting an answer by the framework of concepts and 
conceptions translated into the “language” of constitutional institutional design. Just like the 
moral concepts such as justice, fairness or equality perform as the basis for durability and the 
respective conceptions carry out the burden of adaptation and change, the principles and 
procedures of the design of the democratic government shall respectively ensure the concurrent 
durability and robustness of the constitutional design.  
The apparent intricacy of this argument is concerned with the differentiation between the 
principles on ones side and procedures and rules on the other, as well as with the question how 
we shall separate between these often fused categories in relation with the government? After 
all, if the constitutional concepts in the discussion with human rights acquire their sources from 
universal moral values and, as such, they can be derived from objective moral principles 
(however controversial the latter can be), the institutional architecture does not seem to have 
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similar sources of inspiration and apparently looks to be dependent on the accumulated 
institutional experience and wisdom which is missing in the case of transitional countries.  
These issues may appear complex, but they are resolvable, I believe. The democratic form of 
government may seem to have by now offered so many variations and configurations of 
institutional designs, based not only on reasonably diverse models, but also, to a large extent, 
on quite dissimilar core (mega) principles. This may be true, and the earlier proposition that 
constitutions in our cases should leave the choice of this or that particular democratic form to 
the discretion of the internal logic of the societies and also, perhaps, to the incremental process 
of institutional learning, may as well be. However, all these suggestions do not purport to reject 
that the basic democratic form nevertheless insists on certain fundamental principles which, 
although hardly claim objectivity, may however be assigned to the realm of constitutional 
mega-principles due to their fairly stable and time-proven record of functional excellence: 
separation of powers, independence of the judiciary, etc.  
The major difficulty with this premise lies in the realm of definitions of categories and their 
fusion. After all, the inclusion of the above-mentioned mega-principles is suggested by their 
very unquestionable authority and the indispensability of the institutions for the democratic 
way. But the list, afterwards, can be followed by many other principles, and some would have 
an underlined indication of a certain procedural form rather than a concept underneath. For 
example, what should be the institutions of, let us say, judicial review or civil service which are 
in many cases essential for the democratic institutional organization? Indeed, in practice 
constitutions virtually everywhere have to include also some principles which are pointing on 
several very specific conceptions, such as the principle of judicial review, which is in fact 
neither universal nor indispensable for the democratic form.382 Let us call these “principles 
embodying the basic macro-political conceptions”. More over, it is also possible that in many 
cases constitutions will need to contain also some provisions of purely precise and often 
procedural nature (rules or procedures). How then to separate these categories in our case? 
To answer, it is the time to note that the argument which I try to defend here does not claim any 
methodological preciseness, and neither do most of the other theoretical frameworks in the 
discipline which we represent. The categories of principles and procedures, at least with respect 
to the domain of institutional design, carry a considerable portion of relativity. The problem of 
definitions, then, does not look to be a big difficulty for the overall argument, if not only from 
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the perspective of doctrinal fundamentalism or a scientific tenet purporting to arithmetical 
preciseness in social science analysis, to which I do not subscribe.   
The important issue should be related not with how to formally define these different 
categories, but with the task of “selection” in view of the acknowledgement of a series of cases 
where the rule that constitutions should lay down principles as opposed to procedures, has to be 
subject to exceptions. Obviously, in this light, the argument should in no case be that 
constitutions must bring only mega principles, or only principles, or that they should not 
include procedural frameworks at all. On the contrary, such a categorical claim would destroy, 
rather than build the argument. Furthermore, this argument can offer no a clear-cut 
methodological guideline and formula and has to rest on the premise that the tasks of 
differentiation and selection must completely rely on the common sense and the experience and 
the wisdom of constitutional designers.  
The only reasonable formula that this “theory” can suggest is that (transitional) constitutions 
would be better off if they 1. rested on the premises of institutional mega-principles and gave 
them priority over the other items; 2. identified the principles outlining the basic macro-
political conceptions; and 3. referred to routine rules and procedures, explicating institutional 
configurations within the chosen macro-political conceptions, only in the presence of 
reasonably necessary justifications.  The mega-principles should embody the very “nuclear 
meaning” of constitutions,383 as well as the basic political foundations of the society. These 
underlying principles should bind the ensuing frameworks and arrangements. Principles 
representing the basic macro-political conceptions should be identified and stipulated with 
utmost care, as they will lie in the heart of the organization of government, will bind the 
configuration of the government, and will not be easy to change. The stipulation of the very 
model of judicial review (diffuse or centralized) and its fundamental construction, with which 
this work is concerned to some large extent, would fall in this category. The principles in this 
(second) category shall be made as conceptual as possible, and a big effort should be made to 
avoid subjecting them to explicit regulation in the text of the constitution.  
Procedures and rules shall be avoided in the constitution, unless their inclusion is excused by a 
strong reason. Their regulation on the sub-constitutional level should be desired in order to 
avoid depreciation of the ideal of constitution and shall ensure the elasticity of the institutional 
design of macro-political conceptions. Inclusion of rule-like provisions in the constitution may 
subsequently require frequent revisions of constitutions leading to the downgrading of the ideal 
of the fundamental law. Alternatively, it may result in impossibility or impracticality of 
revising the design due to the difficulties in changing the constitutions, whereas transitional 
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societies often find themselves having opted for “wrong” architecture and their amendment 
procedure often needs to be easy.  
The constitutional stipulation of judicial review, therefore, should require provision on the 
essential features of this institution (as the one which is to be proposed subsequently), while 
such settings as the exact configuration of the courts’ mandate, tenure, qualification of judges, 
standing and so on would need to be subject to constitutional regulation only in the face of 
exceptional, well-reasoned circumstances.   
 
 The constitutional principle of political empowerment 
 
Now I shall make an effort to apply this (so far largely theoretical) framework to the discussion 
of this chapter. I will take my earlier discussion about “political” responsibilities of post-Soviet 
constitutional courts as the occasion to meditate further on the proposed scheme, as well as to 
try to arrive at an idea of optimal design of political empowerment of these courts.  
The subject of the pending discussion, as we can see, is not about the choice between the 
known macro-political conceptions of the institution of judicial review- that is between the 
Kelsenian and diffuse systems. It is about the constitutional prescription of a particular 
configuration of the institution of judicial review concerning the specific scope of the 
responsibilities granted to constitutional tribunals. All that said, the post-Soviet Kelsenian 
tribunals’ institutional settings of political empowerment can be identified as a certain, explicit 
procedure expanding on a particular unique model of constitutional review. If so, this 
construction quite visibly matches the description of the items which normally do not fall 
within the domain of constitutional priorities in the meaning of the argument about principle-
based constitutions which I just developed. At the end of the day, the institutional design of 
constitutional courts’ political empowerment, as it is found in post-Soviet constitutions, hardly 
claims universality or any other reasonable cause for being taken as granted.384 Rather it is 
largely a post-communist constitutional experiment which had a certain political agenda at the 
time of drafting of the constitutions.  
The political rationale behind constitutional stipulation of certain “important” prerogatives of 
constitutional courts, such as the review of electoral results, adjudication of jurisdictional 
disputes or banning of political parties, was in creation of a new powerful instrument of 
constitutionalism which was empowered with extraordinary responsibilities for protecting 
constitutionalism from certain actions which conventionally threaten it. The adjudication of 
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electoral disputes was then intended for preventing electoral falsifications, the adjudication of 
jurisdictional disputes- for preventing concentration and abuse of power, etc. Fairly enough, 
this design has been provisional for exactly these reasons: it clearly addresses some particular 
threats which are typical to the stage of political transition. If so, one expects, this design 
should have allowed considerable plasticity for developing in line with the dynamic change of 
the transitional period.          
In essence, a question meriting attention in the context of our discussion is why to provide for 
the micro-regulated form of political involvement of constitutional courts as a constitutionally 
prescribed construction and are there sufficient justifications for constitutionalization of the 
latter? In other words, why the specific “marginal” responsibilities of constitutional courts, 
such as their responsibilities with review of presidential and other elections, political parties, 
etc., need a special regulation by constitutions? If this question was put before the constitution-
drafters at all, then most likely the answer would have been given by a reference to the same 
rationale for creation of strong defenders of constitutionalism, as mentioned above. Did these 
expectations come true? The obvious “no” to this question may seem to be the correct answer, 
but it may turn to be misleading in a certain perspective.  
Indeed, on the one hand, nobody probably will deny that none of the post-Soviet constitutional 
courts were able to emerge as self-sufficient independent actors in a way that they would 
become an adequate limit on the government, as it was envisaged by constitutional fathers. 
Nevertheless, I strongly oppose that this test is used as a criterion for assessing the quality of 
the institutional design of political empowerment. In my opinion, the competence of such a test 
would fail from more than one perspective.  
First, the attempt at blaming the institutional design of political empowerment in not having 
resulted in politically independent and influential actors would not pass if we considered the 
larger failures on the way of building constitutional democracies. In this obvious perspective, 
the failure of the design of political empowerment of constitutional courts is simply one 
particular fragment of the overall failure of democratic institutions. It is not only the 
constitutional formula for the political empowerment of constitutional courts that failed but so 
did most of the other democratic institutions, and they all did so, in the most part, 
notwithstanding their particular configuration and design. 385 Second, the test would fail if we 
acknowledged the relatively successful application of the model in East European non-Soviet 
countries where the similar design of courts could be said having resulted in the constitutional 
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guess from the entire text of this work, I never consider the prior experience of the institutions as totally counter-
effective or the failures as chronic.  
139 
 
courts’ emergence as independent and relatively strong supporters of constitutional democracy. 
Finally, I consider such ideal-form-oriented inquiries to be largely reductionist and populist, 
and that is why I principally abstain from using this particular test, despite the fact that it would 
formally confirm my basic propositions.   
By stating that it is not the overall success or failure of a macro-political institution or its 
particular element that should be considered the criterion for optimality in our case, instead I 
construct my critique of the existing constitutional design of the political empowerment on 
realistic criteria. My result-driven test for the optimality of the existing design of political 
empowerment proposes to look at whether or not this design helped the courts to adapt to the 
harsh political context in which they were put to work- a political context which would hardly 
allow politically powerful courts in case of any institutional design. This test suggests a rather 
different inquiry. Instead of the questions such as whether or not the courts reached effective 
independence vis-à-vis political branches and could effectively confront the politicians or if 
they performed as expected in cases with presidential elections, (these questions one would find 
in an “ideal form test”), the questions to ask should be whether or not these constitutional 
courts have appeared in possession of a sufficient resource for having the possibility of a 
political performance realistically closest to the expected ideal performance.  
If so, one particular query to make should be whether the constitutional courts have preserved 
their legitimacy in situations when they had a duty to decide on politically sensitive cases but at 
the same time when proper law-based decisions would be contrary to the interests of the 
powerful executives?386 Another question might be if the constitutional courts were in 
possession of a sufficient institutional resource for strategic competition with the political 
challengers? At last, a question from the perspective of formal institutional empowerment has 
to be posed: did the “special” design politically empower constitutional courts or did it rather 
disempower them?    
In fact, the preceding discussions in this chapter submitted that this “realistic result-driven test” 
would probably produce the same final “no” as would the “ideal-form result-driven test” which 
we rejected. A brief summary of the findings of this work merits intervention. The institutional 
design of “political empowerment,” purported to strengthen the “political” arsenal of 
constitutional courts, has resulted in a “model of partial and specific jurisdictions” which is 
associated with both formal and practical limitations on the exercise of effective constitutional 
judicial review. On the formal level, the explicitness of the list of acts and specific matters 
subject to the constitutional courts’ jurisdiction is definitely a limitation if compared to the 
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“unlimited” jurisdiction granted by the diffuse system387 or compared to those “Kelsenian” 
models which provide for a working synergy between the separated segments of the 
judiciary.388 In particular, post-Soviet constitutional courts’ supervisory functions are limited to 
only the cases which are provided by constitutions and these courts cannot handle cases which 
are not, even if these cases contain intrinsically constitutional issues.  
Then, the designation of a separate constitutional tribunal in the manner it was done in post-
Soviet countries has developed a “complex of jurisdictions” in post-Soviet courts. Here, general 
courts abstain from adjudicating conceptual constitutional problems in the cases under their 
review, while constitutional courts often appear to be barred from review of matters which 
technically fall under the jurisdictions of general courts, even if these cases contain important 
constitutional queries. This conclusion looks especially convincing if we consider the impact of 
the emerged legal culture which quite formalistically separates the provinces of constitution 
and the province of other law.  
The model, afterwards, stipulates limitations in terms of judicial leeway to adjudicate both 
matters of law and matters of facts.  
Finally, another limitation, associated with the existing model, relates to the exercise of 
constitutional review in a predominantly abstract fashion and in sound detachment from the 
inherently judicial conflict–resolving milieu.  
All these paradigms will be reviewed in more details later, in the context of the elements of the 
alternative design, to be proposed soon. But to conclude this interim synopsis, the overall 
model, limiting rather than strengthening the courts, has ended up resulting in political 
disempowerment instead of the expected political empowerment.  
Our findings also submitted that although inherently pro-democratic due to both institutional 
and rational reasons, post-Soviet constitutional courts have not been able to confront the 
political abuse of power, serving as loyal agents of political incumbents, except in situations of 
political uncertainty and transition. This has brought a diminishing of constitutional courts’ 
legitimacy,389 which is in large part due to the institutional prescriptions which generously and 
invariably empower these courts with a duty to serve as arbiters in the most sensitive political 
cases. The institutional design of political empowerment, in this light, has considerably 
constrained the courts’ facility to avoid damage to their reputation and legitimacy by making 
                                                 
387 Where the responsibilities of the court of constitutional review is not limited to designated, constitutionally 
prescribed items, but instead the court can review any matters of concern from the point of view of constitutionality 
with only those exceptions stipulated by the court itself.  
388 Where the specific matter, which the constitutional court is officially barred to review, can be nevertheless 
subject to a different court and eventually the judiciary, in one way or the other, is functionally able to address the 
violation. See more forthcoming.      
389 Herman Schwartz, supra note 315.  
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the courts to confront situations where their only choices are associated with violation of the 
laws either by deciding in favor of political incumbents and validating their anti-constitutional 
practices or by abstaining from decisions in violation of their duty to decide. In essence, the 
existing institutional design of political empowerment of constitutional courts represents a 
typical paradigm of idealistic designing which provides for formal institutional architecture 
with no a due regard of its harmonious coexistence with the embedded rules and practices of 
political institutions.     
I reasonably concede that this critique of the existing conception of the institutional design of 
political empowerment can proceed only if provided with an outline of an intelligible 
alternative. But I base on that very critique for starting to construct the contours of an 
alternative design.  
Obviously enough, the alternative should abandon the constitutional micro-management of the 
domain of political empowerment which happens through nominating those “marginal”390 
responsibilities which we widely discussed in the previous chapter. We saw that this project, 
which initially intended at strengthening of “political” responsibilities by underlining the most 
important ones, has resulted in limiting the courts’ competency to these items. As opposed to 
such overly technical micro-regulation, the institutional design of constitutional review courts 
would better rest on a single constitutional super-principle of universality of constitutional 
judicial review, recognizing the general competency of these courts (regardless of the fact 
whether it is a specialized tribunal only or all the courts in the system) over any and all issues 
of compliance with constitutions, including the “political” items, but not limited with them. 
This mega-principle shall contain the following essential elements, each represented by the 
particular fragments of its statement: 1) universal review- constitutional review court(s) can 
review any statutes, acts and decisions on their compliance with the constitution and 
application on review can be submitted by any person or entity with a legitimate interest in the 
issue, 2) judicial review- constitutional review courts shall not be denied the intrinsically 
judicial function of acting as arbiter in a case; their competency in concrete cases shall not be 
limited only to setting of a background that would ideally pave the way for another body to 
handle the particular conflict resolution.  
This basic principle of universality has several elements. The principle of formal subject matter 
universality shall ensure review of all relevant laws, acts and decisions issued by any bodies, 
including courts. This should address the practical difficulties caused by the limitations on 
formal subject matter imposed by the existing models. As a rule, presently the post-Soviet 
constitutional courts’ jurisdiction is extended only to review of constitutionality of specific acts 
                                                 
390 Wojciech Sadurski, Rights Before Courts, supra note 2,  at 13.  
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the list of which is explicitly provided by constitutions. These lists include laws (statutes), 
government decisions, and also often other categories of normative and other acts, though the 
settings vary from country to country.391 The lists do not provide for the review of courts’ 
decisions but in the majority of cases an indirect constitutional (but not judicial!) review of 
these can be done when parties to concrete cases request a review of constitutional compliance 
of the acts on which the particular court’s decision has been based.  
Substantial subject matter universality shall mean that constitutional review courts have 
jurisdiction over any cases concerning compliance with the constitution, and their jurisdiction 
shall not be limited to any specific area or designated items of review. This principle should 
respond to the limitations imposed by the explicit listing of specific types of cases included in 
constitutional courts’ authority, such as jurisdictional disputes, electoral disputes, or political 
parties. The application of the general standard of universality in the proposed design should 
provide for constitutional courts’ right to review absolutely any and all acts and matters of 
compliance with the constitution, including the ones which are currently specified as these 
courts’ exclusive prerogative. The standard of constitutional courts’ restraint (such as a doctrine 
of political question) should be developed by the courts themselves rather than be provided by 
law. These proposals should contribute to the real empowerment of these courts and to the 
effectiveness of constitutional review in general.  
Conceptual subject matter universality means that constitutional courts should be able to 
adjudicate cases both in terms of matter of facts and in terms of matter of law. Disputes on 
presidential elections, for example, can contain either one, or the other, or both. The 
Constitution of Armenia, for example, enables the Constitutional Court as a judge of fact in 
these cases as the Court is empowered to decide on the results of elections whether or not the 
dispute in case concerns a matter of law per se. As opposed, in Russia and Ukraine, where it is 
not the Constitutional Courts that adjudicate electoral disputes, these Courts may practically 
review only matters of law, that is whether or not the law, which was applied by another court 
dealing with an appeal by a presidential candidate, is in compliance with the Constitution.  
Universality of standing shall mean that standing and access should not be defined by law but 
shall be subject to the general principle that any person or entity which has a legitimate interest 
in the case should be able to submit an application. The standard of permissibility and the 
doctrine of legitimate interest in this case shall be worked out by the court itself and not by law. 
This principle still can be defined in such general terms that it can allow later variations 
                                                 
391 In Kazakhstan, for example, the Constitutional Council is empowered to review only laws, but not the acts of the 
President and the Government (see Art. 72 of the Kazakh Constitution). In contrast, the Court in Georgia can review 
not only laws, but also the normative acts of the President, the Government, as well as the “higher state bodies” of 
autonomous republics within the country (see Art. 89 (a) of the Georgian Constitution). In Armenia, the 
constitutional amendments of 2005 allowed the Court to review the acts of local self-government bodies (see Art. 
100 of the Constitution).  
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allowing reasonable exclusions, such as exclusion of the general public from bringing of 
abstract claims.       
The existing “model of partial or specific jurisdiction” is associated with both formal and 
practical limitations on the exercise of effective constitutional review. On the formal level, the 
explicitness of the list of acts and specific matters subject to the constitutional courts’ 
jurisdiction is definitely a limitation if compared to the unlimited jurisdiction granted by the 
alternative formula which is proposed. More importantly, the existing model brings to practical 
limitations and difficulties.  
In particular, constitutional courts’ supervisory functions are limited only to the cases which are 
provided by constitutions and these courts cannot handle cases which are not, even if those 
cases contain intrinsically constitutional issues. For example, the Constitutional Court of Russia 
or Ukraine cannot adjudicate cases on presidential elections and the Constitutional Court of 
Armenia cannot resolve jurisdictional disputes because these items are not listed in the 
respective Constitutions. This is regardless as to whether or not the particular cases contain 
intrinsically constitutional matters: the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, for example, cannot 
review the results of presidential elections even if the elections fall short of basic constitutional 
standards and there is a party legitimately interested in constitutional review.  
It may be argued that despite this, the respective violations of the constitutions can anyway 
reach constitutional courts or that the particular electoral violation can anyway become the 
subject of judicial review. In the presidential elections cases, for example, a presidential 
candidate’s petition in Russia or Ukraine can be submitted to another court’s judicial review 
which will give a resolution to the particular electoral dispute (as it in fact happened in Ukraine 
in 2004), and then there will be a chance of constitutional review of the subject law also in the 
constitutional court if the law applied by general court is alleged to be unconstitutional.  
This may well be correct. But the entire model momentously lacks efficiency if we look at it 
from the perspective of constitutional courts’ empowerment which is the key subject of this 
discussion. Dividing core functions between different systems of adjudication is obviously not 
to strengthen the function itself but to weaken it.392 This is especially so if we consider the far 
not easiest relationship and the competition between the two separated fragments of the judicial 
system (constitutional and general) in post-communist countries.393 But before all this, the 
model in case also brings to essential practical difficulties if we transit back to the realm of a 
judicial culture which quite formalistically separates the provinces of constitution and the 
province of other law. Let us take forward the case with presidential elections in those countries 
which do not assign the electoral disputes to the domain of constitutional courts. Here, the 
                                                 
392 See more on this in the next chapter.  
393 See Sadurski, supra note 2, p. 21; Schwartz, supra note 5, p. 24.  
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resolution of these disputes is falling within the domain of general and not constitutional courts, 
as noticed. Given the formalism in separating the domain of constitution on one hand and other 
laws on the other and the widespread culture of procedural legalism discussed earlier, the 
general court will adjudicate the presidential elections case under the law, but not the 
constitution, because of their being “courts of laws” but not constitutional courts and the 
general habit of procedural reading. Treating the case “under law” may look normal if the 
petition brings an issue of fact, for example a matter of vote counting. But what if it is an 
intrinsically constitutional issue, let us say a matter of violation of the standard of equality or 
abuse of power by the “candidate from the power”? A procedural treatment of the 
constitutional issue will be the most probable outcome in our hypothetical case if we trust the 
conclusions reached in the earlier discussions. But there is also ample empirical evidence 
supporting this hypothesis. Some brilliant evidence is offered by the latest cases with 
presidential candidates Mikhail Kasyanov of Russia and Levon Ter-Petrosyan of Armenia 
which will be discussed soon.  
The principle of judicial review in the meaning of the proposed alternative implies an exercise 
of constitutional review not only in an abstract fashion (or not only in a predominantly abstract 
fashion) but also in the intrinsically judicial conflict–resolving milieu. The word “only” in its 
first use in the last sentence should be emphasized. It shall mean that the idea, which I develop, 
does not imply a clear-cut zero-sum choice between abstract and concrete review. The idea 
rather allows room for both.  
The rationale behind activation of the intrinsic judicial competency is to deal with the 
limitations of the design of constitutional courts where the abstractness of review by these 
courts dominates their mandate. One illustration of this is that constitutional review tribunals do 
not perform the essentially judicial function of an appellate jurisdiction but rather carry out a 
review of concrete cases largely for the purposes of identifying unconstitutional elements in the 
law applied in these cases. This is common to the systems based on the Kelsenian model in 
general.394 As evidence, constitutional courts are said in a handbook published by the European 
Commission for Democracy through Law of the Council of Europe (Venice Commission) not 
to be conceived to perform as appellate tribunal if a constitutional complaints is raised but that 
their mandate should be restricted to “scrutinizing the challenged act as to the violation of 
constitutional rights and not as to its lawfulness in general.”395   
The limitations of this model, investigated in the context of post-Soviet environments,  are 
associated with the arising regulatory inability of constitutional tribunals and the judiciary in 
general to address the particular violation of the constitution and to offer a practical redress to 
                                                 
394 For one, see Mauro Cappelletti, The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective, supra note 21.  
395 Helmut Steinberger, “Models of Constitutional Jurisdiction”, supra note 20. 
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the injured party. The case of the models which do not assign electoral disputes to 
constitutional courts is a good example also for this argument. As we discussed, in all the cases 
of electoral disputes where the issue in case is substantially a matter of constitutional law, the 
cases nevertheless must be reviewed by the general courts, while the constitutional courts can 
only have a mere theoretical chance of an abstract review if a party then appeals the decision of 
the particular general court. Even in this case, the constitutional courts are not in a position to 
essentially address the constitutional violation, but they can only issue a judgment about the 
constitutionality of the law which was applied by the general court for reaching its 
conclusion.396 For one, it is not only the law in case that can be unconstitutional, but also the 
decision of the court elaborating on a law, the last itself being constitutional.  
Consider again the hypothetical case A v. B.397 We speculated that after encountering what we 
called “political legalism” from the part of B, A went to the general court with a complaint that 
the municipal body B has violated its constitutional right of equal opportunities during the 
elections by allowing her pre-election demonstration only in a remote district of the capital city 
while approving the demonstration of another candidate to be held in the central square where 
all political demonstration are normally held. The general court (G), reviewing the complaint, 
found that there was no violation, referring to the article in the law on elections which provides 
that municipal bodies (Bs) can provide an alternative area for a demonstration if the requested 
area is already reserved for another demonstration. The court G furthermore rejected A’s 
argument that the article of the elections law, to which the defendant and the court referred, 
implies that the “alternative area” should be equally good place for demonstration but not a 
remote place on the brink of the city and the neighboring village. G said that the law does not 
provide for this. Hence, A goes to file an application in the Constitutional Court (C).  
The model under our review allows the C to review only the subject law on the issue of its 
compliance with the Constitution. But the law in this particular case seems to be perfectly 
constitutional. What does not look constitutional is not the law, but B’s and then G’s 
interpretation of it, for the review of which C does not have a direct mandate. The absolutely 




                                                 
396 For example, according to the Constitution of Armenia, when filing an individual complaint the applicant can 
challenge only the constitutionality of the particular law applied by the court in the concrete case (see Art. 101/6), 
and according to the Constitution of the Russian Federation (Art. 125/4), in concrete cases based on individual 
complaints or court referrals, alleging constitutional rights violation, the Constitutional Court is authorized to review 
the constitutionality of the law which has been applied or is to be applied in the case.   
397 Supra note 353.  
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 The limitations of defective empowerment in the practice of courts   
 
The two cases, which I will discuss, most starkly demonstrate the array of presented practical 
limitations of the currently active model of constitutional review. 
Kasyanov v. the Central Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation398 was a review of an 
appeal on the decision of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) to decline registration of the 
key oppositional contender and the former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov as a candidate in 
presidential elections in Russia in 2008. In its decision, the CEC referred to irregularities in the 
procedure of collection of pre-electoral signatures, which are required by the Russian 
legislation from a candidate for being promoted as a nominee, as a ground for voiding 
Kasyanov’s registration. The Law of Russia on the Elections of the President in the best Soviet 
traditions provides for routinely detailed procedures for nomination and registration of the 
candidates, including highly technical description of each of the required procedures to be 
completed and “spravkas”399 to be supplied. The decision of the CEC was reviewed twice by 
the Supreme Court of Russia as the Russian Constitution does not provide for the review of 
electoral disputes by the Constitutional Court. Both times, the Supreme Court (once in its 
plenary seating and then as the Supreme Cassation instance) declined Kasyanov’s appeal and 
confirmed CEC’s decision.400  
Mikhail Kasyanov was the only liberal contender for presidency and the staunchest critique of 
President Putin. CEC’s rejection of his registration was widely believed to be the Kremlin’s 
conspiracy for “legally” barring him from the campaign. Whether or not the grounds for this 
“legal” action were present and justified, the case finely illustrates a number of patterns which 
we observed in this chapter.  
To begin, the charge in fabrication of signatures in support of a candidate excellently illustrates 
the legalism and proceduralism of the political process and the judicial culture tolerating it. Not 
only the requirement of such a ceremonial procedure as signature collection is highly formalist, 
but the arguments of the CEC for disqualifying the potential presidential candidate due to some 
technical irregularities with the signatures on that candidate’s behalf do sound unjustifiably 
                                                 
398 Supra note 354.  
399 The infamous Russian word for various requirements to take a written form, such as confirmations, validations, 
approvals by and for completing administrative procedures, widely associated with the highly bureaucratic system of 
administration. 
400 Such formalism may be said to be in best traditions of the Russian Supreme Court. On 4 December 2003, for 
example, the Court upheld the decisions of an electoral commission and a lower court rejecting registration of Yiriy 
Skuratov, the former Prosecutor General of the country, as candidate to the State Duma (Parliament). This rejection 
was on the grounds of submission of “inaccurate personal information”. In particular, the Court accepted the 
reasoning of the electoral commission that the candidate had failed to provide proper information about his 
employment by not mentioning the fact that he had a second job of a professor at a university in Moscow. See 
Skuratov v Russia, supra note 245.   
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formalist too. For example, one of the reasons for invalidating the signature-votes collected for 
the candidate was that the signatories failed to provide their full address by not indicating the 
federal unit where they were registered, as it was required by a standard signature collection 
form issued by the CEC.  
It is worth mentioning that both the CEC and the Supreme Court admitted that the required 
number of signatures has in fact been supplied in favor of the candidate and that the signatories 
personally put their signatures; their position was based on the facts of technical deviations in 
the process of signature collection. In his later comments of the case, Mikhail Kasyanov has 
emphasized that the Supreme Court has confirmed that the CEC is right in what relates to the 
technique of compiling of the designated forms for the signature collection, while the fact of 
the huge number of signatures collected in his support and the political will expressed in this 
way did not concern the Court.401     
Besides the symptoms of procedural legalism serving as a “legitimate” tool for the abuse of 
genuine democratic pluralism and an instrument of concentration and reproduction of power, 
the case also starkly exposes the judiciary’s susceptibility against such cases of violation of 
basic constitutional principles. Consider the fact that the Supreme Court of Russia, when 
reviewing Kasyanov’s appeal that the alleged irregularities with the signatures can not become 
a valid reason for declining his constitutional right to run in presidential elections, did not treat 
the case in the constitutional context at all but rather simply checked on the validity of the facts 
and on the compliance of the CEC’s decision with the routine of the procedure provided by the 
law. I am convinced that in this case we witness a typical paradigm of a general court acting (or 
preferring to act) in its legitimate capacity of a court of laws (as opposed to court of 
constitution) which has a limited mandate of checking on the conformity with the statutes, 
whatever the content of the statute is. It is then especially odd that this is not a regular general 
court but the Supreme Court of Russia (which after all has the mandate on review of electoral 
disputes) that reduced the intrinsically constitutional case of a paramount political significance 
to the level of compliance with the requirements of the routine standards supplied by law or by 
an act of the electoral commission.  
The positivist legalism of the system at large shall only be partially blamed for this. The 
situation is also largely the result of the separation of the jurisdictions of constitutional courts 
from that of other courts with not providing a due care of effective working synergy between 
the two and by the formalism in separation of the provinces of constitutional law and other law. 
Notably, the Supreme Court has been unequivocally recognized as the last jurisdiction that 
could effectively restore Kasyanov’s right to run in the elections. Both the involved party and 
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the observers had considered it useless to appeal to the Constitutional Court most likely from 
the same considerations: the Constitutional Court of Russia does not have a mandate to review 
disputes and this case might have been “cured” by this Court only if the law which was applied 
was unconstitutional; but the law itself was not. It is obvious that the abstract review of the 
subject law, if an individual complaint was submitted, would appear to be a largely symbolic 
measure instead of becoming an efficient instrument for addressing the peculiar insistent 
violation of the fundamental constitutional law.   
In re Ter-Petrosyan,402 the Constitutional Court of Armenia reviewed on February 11 2008 the 
request of the presidential candidate Levon Ter-Petrosyan about considering the campaign run 
by the public television and other state-controlled media against him as an insurmountable 
obstacle arisen before the candidate for the presidency. In particular, the candidate argued that 
the National Tele-Radio Company and especially the “Hailur” news program have violated the 
legislation by regularly and consistently broadcasting materials against his candidacy during the 
three preceding month. The application, which was submitted several days before the day of the 
presidential elections, thought the mentioned state-run campaign as an illegitimate and 
unconstitutional interference by the state into the presidential race which created an 
“insurmountable obstacle” for Levon Ter-Petrosyan as a ground for suspending the presidential 
elections, as envisaged by the Constitution of Armenia.  
In its decision on the case, the Constitutional Court found that the provision of the Constitution 
to which the appellant refers (Art. 52) is implying two cases of insurmountable obstacles for a 
presidential candidate: first, in case of impossibility of further personal participation in the 
presidential elections owing to a situation which causes incapability of a candidate to do so (an 
institution originated in the French constitutional practice, according to the Court), and second, 
in case of the death of one of the candidates. The Court held that neither of these situations 
matches the case of the appellant.  
However, alongside with the decision to decline the request of the appellant based on the 
above-mentioned “legal” justifications, the Constitutional Court further elaborated, in a non-
binding dicta (as it has become the tradition of especially the Court in Armenia), that according 
to the Electoral Law the state ensures the equality during the pre-election campaigns and 
candidates should enjoy equal access to mass media, and that the National Television Company 
and the National Radio should provide equal conditions to the candidates. Furthermore, the 
Court observed that “the news programs broadcasted by the National Television and National 
Radio should provide impartial information on the campaign of the candidates and should 
refrain from assessing the information in order to ensure observance of the fair and equal 
                                                 
402 See the decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia dated 11 February 2008.  
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conditions”403 and by referring to the responsibilities of the public institutions for complying 
with these provisions. The Court also observed the fact that there exists a procedure for 
appealing the respective violations in the administrative court and that the appellant has in fact 
submitted another application to the administrative court.  
The Constitutional Court concluded by saying that the appellant’s actions are lawful and that 
above-mentioned organizations and the administrative court have a responsibility to prevent the 
violations of the laws. By doing so, the Constitutional Court in fact recognized the intrinsic 
legitimacy of the applicant’s argument in the case and the facts of violation of fundamental 
standards of equality by certain state bodies. Nevertheless, the Court abstained from properly 
adjudicating these (recognized) violations due to the limitations imposed on the jurisdiction of 
the Constitutional Court.  
In both of the above-discussed cases we could witness the practical limitations of the model of 
constitutional review with strictly separated jurisdictions of constitutional and other courts and 
with ensuing strict formalism in separating the provinces of constitutional and other law. The 
case of Kasyanov is an excellent illustration of the general courts’ refusal to review 
constitutional issues under the constitutional principles proper where the institutional design 
otherwise fails to guarantee a proper access to constitutional review of the political action 
restricting realization of a fundamental political right. In the case of Ter-Petrosyan, the 
Constitutional Court in Armenia found itself incompetent to decide on a complaint about 
essentially constitutional violations due to the jurisdictional limitations imposed by the 
Constitution even though these violations were recognized by the same court as falling short of 
the prescribed constitutional standards of equal access to state-controlled media. After all, we 
witness well-illustrated evidences of the limitations of the design of intended political 
empowerment resulting in a factual disempowerment of both fraction of the judiciary in light of 
their divided and limited responsibility over the constitutionality of elections.          
 
 
    C. Coping with the paradox of political empowerment 
 
The proposed mega-principle of the universality of constitutional judicial review, as we already 
noticed, can host the ensuing rules and procedures of constitutional review in probably the most 
optimal way. Its generic standard can allow the type of conceptual accommodation which the 
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constitutional concepts are enabling in Dworkin’s model.404 The limit on over-regulation of this 
generic principle should also ensure that constitutional judges accommodate their procedural 
doctrines to the most optimal standards, rather than those standards being stipulated by political 
regulators by means of constitutional or legislative rules. In particular, this would enable 
constitutional judges to set up the most suitable standards of judicial discretion, let us say, in 
politically sensitive issues, where the micro-regulatory style currently requires a mandatory 
action on these issues. This paradigm is discussed below. I believe, meanwhile, that the 
successive analysis will demonstrate that what I advocated in the preceding discussion is not 
merely a pompous and speculative theory, but that it competently applies to practical situations 
and can offer down-on-earth working solutions to existing difficulties.       
The paradox of judicial-political empowerment, as we discussed earlier, resides in the conflict 
between the designation of politically powerful courts in the manner as it has been done in the 
post-Soviet constitutions, and the constraints on due performance  which are put on these courts 
by the political branches. Back in Chapter 3 we discussed that the political empowerment of 
post-Soviet courts has been and keeps being a double-edged sword: not empowering 
constitutional courts would be detrimental for the democratic prospect, while empowerment is 
associated with the prospect of political attack, abstention from deciding on political cases and 
hence erosion of the courts’ legitimacy.    
As early as in 1995, Herman Hausmaninger’s synopsis of the Russian constitutional court’s 
way for success outlined a strategy which was largely shared by the academic community in 
succeeding works: 
The Court must refrain from political involvement, and individual justices must avoid public 
posturing if the Court hopes to affect and protect an emerging Russian legal culture. Since its 
suspension on October 7, 1993, the Constitutional Court has had ample time to ponder past 
mistakes and reflect on a future course of action. It may have concluded that it should both 
signal and practice judicial restraint as its guiding principle until by solid legal work it will have 
learnt that level of respect and legitimacy which will enable it to move forward to the sort of 
legal activism exhibited by other constitutional courts in other political systems. The Russian 
Court has yet to learn the skills ad become aware of responsibilities of a judicial activism 
practiced in the public interest, as well as the art of interacting with other governmental organs 
in a functioning democratic society….405  
The sort of “solid legal work” which Hausmaninger probably has in mind extends to the 
domain of human rights cases which are mostly within the area of tolerance of the executive 
and are for the most part safe for the courts to decide upon, unlike the political issues, as 
Epstein, Lee and Shvetsova would underline later406. But both Hausmaninger’s and Epstein et 
al’s position, unlike that of Schwartz’s, does not stand for a concrete prescription about how it 
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(1995), at 386. 
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shall be done that the courts don’t interfere into political questions when they are supposed so 
under the law. If their position is different than that of Schwartz, then it perhaps stands for what 
we have now: courts should abstain from deciding on political issues even though they are 
obliged to decide by the law. And while this approach, at least for me, makes even more sense 
than simply cutting off the political questions from the courts’ repertoire, the recent case in 
Ukraine (2007, discussed in Ch. 3) should become an alarm about the potential threats of 
“abstentionism” which brings to the diminishing of constitutional courts’ reputation to such an 
extent that even the most “solid legal work” and human rights activism would not be able to 
cure.  
If “abstentionism” was really the intention of analysts like Hausmaninger or Epstein et al (their 
positions stands for court restraints for the sake of gaining necessary legitimacy, but it does not 
specify if the courts should avoid deciding on political issues or they should be deprived of the 
right to decide on them by the law, thus one is not sure if it was), the hidden message in these 
recommendations can be translated into the call for a more flexible, or to be more precise, 
strategic behavior vis-à-vis their “partners” in the other governmental branches. In fact, the 
above-quoted paragraph by Hausmaninger leads to such interpretation almost literally, referring 
to the “art of interacting with other governmental organs.”407 Is the mode of interaction with 
“governmental organs” not prescribed by the constitutions?  
If all this is what the above-mentioned political scientists prescribe, then such recommendations 
refer not to the institutional designer, but to the courts and their members. But there is at least 
one item which is in the domain of institutional designers. Is there a way to institutionally 
enable strategic behavior? The answer may be “yes” if one is convinced in the potential for 
strategic behavior which the “political question doctrine” creates for the US Supreme Court.  
The notorious doctrine of political question of the US Supreme Court distinguishes between 
legal questions which can be resolved by the US Supreme Court and political questions which 
cannot be subject to judicial review. The doctrine provisionally separates the province of the 
judicial branch from the same of the other branches and calls for “respect due coordinate 
branches of government.”408 But separating the provinces of law and politics seems to be a task 
so susceptible both from the normative and from the practical perspectives. Is it possible to 
draw any comprehensive criteria for judiciary’s involvement in politics at all? It is obvious that 
when deciding in a fashion which is easily labeled as political activism, courts do not want to 
coin money or conclude treaties, nor to enact laws, levy taxes, and appoint presidents. 
However, it is hardly correct to say that courts never interfere even in the above-mentioned 
issues as there is hardly any issue which lies beyond the scope of constitutions. Treaties can be 
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(found) unconstitutional and so can the laws. Taxes and currency regulations likewise can be 
considered unconstitutional, and the presidential elections can be corrupt and illegal. So, what 
makes some issues more political than others?  
The duality of the political question doctrine is obvious, so is the history of its application. 
During its activity, the Supreme Court of the United States has from time to time entertained a 
number of issues of public policy with an underlined political context and has equally 
inconsistently abstained from entertaining others which fit in the criteria imposed by the then 
existing standards. The controversy of the political question doctrine has developed well since 
Marbury, and the debate over its legitimacy has been reviving each time of the Court’s 
involvement into issues of political significance. The unavoidable dichotomy of the political 
question doctrine is not a happenstance but an exact mirror image of the existing ideological 
uncertainty. In his classical essay on the US Supreme Court, Robert Dahl says: “As a political 
institution, the Court is highly unusual, not least because Americans are not quite willing to 
accept the fact that it is a political institution and not quite capable of denying it; so that 
frequently we take both positions at once.”409 
But what is the instant rationale behind the doctrine after all? From the normative perspective, 
the Baker criteria,410 which still define the standard, fail to address the central moral issue 
behind the conflict in between the doctrine and the concept of judicial review: if the basic 
normative premise of the latter stands for all and any questions of society being subject to 
scrutiny on the matter of their compliance with constitution as higher law, what may justify 
exceptions to this?  
The “classical” (or “constitutional”) theory of the political question is based on the expressed 
or implied language of the US Constitution.411 But its implied reference to a concept as 
ambiguous as the separation of powers hardly diminishes the usual perplexity of the doctrine, 
while adding no value to its normative worth. Eventually, the reference to a textual assignment 
of some cases to a non-judicial branch while having accepted the legitimacy of the judicial 
review reduces the status of the higher law against some cases of extra-constitutional 
importance and discriminates against human rights. Finally, this places separation of powers 
above the higher law.  
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That the only “valid” justification of the political question doctrine may be offered only by a 
utilitarian excuse is suggested by a strong intuition. The “legal” criteria for the judicial 
limitation imposed by the political question doctrine is itself political and the borders which are 
somewhat vaguely provided for judiciary’s political involvement are rather drawn by the 
degree of political activism that the Supreme Court can afford and wants to demonstrate in 
particular time. In this view, the rational account of the political question is offered by its 
“prudential” doctrine- a judicially created method for avoiding certain constitutional 
questions412- which stands pretty frankly for the strategic rationale behind the application of the 
doctrine. The validity of this concept and also the extent of its importance for constitutional 
design studies entail from the prudential concept’s honest quest for legitimacy through the 
utilitarian premise of an optimal design of institutional interaction, rather than a normative 
justification. The premise of the prudential doctrine is not in the constitutional text and its 
construal but in a rational recognition of the sensitive institutional “interests” of the separated 
branches and the danger of their potential conflict, and in commitment to abstaining from 
decisions on certain issues from exactly the considerations of saving the Court’s legitimacy and 
avoiding such possible conflicts with the political powers.413  
That kind of a tool for strategic use for the sake of preservation of the institutional legitimacy, 
one might see, was exactly what the Ukrainian Constitutional Court lacked in its last political 
engagement when the Court simply abstained from deciding on the case of the dissolution of 
the Parliament because of the political sensitivity of the case, thus immensely damaging its own 
legitimacy. Having found itself in between the two troubles- one for each possible outcome of 
their prospective decision- the Court in the Ukraine preferred just to keep silent by violating all 
prescribed norms of material law- constitutional, higher law of the land- in order to stay safe. If 
the Constitutional Court was equipped with a doctrine of (prudential) political question- a 
famously known technique of judicial abstention414- its largely perceivable silence would have 
its legal and legitimate justification.  
The necessity of a doctrine for a legitimate abstention from judicial review in the cases when 
the designer has opted for a political empowerment has been brought up as early as in the 
beginning of the 90-ies. However, hardly any efforts to push for a sound “political question” 
doctrine survived the overriding ignorance by the mainstream scholarship and constitutional 
engineering which in sum equaled to a mute denunciation of the doctrine. One American 
scholar wrote in 1993 that the Russian Constitutional Court should have invoked the political 
question doctrine to avoid the Communist Party case which, in his words, presented a zero-sum 
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choice between deciding for the Communist Party and the law or the President and the political 
expediency.415 That the Court should have invoked the political question rule granted by the 
law is also suggested by another American researcher of Russia’s constitutional transition of 
early 90-ies.416 More over, there is evidence that the adoption of “a strict political questions 
doctrine” by the Russian Constitutional Court has been continuously advocated by legal 
academics.417 After all, nobody even recalls now that the notorious 1991 law setting up the 
Constitutional Court in Russia indeed envisaged a clause saying that the Court does not review 
political questions418 and furthermore it is not even discussed that many of the modern laws on 
constitutional courts in post-Soviet countries include provisions which could be classified 
political question clauses.419    
But what the common-law trained jurists often propose may hardly get clearly perceived by 
continental lawyers. Continental lawyers need the discourse translated into the language of 
legal routine. This would appear to be the crux of the matter. Regardless of how strong my 
criticism of the positivism of the post-Soviet legal culture, one simple truth should be that any 
innovation or institutional transplant has to be adapted to the dominant setting, and not the 
setting should adapt to the transplant. In fact, the judicial discretion, such as the political 
question doctrine, does not and can not go along with the conventional style of judicial 
empowerment in which the certain items, on the implementation of which we would like to 
assign judicial discretion, are designated as the duties of courts. In this deeply civil-law setting, 
any exemption from duties is perceived only in case of being expressly provided by the law, 
while a canon as generic and controversial as the political question doctrine would hardly ever 
fit in such a framework. The way out is not in the laws’ routine but in changing the overall 
logic of constitutional legal culture from the one based on rules and procedures to one based on 
concepts and principles.  
The paradox of the “political empowerment” gets resolved in this way: political empowerment 
shall be bestowed not as the duty but as the opportunity of the constitutional courts within its 
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 Ending up where? The American model revisited?  
 Conclusion 
 
Once we learnt the lessons from the preceding discussion and the last cases, it becomes evident 
that the institution of constitutional judicial review can be implemented most effectively if it 
combined the separated fragments of conceptually the same function in one decision-making 
centre or system as opposed to its current design of limited and not well-connected jurisdictions 
delivered between separate bodies. That is to say that constitutional judicial review will be 
better if the particular decision-maker on constitutional issues (whether it is always the same 
single tribunal or different courts) is in a position to do both abstract and concrete review, to 
review both question of law and questions of fact, and to fully perform as a valid 
comprehensive appellate jurisdiction in all cases which raise constitutional issues.  
In fact, this is to suggest that the design of constitutional review should make a step forward 
towards the initial and simplest conception of the judicial check on the conformity with 
constitutions. This original conception, born in the United States and later subjected to 
fundamental modification by Kelsen, envisaged constitutional review as a universal function of 
the judicial competency implemented through concrete and substantial review of judicial 
controversies. This simple but fundamental principle built up the entire mechanism of 
constitutional judicial review. Kelsen’s conception was a deviation from this paradigm in many 
respects.  
First, the designation of a separate constitutional review tribunal was clearly a deviation from 
the earlier standard of constitutional review as a judicial prerogative. Indeed, whether or not 
one considers Kelsenian tribunals as courts, the judicial personality of continental constitutional 
courts can be doubted on many grounds. As noticed elsewhere in my thesis, the continental 
conception does not even attempt to oppose this perspective. According to Cappelletti, 
principally due to the political nature of this function European systems refused to grant this 
power to the judiciary generally.420 In this light, European constitutional courts, as intended by 
Hans Kelsen, are designated as primarily political institutions. Some of European constitutional 
courts involve very closely in the legislative process, sometimes through a priori review, 
hence, no surprise they are often called quasi-parliamentarian institutions or third chambers of 
parliaments.421 After all, the key institution of abstract review, which is the dominant function 
of the Kelsenian courts, not only makes these courts parties to the political process and policy 
                                                 
420 Mauro Cappelletti, supra note 21, p.137. 
421 Alec Stone Sweet, “Complex Coordinate Construction in France and Germany”, in Tate and Vallinder, The 
Global Expansion of the Judicial Power, NYU Press (1995), at 225.  
156 
 
making, but also makes them to depart from their legitimate status of conflict resolving courts, 
in the meaning of Martin Shapiro.422  
The latter paradigm constituted the other departure of Kelsen from the earlier image of judicial 
review by essentially abandoning the standard of concrete review. It is not only due to the 
reality that abstract review is the dominant function of the Kelsenian courts while concrete 
review is found only in some countries and even in these systems it is limited in its scope and 
purpose. It is also due to the acknowledgement of the overall abstractness of separate 
constitutional courts’ intervention also in concrete cases where constitutional courts’ mandate is 
often limited to the review of the law governing the case rater than the particular action under 
the law, which is well represented by the earlier discussed  hypothetical case of A v. B.  
My reference to the American model does not imply that its design has to be taken as a literal 
transplant. Elsewhere in this work I have noticed that the transplant of the American model 
without a substantial adjustment to the local context, as well as the same of the continental 
model, is likely to end up in an “idealistic design”. I refer to the American model only as far as 
it is a major archetype of constitutional review implemented in a judicial fashion where the 
authority of the court is not limited in its scope and jurisdiction. The variations within this 
broad standard may differ in regard to many other important settings.  
A system enabling constitutional review in an all-out judicial fashion may still provide for the 
two most essential elements which distinguish Kelsenian courts and which are missing in the 
American model: abstract review and concentrated review. Firstly, the alternative can manage 
to abstain from introducing a diffuse system. Constitutional review can be implemented in a 
judicial fashion by a single court on the top of the judiciary if this court is empowered as the 
single highest judicial instance with a sound appellate command over the decisions of the other 
courts in the system. Secondly, the alternative should necessarily make clear that it does not 
purport to abandon the institution of the abstract review. The institution of abstract review, in 
essence, does not become a matter of trade off as it might seem, and it may keep operating 
under a special regime (concerning restricted standing, for example). What this suggestion 
rather implies is that abstract review should be viewed as a supplementary function 
implemented by constitutional courts, though this does not imply any subordination of the 
abstract review to the concrete or vice versa but an institutional setting where constitutional 
courts essentially perform in a court fashion while the function of abstract review is added to 
that conceptual setting. In other words, if the classical paradigms were to serve as examples, 
one should designate not the Kelsenian court to perform also concrete review functions, but a 
classical court to perform also an abstract review function.    
                                                 




THE PITFALLS OF THE KELSENIAN MODEL REVISITED 
 
 
A. Why a special tribunal? 
 
Why a special tribunal? There is hardly any discussion about the emergence of the 
constitutional judicial review in new democracies that has avoided this inquiry. The rationale 
behind the separation of the judicial review into a special quasi-judicial institution may be 
attributed to a series of explanations.  
The “legal families” explanation, deriving from the earliest conceptualization of the 
concentrated system by its founder, Hans Kelsen, and later scrutinized by Mauro Cappelletti,423 
may attribute the choice of the Kelsenian model to the civil law family background of the post-
communist legal systems. The choice of these countries can also be suspected as deriving from 
the other conventional reasoning for the constitutional courts- the civil law traditions’ 
commonly acknowledged distrust in general judiciary.424 In the post-communist area, the desire 
to create a separate court was supplemented by the countries’ natural willingness to break with 
the communist-time legacies in the very early years of the transition by creating an institution 
of a new generation, which is emblematical of constitutional democracy.425 There has been, 
meanwhile, a very active debate about the credentials of the model from the perspective of its 
legitimacy and the democratic capital.426  
This chapter, equipped with the insightful guidelines from these preceding works, offers a 
somewhat different perspective about the expediency of the transplant of the Kelsenian design. 
This view is based on a rather pragmatic evaluation and comparative analysis of the trade-offs 
between the pros and cons of the possible institutional combinations relying on the variety of 
specific “local demands” and the political environments in the target countries.   
To start by fitting this discussion into the conceptual theoretical framework offered in the first 
chapter, the threshold question should be: was the choice of the Kelsenian model an optimal 
design for the countries of this study? The rationale behind the separation of the constitutional 
court from the general judicial function apparently seems sound if we consider the expected 
impact of the emerging system on the development of political and legal culture in the new 
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regimes. The constitutional courts have been created with a major purpose in mind: to build a 
new instrument of constitutionalism, which will stay away from the Soviet judicial practices 
and the old-fashioned and corrupt general judiciary. In fact, the consideration of breaking with 
the destructive legacies of communist constitutional and judicial traditions and founding the 
new ones speaks exactly for the virtue of separate constitutional courts.  
However, this line of argumentation demonstrates a quite one-sided and excessively optimistic 
vision of the political path of the future to be taken by the transitional governments, as well as 
of the prospective local demands in the ex-Soviet countries. This is perhaps due to the over-
estimation of the role of the formal institutional arrangements, the somewhat naïve trust in the 
“devotedness” of the agents, judges on one hand and the politicians on the other, as well as the 
general belief in the capacity of the new institutions to resist the constraints created by the 
legacies and actors. Could the constitutional courts triumph over such constraints, even if they 
were generously empowered and were composed of the most competent and decent judges? 
Not only have the constitutional courts proved being unable to stay immune from the 
corruption of the entire political system, but so has the function of the constitutional review in 
general, subject to pressure from the dominants actors in the political dimension, failed to 
emerge as an institution of its own according to the best expectations of the institutional 
designers. And while the “noble” motivation of separating the judicial review in a special 
tribunal seems now totally undermined in light of these circumstances, the existing major local 
demands stay pretty much unaddressed by the Kelsenian design of the constitutional judicial 
review.   
My position stands for the fairly “ideal type” properties of both the Kelsenian and the American 
models if these were transplanted into the post-Soviet systems without any reasonable 
adjustment to the local environments, while the hypothetical optimal design may only be the 
one aiming at a balanced formula fitting the local demands. This work considers consolidation 
and strengthening of the judiciary to be the key local demand and the objective in today’s post-
Soviet countries where the development of independent judiciaries, capable of “competing” 
equally with the other branches of power for the sake of constitutionalism and for assuming the 
foremost role as the guarantor of the rule of law, has clearly lagged behind the similar processes 
in the now EU-member post-communist countries. Hence, this work aims at justifying the 
rationale of the “consolidation of the judiciary” through an institutional merger of the 
constitutional courts and the courts of general jurisdiction in a way which would rationally 
contribute to the independence and strength of both segments of the currently separated judicial 
authority in the formerly Soviet states.   
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B. Courts: the Achilles Heel of post-Soviet democracies 
 
 I see the most topical demands of current post-Soviet states in developing truly independent 
and effective judicial systems. I “rank” post-Soviet courts in the very top for the role they are 
expected to play in the struggle for democratization and rule of law, and in the very bottom for 
their very low capacity to achieve this presently.  
We may depart from the drastic discrepancy between the law on books and the state of their 
implementation, or between the ideal constitutional order envisaged and the actual political 
order in place. While fundamentally democratic and law-governed on the books, all of these 
countries are neither democratic enough, nor governed by law in reality. As already mentioned 
in the Chapter 2, as of 2007 among the 12 countries in the post-Soviet land only Ukraine 
qualified as a free country (in the 2005 survey, Ukraine was still among the partly free 
countries). Four countries were partly free: Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova.  The 
rest were not free countries: Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The scores on democratic parameters for these countries were 
also shown back in Chapter 2.   As for judicial framework and independence, the former Soviet 
countries’ scores were: Armenia: 5,00; Azerbaijan: 5.75; Belarus: 6.75; Georgia: 4.75; 
Kazakhstan: 6.25; Kyrgyzstan: 5.50; Moldova: 4.50; Russia: 5.25; Tajikistan: 5.75; 
Turkmenistan: 7.00; Ukraine: 4.25; Uzbekistan: 6.75. Bulgaria’s score was 3.00, Macedonia’s 
3.75, Croatia’s 4.25, Estonia’s 1.50, Lithuania’s 1.50, Poland’s 2.25, and the Czech Republic’s 
2.25.  
This data provided by Freedom House is a useful tool for a comparative analysis of judicial 
independence in transitions despite the widespread recognition of serious difficulties in 
measuring judicial independence. In a comprehensive overview of the existing methodology 
and tools for comparative assessment of judicial independence, Christopher Larkins undertakes 
a scrupulous analysis and critique of the accepted methodology for gauging judicial 
independence.427 His critique could well be related to the methods applied in the Freedom 
House’s study of nations in transit where numerical ratings are assigned to each country’s 
performance in the area of judicial framework and independence based on assessments by 
expert consultants (who are selected from among country or regional specialists recommended 
by “recognized authorities”) and academic advisors. Proceeding by pointing out the problems 
in interpreting evidence of impartiality, insularity and the structural data on the courts’ 
independence, Larkins addresses the drawbacks of positivist methodology in assigning 
numerical scores to judicial independence which was supposed to overcome the mentioned 
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difficulties.428  He finds that “the component concepts of judicial independence do not 
automatically lend themselves to rigid scientific analysis” due to one or more of specified 
reasons, such as the unreliability of formal data which is normally employed in such analyses 
and the arbitrary nature of assigning numerical scores.429 In addition, Larkins criticizes the 
method of assessing judicial independence via the polling of various neutral public 
commentators, such as social scientists.430 His criticism is based on the analysis of a 1976 study 
of Latin American courts by Kenneth Johnson431 where the author undertook polling of 84 
social scientists for their expert views on the independence of Latin American courts and the 
consequent ranking of these courts based on the poll results. Larkins labels this classification as 
“arbitrary” and refers to a quote by a fellow social scientist432 qualifying the applied 
methodology as “hearsay.”433   
The reliability of the above-mentioned “positivist” ranking undertaken by the Freedom House 
might likely be subject to similar criticism by a Larkins-style analyst. Still, the methodology 
applied by the Freedom House, compared to the majority of academic studies on judicial 
independence in transitions, has at least two major virtues which, in the meantime, strongly 
resist the main critique of the above-mentioned kind. The first merit of this methodology is that 
it does concentrate on factual indicators as opposed to many academic works that rely 
extensively on formal indicators which principally lead to considerably different conclusions. 
As mentioned, Larkins mentions the reliance on formal indicators as one of the major 
drawbacks in determining judicial independence empirically. He tackles a 1975 study by David 
Clark who attempted to measure the effectiveness of Latin American courts by using such 
indicators as tenure and salary guarantees, appointment and removal, etc.434 Arguably, by using 
such data Clark overstated the real independence of some countries’ courts ranking them before 
Costa-Rica’s, which was universally accepted as the most independent in the region.435 Larkins’ 
criticism of such methodology has merits. The reliance on formal indicators of judicial 
independence is very unlikely to produce the desired outcome due to the very big discrepancy 
between written laws on the books and the actual application of these laws in transiting 
countries.  
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It can be appreciated that this is also true about post-Soviet countries. In their article on the 
relationship between judicial review and the independence of courts, political scientists Erik 
Herron and Kirk Randazzo reasonably demonstrate considerable discrepancies between official 
(formal) and factual indicators of independence of the post-communist courts.436 They criticize 
the reliability of formal data such as on court activism which has been often used as an 
indicator of independence. This study argues, for example, that formally fairly active 
constitutional courts in both Belarus and Azerbaijan have been subject to manipulation by the 
presidents in their political interests, and that these courts’ record of activism almost equals the 
review and invalidation of legislation undermining the presidential authority.437 Therefore, 
while according to formal indicators Belarus and Azerbaijan have the most active constitutional 
courts, the relevance of this factor to these courts’ independence should have been doubtful due 
to the highly authoritarian nature of regimes in both countries.  
The second merit of the study by the Freedom House is its assessment of the judicial system of 
particular countries in wider political perspective with essential reference to all the indicators 
concerned. This approach allows for contextual evaluation of phenomena based on all their 
multi-faceted aspects and the inter-dependence of different factors. In contrast, many academic 
observers concentrate on a particular phenomenon among the vast number of issues which 
determine the status of judicial independence.  
Larkins does not leave this methodological tendency unattended either. His critique of studies 
concentrating on one of the characteristic features of an independent judiciary, such as 
impartiality, insularity and authority, assumes that “some of these traits could be exhibited by 
non-independent as well as independent judicial branches. 438” This is why he concludes that 
“evidence of one but not all of them does not decisively indicate the existence of judicial 
independence.”439 Larkins harshly criticizes these noticed tendencies in one-sided appraisal of 
courts, referring to the evidence of the studies of courts in Spain under Franco440 and Chili 
under Pinochet.441 While such “specialized” perspectives are important for revealing the overall 
quality of judicial independence, they are insufficient by themselves for arriving at a 
consolidated evaluation of a judicial system. As to the criticism of the polling method, Larkins’ 
point seems to be a little bit overstated: regardless of the number of deficiencies which the 
results of polling may have, this method contains some essential merits, such as impartiality 
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and professionalism, which make it a valuable resource compared to other existing methods of 
evaluating judicial independence in a cross-country context.   
The Freedom House’s data may have some other deficiencies. One of them is arguably the 
reliance on single popular cases in evaluating the overall quality of the judiciary. Thus, 
improvement in Ukraine’s score in 2006-2007 was based on the single case of the 2004 post-
election decision of the Supreme Court442 which hardly represents a general trend in the whole 
judicial system in this country. As we could see in the previous chapters, the courts in Ukraine 
still stay constrained by the executive. Likewise, the drop in Russia’s score can hardly be 
justified by only the single politically-motivated case of Mikhail Khodorkovski whereas there 
has always been evidence of the widespread practice of political prescriptions for the resolution 
of certain cases in the Russian courts.  
Taken as a whole, however, the Freedom House’s evaluation is a reliable and, overall, a truthful 
source for comparative analysis of courts in transiting societies. At the end of the day, this is 
the only available cross-country assessment of judicial frameworks and independence which 
allows comparative analysis of various groups of countries with visual numerical scores 
attributed to each one. Moreover, these cross-country evaluation tables are supplemented by 
separate annual country reports with summarizing narratives on each country’s state of affairs 
and progress in democratic governance. Notably, in all the reports concerning post-Soviet 
countries, the Freedom House’s experts underline deficiencies in the judicial independence in 
their overall appraisal of countries’ democratization. The report on Armenia confirms my 
earlier assumption about the discrepancy between the law on the books and its enforcement and 
about the lack of independence of the judiciaries for overcoming this problem:  
Despite constitutional provisions guaranteeing a full range of basic human rights, in 
practice there remain substantial barriers to effective protection of said rights. The 
judiciary enjoys little independence and is unable to fulfill its role as a guarantor of law 
and justice. 
The Russian report refers to the courts’ manipulation by the state. Political pressure on courts is 
reported in Georgia despite the drastic progress in democratization and the rule of law since the 
triumph of the pro-democratic movements in 2004. The Belarusian court system is reported to 
be subordinate to the presidency. Similar are the statements about Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and 
other Central Asian countries. The report on Kazhakstan submits:  
Kazakhstan's judicial system has lost much of its credibility by acting in full 
compliance with the regime's interests rather than stepping in to protect civil liberties. 
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In Moldova, Freedom House reports political pressure on the Constitutional Court. In allegedly 
the freest country in the post-Soviet area, Ukraine, the judicial branch is reported to have 
provided little help in guaranteeing the rule of law.   
We may refer to various other sources for identifying the real state of affairs with judicial 
independence and the effectiveness of courts in post-Soviet nations. On the level of 
constitutional judicial review, the survey of the recent politically-sensitive cases, undertaken by 
this work in the previous chapters, showed the constitutional courts gravely dependent on 
political leadership. In Ukraine, the Constitutional Court appeared incapable in 2007 to decide 
on the case of the dissolution of the Supreme Rada as any decision in that case would produce a 
strong counter-reaction from either of the divided executives.443 In general, the courts in this 
country have regularly reported pressure from the executive power.444 In Russia, the 
Constitutional Court could not find enough courage to counter President Putin’s constitutional 
project eliminating the elections of the governors.445 In Armenia, the Court was unable to 
effectively address the violations before and during the elections of 2008, though the Court 
observed the fact of these violations in one of its decisions.446  
After all, being involved in electoral markets and political games by virtue of the constitutional 
imposition of arbiters’ functions in electoral and other political matters (as discussed above), 
constitutional justices have to cope with the pressure coming from the political actors. 
Decisions of constitutional courts in such situations represent an inherent “institutional 
survival” strategy447 by which constitutional judges are being guided. In this light, it is not 
surprising that sustaining the current executives’ will, in the manner of the Belarusian and 
Azeri courts as described by Herron and Randazzo,448 demonstrates the typical pattern of the 
constitutional courts’ behavior in the former Soviet countries.  
There is, meanwhile, abundant evidence of the currently “low” status of the constitutional 
courts in newly democratizing countries, of their damaged standing and reputation among both 
the public and the state authorities. Hence, usual ignorance of the constitutional courts’ 
decisions is observed. Herman Schwartz mentioned the difficulties with the implementation of 
the Constitutional Court’s orders in the Russian Federation as “one of the Court’s most 
troubling problems.”449 This problem in Russia clearly goes back to its noteworthy Tatarstan 
case as early as 1992 when the Constitutional Court considered as unconstitutional a question 
in the regional referendum containing statements on the sovereignty of Tatarstan. This decision 
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of the Court, as well as the Court’s subsequent references to the Russian Parliament and the 
President, though, were ignored by the Tatar government which succeeded in proceeding with 
the concerned question on the referendum despite the Constitutional Court’s judgment.450 There 
have been many cases of noncompliance after the Tatarstan case.451 Schwartz cites a Russian 
Constitutional Court’s justice complaining about the executive’s and the prosecutor’s low 
motivation for enforcement of the Court’s decisions.452 In addition, noncompliance with the 
Constitutional Court’s decisions is “widespread above all in ordinary courts.”453  
Meanwhile, Klaus von Beyme’s remark in his article on the Russian Constitutional Court 
suggests that ignorance of constitutional courts’ decisions is not typical to Russia only: “A non-
consolidated democracy has always initially the problem of enforcement of legal sentences. 
Legally the Court’s decisions are binding- but who secures this?”454  
Indeed, the problem seems to be related to virtually all post-Soviet countries455 and not really 
only in the early years of their transition. As Epstein, Knight, and Shvetsova argue, this reality 
is clearly a by-product of the previous regime where no neutral and independent check on the 
governmental activity might be implemented and thus this newly-established function seems 
very odd to political institutions.456 In Armenia, the local media labeled the Constitutional 
Court as a powerless creature which reminds a publishing house that prints flamboyant books 
on legal studies.457 There are some reasons for such a treatment: since 2004, for example, the 
decision of the Constitutional Court holding unconstitutional the Government’s program on the 
alienation of private property for the reconstruction of the city center in Yerevan was not 
followed by the Government which continued with its program after the Court’s decision. A 
more noteworthy decision of the same Court, which was mentioned in the previous chapters, 
calling for the acting National Assembly and the President of the country to organize a 
referendum of confidence within one year after the obviously unfair elections, was likewise 
ignored by both the Parliament and the President.458 Schwartz reports about regular ignorance 
of the Constitutional Court’s rulings by President Lukashenka in Belarus.459 It is not a surprise, 
in this light, that the public reputation of the courts would decline considerably since the time it 
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became clear that this new institutions, which were created for the promotion of constitutional 
justice and human rights and which therefore enjoyed a large public support at the beginning, 
proved to be incapable of performing independently and were viewed as mere proxies of the 
executive power.       
Even worse is the situation with general courts which enjoy even less legitimacy and public 
support and which are subject to pressure from the part of a variety of actors, including national 
and regional authorities, and even powerful individual actors, such as representatives of local 
business elites, etc. One researcher submits a symbolic quotation from President Lukashenka 
saying that the judiciary is essentially a part of the Presidency and that though the courts are 
supposed to be independent, it is the President who appoints them and thus can so manipulate 
them.460 Such treatment by the highest political officials in the formerly Soviet states is not 
typical only to the emblematic though a bit extreme example of Belarus. In Russia, one should 
not go deep to see elements of “telephone justice” in a number of politically-sensitive judicial 
cases, such as the Yukos trials, where the addresses of the main screen-writers of the respective 
judicial decisions can be traced to the highest offices of the country.  
Among the Yukos series, the case with the last Chief Executive of the company is illustrative. 
In a nutshell, in 2005 the newly appointed senior manager of the former oil giant, Vassili 
Aleksanian, who publicly announced his plans for consolidation of the assets and rehabilitation 
of the company which was since the last two years under the special attack from the 
Government, was subject to criminal persecution by the Prosecutor’s office. The criminal 
charges against him were initiated immediately after his appointment to office and his 
mentioned announcements, whereas the alleged offences of his were previously subject to 
scrupulous investigation and could have been dealt by the prosecutors well before he would 
become the key manager of the company. The Simonovsky court of the Russian Capital 
endorsed these charges brought by the Prosecutor’s office, giving the sanction for Alexanian’s 
detainment.461 As of 2008, no official indictment against Alexanian was presented, while his 
custody on pre-trial detention, without access to basic medical care despite his life-threatening 
condition, has continued up to the present time.462 Not surprisingly, there is hardly one incident 
when the different courts would not endorse the prosecutors’ charges in the number of Yukos 
cases since 2004. In such or other ways, through its central or local proxies, the state in the 
former Soviet world administers and controls the legal system, including the courts.       
I undertake this “journey” to properly verify the accuracy of my assumptions about the very 
low credentials of judicial independence in post-Soviet societies, following Larkins’ 
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recommendation to concentrate on the evidence of dependency of courts rather than that of 
independence (which he considers a methodological substitute to the criticized options).463 This 
is in spite of the fact that in some sense such a scrutiny may seem to be excessive: after all, the 
fact of “judicial dependence” in the formerly Soviet countries on both constitutional review and 
general levels is patently obvious, and there is hardly anyone familiar with these societies who 
would strongly disagree with such assessments.  
The observed deficiencies of the judicial system currently create the biggest barrier to these 
countries’ path to development and this is virtually in all areas. It is obvious that no real 
progress in democracy building can be achieved without serious achievements in judicial 
independence as no democracy can exist without the rule of law. Likewise, there may hardly be 
any significant economic growth founded on a poor rule-of- law environment. In this light, the 
judiciaries can be characterized as the Achilles heel of the post-Soviet transitions. 
Obviously, the communist legacies are the main explanation for the current state of affairs in 
post-Soviet judicial systems. For any observer with a more or less clear perception of the 
judicial practices in communist times, there should not be any major doubt about it. Like in 
communist times, the majority of the judiciary in the now independent post-Soviet countries 
stays subservient to the major political actors in their countries in almost the same manner as 
they were under the communist regime. This is, largely, due to the incredible difficulty in 
overcoming the inherited structures existing in the whole generation of judicial officers and 
legal professors who, as a rule, still dominate in both the judiciary and in the law schools 
training future judges.  
However, apart form the legacy explanation, there is another factor to keep in mind. In such 
political environments, as in the countries under review, the judicial bodies and especially the 
individual judges, who comprise the major body of the judiciary, stay functionally and 
institutionally unprotected vis-à-vis their main “oppressors” who are endowed with real power 
and resources. There is something about the institutional design of the judicial branch at large 
that one can view as making this inequality obvious. Given the reality of the post-Soviet 
judiciary and judges being subject to various pressures from other branches of the power, I do 
not see any real powers being given to the judiciary as a separate institutionalized branch for 
resisting such pressure. In this situation, the individual judges, of whom the judicial branch is 
mainly composed, appear as powerless functionaries who can hardly feel the strength of the 
judiciary as of a compelling, consolidated institutional entity behind them when confronting 
pressure from, let us say, the prosecutor’s office or the local governor. If all or only one of 
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these arguments makes sense, then the institutional design, aiming at a better consolidated 
judiciary, should have particular attention paid to it. 
All this having been said, does the Kelsenian model offer such a design?  
 
C. The Kelsenian model and the consolidation of judiciary 
 
I argue that in the post-Soviet environment, the separation of the two judicial functions- 
constitutional and general, considerably weakens both. In contrast, the well-designed 
consolidation of constitutional and general judicial bodies would enhance the independence and 
the standing of the judicial power. The reasoning for such an option does actually go beyond 
the visual attractiveness of this statement.  
Let us consider, firstly, whether the emergence of the two separate fragments within what we 
can conditionally call judicial power is not detrimental to the overall strength of the judiciary. 
Then, it will be worth looking at whether, besides such assumed negative consequences of 
partition, there may be arguments found by which the consolidation would rather add to the 
independence and effectiveness of both these functions.  
 
The perils of separation 
This inquiry is worth starting with the evidence of conflicts between constitutional and general 
courts, a reality which obviously does not support an image of a consolidated and strong 
judicial body. While my proposition about destructiveness of such conflicts was originally 
based on a rather intuitive suspicion, this concern was confirmed by a series of interviews 
which I had with acting and former justices from the post-communist area.  
Answering my question about the virtues of the Estonian model of judicial system, which is, 
first of all, distinguished by the absence of a separate constitutional court, the Justice of the 
Constitutional Review and the Administrative Chambers in the Supreme Court of Estonia Juri 
Pold emphasized the importance of judicial integrity, enabled by their system, which excludes 
the possibility of a conflict between the particular segments of the judiciary.464 While at first 
glance I was quite surprised that this argument was particularly pointed out from among the 
many others, which are normally brought in support of the Estonian model, my later inquiries 
came to convince me that this experienced judge and constitutionalist should have had enough 
evidence of the destructive consequences of such conflicts in all over the neighboring region. 
                                                 




Indeed, there may be hardly any country found in post-communist Europe which had avoided 
the clash between constitutional and general courts over the constitutional review prerogatives 
in their judicial competency.465 The former Chief Justice of the Polish Constitutional Court, 
Marek Safjan, in an interview in 2007466 observed that the tension between the Constitutional 
and general courts in Poland is still in place and that the consequences of this clash have a 
significant negative impact on the performance of the judicial system at large.  
The conflicts between constitutional and general courts have sometimes been so 
uncompromising that it has led observers to speak of the “war of the courts.” Notably, such a 
conflict is said to be typical of virtually all the post-authoritarian states which decided to create 
a separate tribunal for adjudicating constitutional matters.467 In the post-Soviet countries which 
have not avoided the “wars of the courts”,468 the Russian courts’ clash has probably been the 
most uncompromising. It arose as a result of the country’s two highest judicial bodies- 
Constitutional and Supreme Courts’ differing visions on the review of constitutional issues by 
the general lower courts. The first was the Supreme Court’s persuasive clarification of 1995, 
addressed to the lower courts, which provoked the conflict. In this clarification, the Supreme 
Court recommended469 that the courts disregard any laws which they would deem as 
unconstitutional and in such cases directly apply the provisions of the Constitution unless the 
courts have doubts about the constitutionality of a law in which case they would need to refer 
the case to the Constitutional Court.470 The reaction of the Constitutional Court followed in 
1998: the Court reaffirmed its exclusive competency over constitutional matters at both the 
federal and regional levels.471  
At a glance, this is reminiscent of an ordinary juridical dispute. But there is evidence to the 
contrary showing a real rivalry between the courts, which goes beyond the ordinary dispute 
over a technical legal matter. Herman Schwartz considers the conflict between the two judicial 
segments as the cause of the very few referrals to the Russian Constitutional Court from the 
general courts.472 If this really is the case, then the conflict between the two segments of the 
judiciary seems to involve a much harsher confrontation and mutual antipathy than we would 
expect the results of a simple legal contest to be. At the same time, Schwartz, who calls the 
relationship between the Russian courts “troubled”, quotes a constitutional judge reporting 
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rather a series of jurisdictional disputes between the Constitutional and the Supreme Court in 
the context of the above-mentioned jurisdictional dispute.473  
A student, who specifically devotes an entire article to this essential conflict between the 
Russian Constitutional and Supreme Courts, submits that the Supreme Court, in contrast to the 
Constitutional Court, enjoys a greater authority and prestige among the judiciary.474 This 
remark, made in the context of the Russian “war of the courts” in a sense indicates the 
delineation between the Constitutional Court on one hand and the rest of the courts on the 
other. After all, we can imply from these comments that the widespread disregard of the 
decisions of the Constitutional Court by the ordinary courts, as mentioned above, is largely a 
result of the “war of the courts.”475   
Do such “wars of the courts” threaten the independence of the judiciary? I look at this from the 
perspective of the overall image of the judiciary as a separate power and an institutionalized, 
integrated body. In light of the specific transitional demands in post-Soviet countries, which I 
now consider, this issue is much more important than even the “coordination problems when 
allocating jurisdiction”476 or the problems with “dual constitutional jurisdiction”477 produced by 
the separation of the constitutional review from the general judicial function. The problem 
looks particularly worrying from the perspective of the US judicial tradition where the troubled 
relationship between the judicial fractions is viewed first of all from the standpoint of the 
judiciary’s composite capacity vis a vis the other branches: for example, the main concern 
expressed by a former US judge of the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia about 
the systems which divide the judicial functions between constitutional and other courts, is that  
“the concentration of the highly visible constitutional issues in one court, which would then tell 
other courts what the constitution meant and how to apply it, would diminish their stature, 
particularly before the executive and parliament.”478  
Meanwhile, we should ask whether the general environment of distrust, apathy and 
psychological dissatisfaction within the courts is not detrimental to their independence and 
strength. Wojciech Sadurski notes that the separation of judicial functions raises problems of 
“professional pride” and “sense of dignity.”479 Angela Di Gregorio submits that the creation of 
the Constitutional Court “has hurt the pride of the Supreme Court.”480 I believe in the 
destructive effects of such unhealthy contests and “jealousy” between the different courts. At 
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the same time, this is not the best way of curing the extremely poor fame of the judiciary, 
which is, in many instances due to the long-standing reputation of corrupt and dependent 
courts- a reality which it is important to improve rather than avoid.  
The separation of the “elitist” constitutional courts from the other courts clearly emphasizes this 
contrast. On the contrary: the accepted image of the constitutional courts as “elite” bodies in 
general and the reputation of its intellectual and respected members should rather add to the 
reputation of the general judiciary whose popular image is more that of a corrupt and limited 
Soviet-era bureaucrats. While the conventional wisdom has been, since the collapse of the 
Soviet ideology, to keep the newly created institutions away from the infamous judiciary, I 
would argue that a better-thought policy should have, at some point, been concerned to upgrade 
the judiciary’s stature and the consolidation of the judiciary, which as I principally advocate in 
this chapter, is the proper institutional device for addressing the problem.    
After all, there are other problems too. The decline in the ordinary courts’ referrals to the 
constitutional courts, as concerned above, threatens the very core idea of constitutional 
adjudication in the countries which introduced the mechanism of concrete review by means of 
referrals from general courts. The other essential problem is the level of constitutional culture 
among the general judiciary. Herman Schwartz brings a set of evidence to indicate the very low 
awareness of constitutional issues among the ordinary judges in the post-communist countries 
in general.481 Where the ultimate prospect of constitutionalism in transitional countries is 
concerned, the problem is of significance. At the end of the day, as Wojciech Sadurski notes, 
“it is the ordinary courts that are the front line, so to speak, of the application of the law.”482 
The dissenting opinion of the Russian constitutional judge Gadzhiev from a Constitutional 
Court’s decision of 1998 is very illustrative: 
Decisions of the ordinary courts which have identified a conflict between a law and the 
Constitution, and have declined to apply the law, without repealing them, represent the 
birth of judicial law, the development of which is particularly indispensable to the 
Russian legal system in its search to avoid positivist approaches.483  
All this said, the “wars of courts” should have become a tormenting alarm for those who 
worried about the overall capacity of the judicial branch in its uneasy fight against the other 
institutions in the aggressive turmoil of post-authoritarian power structures.  
 
The virtues of consolidation 
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Let us now consider how the consolidation of the separated judicial functions would augment 
the independence and strength of the judiciary. As an illustration and a sample for developing a 
hypothetical analysis of alternatives, let us consider a situation where a court is confronted with 
deciding a case where a private interest of a powerful governmental actor is concerned. 
Typically in such situations in a post-Soviet country, a judge would likely decide in line with 
the interests of the political litigant, regardless of the real merits of the case. The conventional 
explanation for this reality is simple: as I said before, the individual judges, who perform 
justice in the vast majority of cases, in the absence of the essential cultural setting for the 
respect of the judicial office and the rule of law in post-Soviet countries, are quite powerless 
against the mighty “opponents” from the executive branch who put pressure on them in search 
of a favorable outcome in their case. The problems of financial, administrative, logistical, and 
other dependence of the courts on the other institutions are central, and it comes as no surprise 
that these are extensively addressed by a variety of studies and practical guides on judicial 
independence.484 The “verdict” in such cases is clear: to provide for real independence, these 
powers of other institutions to constrain the judiciary should be cut to the minimum.  
However, another aspect is worth consideration in this context- if the other institutions in fact 
possess powers (in fact, so many of them) by which they are able to constrain the courts, which 
are the respective powers under the judiciary’s possession that would help them to “balance” 
the power structures? One would agree that these powers are vested mainly in the constitutional 
courts which, as we could see, do not in any sense share these assets with their fellow 
colleagues from the general judiciary. If the institutional actors from the other branches of 
government or individuals or groups associated with them are supposed to pose the main 
constraints on the courts, as is the case in the countries of this study, then what are the special 
guarantees for the independence of the conventional judiciary under this conception of the 
separation of powers principle?485 
I argue that the political function, currently vested only in constitutional courts, can largely add 
to the strength, and therefore, to the independence of regular courts. Look at the conclusion to 
which political scientists Herron and Randazzo arrived in their study of the judicial 
independence and activism in post-communist countries: 
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Courts with a constitutionally-invested power of judicial review are arguably more 
independent than courts without a formal grant of judicial review or courts whose 
authority outlines in an easily amended statute. Without the power of judicial review, 
courts have substantially limited authority to make decisions opposing the actions of 
political branches of government.486    
In this context, unlike most of the academic writers on constitutional courts in post-communist 
countries, I am strongly in favor of the exercise of activist political functions by the courts 
especially in the former communist countries. While the political nature of the main functions 
implemented by constitutional courts is universally recognized, judicial activism by post-
communist courts is rarely justified by these experts.487 Although one should be worried about 
generalizations, I principally disagree with them for two main reasons.  
First, references to constitutional courts almost always produce plenty of democratic effect that 
is among other things is a strong engine for promotion of a culture of democracy. As a rule, this 
effect is not possible to reach if the courts do not step over the standards put together by the 
dominant political elites through the process of law-making. Take, for example, the decision of 
the Constitutional Court of Armenia on the results of presidential elections in 2003, discussed 
in length in the third chapter. It may be recalled that the case related to the controversy between 
the presidential candidates over the results of two-round elections in 2003.488 The application 
was submitted to the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenian by the presidential 
candidate Stephan Demirchyan on the results of the second round of the elections. In particular, 
the petitioner had alleged essential violations committed during the election process, including 
mass stuffing. The outcomes of the adjudication are known to us. The ruling of the 
Constitutional Court had upheld the results of the second round, recognizing the re-election of 
acting President Robert Kocharyan. The decision of the Constitutional Court, however, 
contained another statement, a non-binding recommendation, which proposed to overcome the 
political controversy over the elections by holding a referendum within one year “as an 
effective measure to overcome social resistance deepened during the presidential elections.”489 
Despite the Constitutional Court’s legally vulnerable argumentation, containing a call for a 
“referendum of confidence” to overcome the complexities of the disputed elections, the 
decision, reached through judicial activism, provoked the strongest democratic momentum in 
this country.  
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By the same token, even the widely criticized political involvement of the Russian first Court, I 
believe, has greatly enhanced the political culture within the society in general and within the 
political leadership in particular. One symbolic indication is provided by Epstein, Knight and 
Shvetsova quoting President Yeltzin, who suspended the Constitutional Court in 1993, saying 
only after five years that the ruling of the Constitutional Court is binding upon him even though 
he dislikes it.490 In sum, I hypothesize that the greater the involvement of post-Soviet 
constitutional courts in politics, the better is the prospect of democratic consolidation.  
Second, political involvement is a primary guarantee of the courts’ independence. Kim Lane 
Scheppele calls this the “liberating effect on judges of the ever increasing constitutionalization 
of politics.”491 Her extraordinary point of view stands for “judicial empowerment” precisely for 
the benefit of promoting judicial independence. The wealth of empirical evidence supporting 
this account is provided from the post-communist constitutional courts’ experience which is not 
a surprise if we revisit the exclusive competency of these bodies in exercising constitutional 
review in former communist lends. Having employed this concept, I apply its main 
propositions to support my main argument for the independence of the judiciary in general. The 
remarkable inventory of judicial techniques listed,492 which Scheppele views as “tools that 
activist courts are using to constrain the political branches”493 may equally be utilized to 
enhance the arsenal of the judiciary in general if a reasonable level of judicial integration is 
reached that allows a power-sharing to take place between the general and constitutional 
judicial functions.  
In this perspective, consider our hypothetical case already in a situation where the ordinary 
courts in general, either directly or through their functional integration with the constitutional 
review court, possess the entire list of functions which are now set quite clearly aside in the 
constitutional courts, including invalidation of laws and governmental acts, verification and 
validation of elections, right to impeach executives, as well as the legal empowerment methods 
through “expansion of constitutional-judicial domain,” that are mentioned by Scheppele. I 
argue that there is considerable empowering potential of such a design. Added the prospect of 
“non-positivist” approaches in application of law and the “birth of judicial law”, as Justice 
Gadzhiev puts it, the institutional empowerment would enable the judiciary to possess a serious 
instrumentality virtually in any areas of public relations and law enforcement. Scheppele shows 
a direct correlation between the exercise of judicial discretion in interpreting the law and 
judicial independence.494 This would stand for another potential instrument in the hands of 
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courts, to “balance” the other institutions: “Empowered by constitutional principles, judges can 
(and some judges often) bend the positive law to a judicial conception of what the law should 
be, thereby challenging the political branches for the final word on what counts as law in the 
first place.”495  
As I emphasized before, another important issue in this context is to sustain the judiciary’s 
consolidated image vis-à-vis the other branches. This would be a serious investment in 
promoting separation of powers and providing guarantees for constitutionalism through 
enhancing the judicial independence on the institutional level. A fair portion of the causes for 
“inequality” between the judicial and the other institutions is due to the mostly individualized 
character of the judicial system in general where the supposedly independent individual judges 
are in the core of the system. In a sense, without the function of the constitutional review and 
not regarding the relatively few cases heard by higher general courts’ benches, the “judicial 
power” is chiefly an abstract ideal for individual judges who are selected and appointed 
individually, who are responsible and accountable individually, and who confront political 
pressure individually. While this reality seems to be hardly possible to change on any 
conceptual grounds, any arrangements, which would enhance the institutionalization of the 
judiciary and its functional consolidation, should be paid special attention. 
I argue that the merger, in any well-designed fashion, of the constitutional review court with the 
general judiciary would fundamentally enhance the overall weight of the judicial authority and 
its image among the other institutions and the public. In association with the “asset of political 
function,” we can call this the “asset of a consolidated judiciary’s image.” Larkins observes that 
the more institutionalized judiciary is more independent.496 His reference to a study of judicial 
institutionalization in India497 better articulates my point. Here he says that the more “coherent” 
judiciary “can speak with a more united voice to regulate the legality of state behavior and, 
with this, the judicial branch may be better able to assert itself vis-a-vis other institutions.”498  
Unlike the “asset of political function,” which may bring additional strength to the general 
judiciary as the constitutional courts already “enjoy” the fruits of political empowerment, the 
“asset of consolidated judiciary’s image” can add to the independence of both the general and 
the constitutional review fractions. At the end of the day, constitutional judicial review, as we 
could see, suffers strongly from the same ills as the general judiciary does in its struggle against 
political institutions, which strive to constrain its independence as much as possible. Apart 
from the collective strength of the various judicial functions, the consolidation of the judiciary 
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would essentially eliminate the self-perception of the constitutional review courts as a 
functionally limited specialized body with a quite unclear vision as to its own genuine type and 
place in the intricate constitutional framework.  
Last, but not least, the consolidation would also help to address the issue of “legal legitimacy” 
of the constitutional review courts. What is at stake is the legal competency of the 
constitutional courts which are often argued to be quite detached from the general legal 
discourse due to their narrow specialization in strictly constitutional matters. While this view is, 
as a rule, that of general judges and can be challenged on a number of grounds, the problem is 
worth attention if we care about the harmonized relationship between the judicial segments and 
the prospects of due respect and proper application of constitutional judgments by the rest of 
the courts on the one hand, and about the overall quality of the legislation in a country as far as 
the harmonization of the legal norms is concerned, on the other.  
Di Gregorio’s article, mentioned in this chapter, shows, in an illustrative way, in a number of 
cases concerning the Russian Constitutional Court, how judgments of a constitutional review 
court would fail to fit in the existing legal body and would create essential problems for 
ordinary judges who are called to applying these provisions in their daily practice. Such 
“detachment” of the constitutional courts from “the realities of ordinary courts” and the alleged 
“abstract nature”499 of their decisions seems to be the common syndrome of all post-Soviet 
systems, at least so from the perspective of general courts. While this problem has generally 
been attempted to be solved by such requirements as the legal education of the constitutional 
courts’ members,500 its causes should rather be searched for in the practical detachment of the 
judicial functions from each other which essentially bring alienation of both the constitutional 
judges from the general legal framework in a country, as argued in this paragraph, and the 
alienation of ordinary judges from constitutional issues, as argued earlier.   
This has been a complex argument and it may be worth to summarize it. This section provided 
a series of evidence to show that in the post-Soviet countries the emergence of the 
constitutional courts, separate of the general judicial system, has resulted in a drastic 
delineation between the two judicial functions (constitutional and general courts) both in terms 
of institutional partition and in terms of functional and even psychological failure to 
collaboration. It was argued that this reality essentially weakens the positions of both the 
constitutional review and general courts as far as the independence of courts in general is 
concerned. It was furthermore argued that the combination of the “asset of political functions,” 
enabled by the raise of activist “judicial law” and the “asset of a consolidated judiciary’s 
image” can substantially improve this state of affairs and largely add to the independence of 
                                                 
499 Di Gregorio, supra note 451, p. 388. 
500 For a more “contextual” critique of the requirement for legal education, see Sadurski, supra note 2, p. 39-40. 
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courts under an institutional design providing for a functional merger of the separated judicial 
segments. If so, the proposals on reconsidering the “institutional divorce” indeed require an 
urgent attention.  
However, another examination is crucial before we attempt to make normative conclusions and 
this is whether or not there are proper institutional models that would provide for the proposed 
ideal of the consolidation.  
 
D. In search of an optimal design of judicial integrity 
 
What are the institutional solutions which allow one to experiment with such hypothetical 
notions as the “consolidation of the judiciary” to which I so often referred in my previous 
section? 
If the Kelsenian model and especially its post-communist version, where these courts are even 
more removed from traditionally disrespected ordinary courts, failed to secure this then the 
proposed concept has to run into an uneasy search for institutional alternatives to the 
continental model. This prospect may seem to be unpromising only at first glance. 
 
Would the diffuse system be an idealistic design? 
It is hardly any more the conventional wisdom that there exists a direct correlation between the 
legal tradition of a country and the system of judicial review it can have, an opinion which goes 
back to Hans Kelsen. Kelsen referred to the difficulties with unified application of law in the 
systems lacking the effect of stare decisis as one of the main arguments in favor of his creation- 
the centralized system.501 This hypothesis, based more on Kelsen’s hypothetical analytical 
exercise, as no one could test its validity on empirical grounds at that time, was apparently 
confirmed by later experimentation with both of the major judicial review systems in Western 
Europe. Thus, Mauro Cappelletti refers to the experiences of the Weimar Republic and post- II 
World War Italy which tried to adopt a diffuse system, which he says “fully revealed the 
unsuitability of the decentralized method for civil law countries.”502 In his study, Cappelletti 
mentions three major causes which, he believes, stand for the adoption of the centralized 
system in the civil law world. 503 The first is the continental conception of the separation of 
powers with its arguably rigid refusal to grant any political functions to the “anti-democratic” 
                                                 
501 See Allan Randolph Brewer-Carias, Judicial Review in Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 
129. 
502 Cappelletti, supra note 21.  
503 Id., p. 137. 
177 
 
judiciary. Then, in line with the hypothesis of Kelsen, it is the absence of the stare decisis in the 
civil law tradition, which as argued, threatens the consistency of the legal system if in 
combination with the diffused judicial review. Finally, it is the unsuitability of the traditional 
civil law courts which “lack the structure, procedures, and mentality required for effective 
constitutional adjudication.”504    
 Despite the fair amount of common sense in these arguments, the verdict of unsuitability of the 
diffuse system to civil law countries does not sound so deterministic in light of the many 
experiences on the European continent, as well as elsewhere in the civil law world, which 
provide evidence to the contrary. The diffuse system of judicial review has existed in Greece 
since 1847. Although this country has, since then, extensively experimented with particular 
elements of this system, the review of the constitutionality of laws has been, up to now, 
implemented by the general courts regardless of the major trends in European legal tradition to 
which Greece seems to be closer in all other respects. The continental model has also not been 
adopted in the Scandinavian countries and Finland which are, in general, distinguished by their 
strong attachment to the civil law traditions.505 Whilst in Finland the existing constitutional 
framework does not provide for judicial review of legislation as such, the latter is recognized in 
Sweden and Norway and at least the Norwegian judicial review model is said to be among the 
most “comprehensive” ones if judged by the legal setting.506 The diffuse system continues to be 
the model also in Japan, which despite Cappelletti’s negative appraisal, combines this form 
with its civil law traditions. Finally, the American tradition of judicial review is set on the 
foundations of the majority of the Latin American civil law countries, which in many different 
variations preserve the main characteristics of the diffuse review.    
In the meantime, the main arguments developed by Cappelletti may be challenged on both 
analytical and empirical grounds in the context of post-communist countries. Wojciech 
Sadurski undertakes a comprehensive critique of the conventional wisdom in his major study of 
constitutional courts in Central and Eastern Europe.507 Equipped with empirical evidences from 
both the Western, and Central and East European countries, this study challenges the absolute 
validity of the legal tradition arguments, labeling them as “justifications for the maintenance” 
of the widespread acceptance of the Kelsenian model.508 Summarizing his comparative and, to 
a large extent, empirical analysis of this view, Sadurski notes that it is not the separation of 
powers framework and neither it is the authority of precedents that predetermine the choice of 
                                                 
504 Id., p. 143. 
505 Neil MacCormick and Robert Summers (eds.), Interpreting Precedents: A Comparative Study (Ashgate- 
Dartmouth 1997), p. 3 in the Introduction.  
506 Allan Randolph Brewer-Carias, supra note 501, pp. 173-174. 
507 Sadurski, supra note 2. 
508 Sadurski, supra note 2, p. 41. 
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the Kelsenian model in post-communist countries.509 Similarly supported by detailed empirical 
evidence is this study’s critical reaction to the argument about the incompetence of judges in 
post-authoritarian countries, one mentioned inter alia by Cappelletti. The author, who doesn’t 
have a lack of first-hand experience on post-communist countries, notes: 
Neither were the judges of constitutional courts in the regions quite “purified” of their 
old habits and ideologies, nor were the ordinary judges as hopelessly immersed 
mentally in the “preceding period of dictatorship” as to offer no likelihood that they 
would dispense justice in accordance with the new axiology of the law.510 
Notably, this study does not shy away from proposing to “re-open the debate surrounding the 
relative merits of the US style review and its future prospects in the region.”511    
 
The virtue of hybrid systems 
The analytical exercise in the previous section was not intended at proposing the diffuse system 
as an optimal design for the post-Soviet countries. Not any deviation from the Kelsenian model 
necessarily brings to the mere reproduction of its conventional alternative- the American 
diffuse system- in its proto-type form. As already mentioned for several occasions in this work, 
the optimal design of constitutional review has to be elaborated with a serious effort at refusing 
to view the standard forms of the classical models in the foundations of the institutional settings 
of constitutional review systems in the new democracies. The emergence and the success of the 
so-called mixed or hybrid systems in Europe or elsewhere speak to this. Such systems are 
reported to function quite successfully in Portugal, Switzerland, Colombia, Brazil, and Peru.512 
At a closer glance, some unique alternative elements can also be noticed in the common-law 
India, and finally, in the post-Soviet Estonia, as it will be discussed later. To explore the vast 
variety of institutional peculiarities behind all these models, one should note the enormous 
room for “improvisation” which can be afforded by a constitutional designer.    
All this having been said, I should abstain in this part from attending the major debate about the 
judicial review systems and from exploring, in-depth, the large variety of particular institutional 
models which could be set up in post-Soviet countries. Leaving this essential study to my 
following research, my intention now is to tackle one particular alternative model among the 
variety of theoretical models, which may empirically substantiate the expediency and 
practicality of my suggestions. I choose the Estonian engineering, which is optimal for this 
exercise for a number of reasons: first, it is a deviation from the Kelsenian model; second, it 
offers insights from a post-communist, and even more than that, from a post-Soviet country 
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despite the fact that that Estonia is not considered among such for the purposes of this research; 
finally, as I will argue, it suggests some optimal solutions for the shortcomings of the Kelsenian 
system and for the functional consolidation of the judiciary.     
 
 
Are there lessons to be learnt from the Estonian experiment? 
 
Among the post-communist countries, Estonia’s design of the constitutional judicial review is 
unique due to its refusal to introduce a separate constitutional court. The function of judicial 
review is nevertheless present in this country, unlike in Finland, and yet, this does not mean 
that the Estonian scheme is a decentralized American type system.  
The function of the constitutional review is mainly vested with the Constitutional Review 
Chamber in the Supreme Court of Estonia, which is the single highest judicial body in the 
country. The Constitutional Chamber consists of nine judges, appointed to office by the 
Riigikogu (the Estonian Parliament) for life tenure. All of the judges at the Constitutional 
Review Chamber serve also in the other specialized chambers of the Court.513 The Chief Justice 
of the Court is the ex-officio Chairman of the Constitutional Review Chamber. As a rule, the 
Constitutional Review Chamber hears cases in panels of five judges.  
It is noteworthy that the Constitutional Review Chamber is not the only legal forum for 
deciding on constitutional review matters. The latter category of issues can also be subject to 
review by the Supreme Court en banc, which is the highest legal instance, comprising all the 
nineteen members of the Supreme Court, as well as ordinary lower courts which are vested 
with a power to decide on constitutional matters. This is a peculiarity of the Estonian model 
which gives me another chance for emphasizing the functional rather than merely the structural 
and visual distinctiveness of the Estonian judicial system and for stressing the latter’s merits 
from the perspective of the consolidated judiciary (as I will try to argue later).           
At the first look, the Estonian model’s only deviation from the standard choices of the region is 
the formal title and the address of the constitutional review court. Herman Schwartz notes about 
Estonia that the reason for its declining to create a separate constitutional court has been more 
economic in nature than philosophical, political or historical, having in mind the small size of 
the country and the expectation of too small a load to justify the expense of a separate court.514 
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Apart from the fact that this statement can hardly be taken as the whole truth,515 its main 
propositions create the impression of the visual rather than the functional significance of the 
failure to create a separate court. Notably, this was also my impression of the opinions on the 
Estonian paradigm of other experts on post-communist constitutional law. My deeper 
observations of the Estonian model and the particular mechanisms which it employs 
recommend though that a closer look at this model reveals an extra value of declining to have a 
separate court. Let’s consider some perspectives.   
Primarily, the very fact of vesting the two judicial powers within one highest court is by itself 
supportive of the idea of judicial consolidation due to its effective coping with such shortages 
of the Kelsenian design as those discussed in the context of the “wars of the courts” and related 
technical and emotional clashes between the judicial segments. Meanwhile, the fact of 
combining these functions in one court has the very potential for promoting the “consolidated 
judiciary’s image” and thus strengthening the judicial independence. It may be opportune at 
this point to review some expert views. In a regular report of the European Commission on 
Estonia’s Accession to the EU for 2000, for example, it was said of the country’s judicial 
system that the “the Supreme Court serves as Constitutional Court and is therefore fully 
independent.”516 Likewise, another expert report concerning with the state of affairs on judicial 
independence in the accessing countries provided: “Vesting judicial review in the ordinary 
courts (as in Estonia) eliminated the risk that other branches will influence the judiciary 
through this channel.”517  
But the virtues of the system, which we are discussing, do not merely stem from the emergence 
of a merged highest court. One should notice the peculiarities of the whole system. In 
particular, there are some essential elements of the substantive and procedural kind, which in 
my view are highly supportive of the overall independence and strength of the judiciary. Here 
are some major reflections. 
• The Supreme Court en banc 
As I already mentioned above, the Supreme Court en banc is the highest judicial echelon in the 
country, which inter alia reviews matters of a constitutional nature. The constitutional issues 
which are entrusted to it include cases referred to it by the Constitutional Review Chamber 
                                                 
515 This was my overall impression from the series of interviews which I held in the Supreme Court of Estonia and in 
the University of Tartu in April, 2006. In particular, although all of my interviewees did agree that the economic 
reason was taken into consideration during the design of the judicial review system, they all noted that this was not 
the only and even not the major rationale for opting to this system. Among the other causes of this choice were 
mentioned the institutional patterns existed in Estonia before the war, the influence of the Scandinavian systems, and 
after all, the overall logic of the model which emerged in the post-communist Republic.   
516 Regular Report of the European Commission on Estonia’s Progress Towards Accession, COM (2000) 704F, 
13373/00. 
517 Judicial Independence in the EU Accession Process, Report by the EU Accession Monitoring Program, Open 




though there is a distinct category of cases which can be heard only by the Court en banc. This 
last category of issues includes such matters as petitions to declare a member of the Parliament, 
the President or the Chancellor of Justice incapable of performing their duties, to terminate the 
mandate of a member of the Parliament, or to suspend the activities of a party.  
The answer to the question of how this construction enhances judicial integration is, in a sense, 
self-evident. After all, it is obvious that the constitutional matters in this country are not 
entrusted to a sole specialized body which is set so evidently far apart from the general 
judiciary. To return to the existing impression of the Estonia’s failure to introduce a separate 
constitutional court as a formal, visual deviation, this construction submits strong argument to 
the contrary. More importantly, while symbolizing, by itself, the unity of the judicial function 
as such, it provides for efficient cohabitation and collaboration between various judicial 
prerogatives.  
 
• The composition of the Constitutional Review Chamber 
As said above, the members of the Constitutional Review Chamber of the Supreme Court are 
selected from among the Justices of the other Chambers of the Court. More particularly, the 
Justices of the Constitutional Review Chamber are appointed by the Supreme Court en banc 
from among the Supreme Court members appointed to office by the Riikogu.518 This fact by 
itself excludes the possibility of individual clashes between the constitutional and general 
judicial functions as both, in this case, are implemented by the same people. The model also 
offers a solution to the problem of the “legal legitimacy” of constitutional review courts, as 
discussed earlier. Most importantly, it is also emblematic of judicial integrity and existence of a 
single judicial function, similar to what I noted in the case of the Supreme Court acting en 
banc.  
Based on this prototype, one should not abstain from proposing alternative models of a 
consolidated highest court. Consider, for example, the model of a single highest court 
composed of judges who decide on the entire variety of legal cases before it without being 
divided into specialized chambers. Such a court could perform equally well as both the court of 
general jurisdiction and that of constitutional review. While the majority of conventional type 
arguments against such a court would likely be answered by the reference to the Estonian 
paradigm, the assets of such a judicial body are obvious from the perspective of the judicial 
consolidation. After all, the experience of the Supreme Court of the US and the US judicial 
system in general, where the judges perform as general rather than specialized experts on all 
                                                 
518 In fact, the Riikogu (the Parliament) does not appoint constitutional judges specifically. This arrangement keeps 
the composition of the constitutional review court out of the elected politicians’ direct influence.  
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legal matters, can evidence that this alternative is something more than a mere fantasy of a 
creative mind.519  
 
 
• Judicial review by lower courts 
The judicial review system of Estonia is often described as a mixed model between the diffuse 
and centralized systems. This is not so much because of the failure to create a constitutional 
court, as one can presume, but because of the way in which this country’s general courts are 
involved in judicial review. Actually, every court in the country is allowed to render a judgment 
in the constitutional adjudication process, or in other words, to render a decision on the 
constitutionality of a law which is binding on the parties to the case. So far, the described 
function matches the characteristics of the American decentralized version of judicial review. 
Meanwhile, though, the Estonian law provides that the decision of the courts in such cases shall 
be automatically submitted to the Supreme Court for initiation of a constitutional review 
procedure.520 This procedure, in an important way, differs from the usual institution of 
preliminary referral in cases of concrete review by ordinary courts. The ordinary judges of 
Estonia, unlike those of Germany, let’s say, do not set the respective case aside until the 
constitutional review court releases a judgment, but they do, in fact, themselves render a final 
decision subject to review by the Supreme Court.    
In fact, this setting involves all the judges in the country in the process of constitutional review. 
By doing this, the design enables participation of the “front line”521 of the system of justice in 
the core constitutional debate, enhancing the judges’ self-respect and the level of constitutional 
culture among them. One can also note that the core arsenal of ordinary judges, if their struggle 
vis-à-vis other institutions for dispersing independent justice is concerned, is enhanced by such 
a design. With these characteristics, the model differs substantially from the ordinary procedure 
of referrals by general courts which are present in most countries’ systems.  
At the same time, the Estonian system provides for a harmonic mechanism of abstract judicial 
review to be implemented at the level of the highest Court. In a sense, this combination allows 
                                                 
519 In this light, one should not shy away from discussing the possibility that this single highest court to be composed 
by general judges who are not necessarily lawyers at all. As to constitutional review, one may argue that the legal 
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Although I do not claim that such a proposal should be compelling, especially if one takes into consideration the 
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judicialization of public relations.     
520 This is in contrast to e.g. the US and the Portuguese systems where the proceedings in the highest court may 
begin only upon an appeal by a party to the cases in the ordinary lower court. 
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an effective mixture of the concrete decentralized and the abstract centralized systems of 
judicial review. At some point, the accuracy of such a combined system may come under 
scrutiny. If so, one should note that the major problem which might arise in this context- the 
problem of consistency in the application of constitutional law given the absence of the stare 
decisis in a civil law country,522 is avoided by the requirement for mandatory review of the 
lower court’s judgment in the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Review Chamber. Evidently, 
although Estonia did pass up this major problem directly, there have been some problems of a 
related nature under the Constitutional Review Procedure Act before its amendment in 2002. In 
particular and most substantially, the system created situations where the Supreme Court would 
not agree with the conclusion of the ordinary court and would find the applied law to be in line 
with the Constitution, while the judgment of that lower court might remain in force. This would 
be the case if none of the parties to the constitutional controversy in the lower level appealed 
the decision. Meanwhile, if one of the parties appealed, two simultaneous procedures would go- 
an appellate proceeding in the higher ordinary court and a constitutional proceeding in the 
Supreme Court.523 The story of the emerged debate on this issue and the effectiveness of the 
measures taken by the new Act in 2003 though prove that such drawbacks hardly amount to 
any substantial opposition to the overall system.  
In particular, the mentioned issue with parallel proceeding was sorted out by an arrangement 
that enabled appeals against the ordinary court’s decision only after the release of the Supreme 
Court’s judgment. The only issue left is that if no appeal is submitted to the lower court based 
on the Supreme Court’s verdict, the decision of the former will still remain in force which is by 
no means a serious problem if we consider that such situations are highly unlikely after the 
Supreme Court’s revisions of the lower court’s judgment.524       
In light of this discussion, the Estonian system of judicial review looks both like an effective 
and a practical hybrid of the classical models of judicial review and an optimal design, avoiding 
the separation of judicial segments and on the contrary, providing for functional mechanisms 
for judicial consolidation.525 All this said, I should note that it is hardly the case that all of these 
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525 It is noteworthy that the Estonian design of constitutional review has never been challenged on any essentially 
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the prospect of allowing individual petitions to be brought to that court though there has been no a comprehensible 
argument in this view that would demonstrate why such petitions could not be similarly brought before the 
Constitutional Review Chamber within the Supreme Court: see, Opinion of the Venice Commission on the Reform of 
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arrangements have been provided by Estonian designers especially having a concern about 
independence of the judiciary. Indeed, one may observe about Estonia that since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, the country has not encountered serious problems with judicial independence, 
such as we observed with the post-Soviet countries in general. Justice Julia Laffranque of the 
Estonian Supreme Court’s Administrative Chamber noted that the judicial power in Estonia has 
in general succeeded in sustaining itself as an independent institution, inter alia vis-à-vis the 
other powers of the Government.526 Justice Juri Pold said that they do not have to rely 
especially on the function of constitutional review for sustaining the independent status of the 
judiciary as there has never been a specific threat to the independence of the judiciary.527   
In this light, it is noteworthy and paradoxical, that such a design emerged in a country which 
probably least of all the post-Soviet countries had a difficulty with sustaining an independent 
judicial authority. This evidence does, however, hardly undermine my consideration of this 
model due to its attributes which are highly supportive of judicial independence in general. 
Would the other post-Soviet countries adopt a similar design of constitutional review and the 
judicial system in general, I could expect a considerably improved state of affairs with judicial 
independence there.   
Still, the reference to the Estonian paradigm is not an absolute tribute to its exclusiveness at all. 
One can imagine a considerable likelihood of institutional variations which propose some 
alternative paths avoiding the unwanted consequences of the Kelsenian model. In fact, my 
suggestion is not so much to abolish the constitutional courts as to guarantee their functional 
consolidation with the judiciary, should an institutional design affording such a possibility be 
found. The Estonian lessons rather show and confirm the applicability and the realistic 
character of opting for alternative, unprecedented models, that is rather to say for models which 
are designed for particular countries and particular transitional demands, rather than those 
carrying the key features of the popular generic type. The demands of the post-Soviet 
transitions are totally unique. Neither any existing or historical pattern, nor any standard 
institutional structure, derived from that experience can directly meet these demands. Only the 
models based on the scrupulous comprehensive analysis of those patterns with regard to the 
local factors, having considered not only the final objectives but also the transitional needs, can 
be successful.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                              
Constitutional Justice in Estonia, based on the opinion of Prof. Sergio Bartole and comments by Prof. Helmut 
Steinberger, Venice Commission, CDL (1998) 059e-restr. 
526 Interview in Tartu, Estonia, on 12 April, 2006. 
527 Supra note 464. 
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Are there still valid justifications for the Kelsenian transplant? Conclusion 
 
If one is convinced by the series of arguments demonstrating the drawbacks of the Kelsenian 
transplant in the post-Soviet countries and with the persuasiveness of arguments about 
alternatives, then opening the discussion on the rationale behind the faithfulness to the 
continental model is worthy of consideration. After all, if there is a prospect of enhancing 
judicial independence by re-considering the Kelsenian model, what are the major virtues of the 
latter that would prevent us from doing that?  
I believe that the key arguments for the emergence of the separate courts in post-communist 
countries have either lost their persuasiveness nowadays, or they have never been really 
persuasive at all. One should first note that the popularly voiced points for the continental 
model have not been arguments for separate courts as much as they have been arguments 
against the decentralized model of judicial review. In this sense, they remind the major 
arguments brought by Cappelletti against the prospects of the diffuse system in the continental 
civil law countries.528  
In this regard, we had a chance to observe two factors in the order. First, the applicability of the 
diffuse system, or more precisely of its principal settings, does not seem as unpromising as it 
used to, and one can find a strong argumentation for this account made in the context of post-
communist countries.529 Second, we noted that not any alternative to the Kelsenian option 
brings to the transplantation of the diffuse system at all, and the assortment of hybrid and 
unprecedented systems in a designer’s arsenal makes one seriously doubt the authority of such 
arguments for the Kelsenian design.  
This is also true about the other main points for the emergence of separate courts in post-
communist countries. One central motivation among these was to separate the newly 
established function of constitutional review from the highly discredited general judiciary.530 
As we can see, this is also an argument against the implementation of the judicial review by 
general courts rather than it is an argument specifically for the existence of a separate court. If 
so, one should see if this concern which was highly topical and important at the immediate 
after-collapse period is still valid nowadays.  
From the political perspective, it is hardly possible to reject that the lack of a neutral and 
independent check on the constitutional processes, as well as the lack of a guarantor of 
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constitutional human rights protection is still present in post-Soviet countries. Possibly, the 
deficiency is even more accentuated now than it was in 1991.  
The opposition to the suggestion that the constitutional court should keep distance from the 
general judiciary should proceed instead from other perspectives. In the first place, the “special 
regime”, so to say, for the constitutional courts has to be justified by evidence of superior 
(compared to general judiciary) achievements of this body in being independent and 
performing its duties impartially during the period of the “experiment”. In this respect, the facts 
might be unsupportive to such propositions if the post-Soviet countries were concerned. A first-
hand indication is that one can fail to show a single constitutional court from among the former 
Soviet countries which has been so far successful in maintaining its independence and the 
stature. If this was the ultimate result, then the very rationale behind the separation of the courts 
bumps into a practical difficulty. One can resist this argument by turning to evidence of 
constitutional courts’ fervent efforts in acting independently, such as the judicial activism of the 
Russian Constitutional Court in the early 90-es. But from the perspective of a more than 15-
year experiment, such justifications can hardly rehabilitate the overall failure of the design of 
strong separate courts which in any case looked to be destined to disappointment in the corrupt 
political environment of the former Soviet states.  
Moreover, if the time experiment proved the “failure” of selected and highly reputable judges 
of constitutional courts, why should not one permit the possibility of rehabilitation of corrupt 
general judges during this long time even if such “black and white” discrimination is to be 
taken for granted? After all, the distinction between these was not based on personal 
characteristics of individual judges, be they constitutional or general, but on rather conceptual 
bias based on the judges’ ideological perceptions. In this light, one should not totally distrust 
the ordinary judges, viewing them as chronically corrupt and likewise he or she shouldn’t rely 
on the constitutional judges as absolutely trustful honest democrats. At the same time, no one 
can guarantee the constantly reliable pool of judges on the constitutional forum given the ease 
of substituting the “unfaithful” liberals even in spite of the generally accepted life tenures, as 
the Belarussian or the Russian experiences submit; neither should one be too skeptical about 
penetration of a new generation of educated and honest ordinary judges.  
Ultimately, the long-living of the “trusted/distrusted judges’ doctrine” in the context of 
constitutional courts in the formerly communist countries raises a feeling of absolute misery of 
the democratic prospect and improvement in these countries: in a sense, the almost two 
decades-long survival of chronic distrust in judges, and moreover- if this rationale keeps being 
binding for the protection of the separate constitutional courts- the expectation of its survival 
for some more decades speaks about a political mentality under which the very idea of an 
independent review in any of its forms looks to be unpromising at all.        
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Even if there still exist reasons to insist on keeping the constitutional review function away 
from general judges, one can wonder why this goal is necessarily associated with the creation 
of a separate court and its isolation from the judicial branch, which appears so detrimental to 
the both segments of the judicial power, when there is so much of a prospect of an alternative 
institutional configuration which enables integrity of judicial segments while granting the 
constitutional review power to a specialized body. At the end of the day, it is difficult to find a 
reasonable answer to the question why the “highly reputable legal scholars” and the “honest 
democrats” can not be selected to the Supreme Court instead of the Constitutional Court and 
therefore distribute constitutional justice on behalf of the Supreme rather than the 
Constitutional Court. But if even this perspective seems troublesome, why ultimately it is not 
possible for these judges to serve in a specialized chamber within a single highest judicial body, 
in the manner of the Estonian Supreme Court? 
Or is it that the European traditions, as indicated by Herman Schwartz, effectively predetermine 
the preference of the continental model of the judicial review? There are some comments in an 
order to respond to such claims. First, if such an argument may be raised for justifying the 
choice of now EU-member countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics, it cannot 
be similarly valid with respect to the greater part of the former Soviet Union where not even the 
majority of the countries emerged out of its collapse can be validly assigned to Europe or its 
cultural or any influence. Even for those of them which could be viewed as European in these 
accounts, one should be cautious not to overstate this point. After all, the institutional proximity 
of let’s say the Russian, Ukrainian or Armenian systems to the European legal tradition raises 
many doubts. Actually, this is not the existence of the “macro institutional” ground such as the 
civil law tradition in these countries that can explain the proximity; otherwise one should not 
shy away from applying this concept to Japan or Iran. In fact, the closer look at the pre-
communist institutional legacies of post-Soviet countries and consideration of critically exotic 
Soviet-type institutional practices can strongly oppose to making such generalizations.  
Last but not least: I feel a fair portion of anachronism and paternalism in any claims praising 
the institutional dependency on a legal family or tradition in today’s cosmopolitan world. From 
one perspective, it is hardly possible now to trace such cultural traditions in their pure forms in 
either of the continents. It would rather be true to say that the world’s legal systems have 
critically altered and transformed from their original forms, subject to influence from the 
globe’s different patterns and traditions which are now largely gathered in one universal spot. 
In modern societies, the major driving force is rather the practical expediency, which highly 
predetermines the shape and the contents of the institutions. This factor obliges deviations from 
pure forms and urges optimal designs to match the specific local demands. Completely 
different societies of the globalizing world need greater multiplicity in institutional options. My 
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personal guess is that the next generation of institutional models will be a generation of mixed 





























The new Millennium closing its first decade, the question of institutional redesign of 
constitutional courts should be high on the political agenda in post-Soviet republics. Almost 
twenty years since the start of the transition from communism, democratic development in 
post-Soviet republics remains to be still a work in progress. So far in progress, this “work” has 
nevertheless seen a substantial change in its environment since the beginning of the 
transformation. Different are the attitudes and expectations from democracy, the patterns of 
democratic governance, the political elites and leaders, the societies themselves. Different are 
the constitutional institutions, though they have mostly preserved their basic forms, and the 
modes in which they perform; the constitutional courts, which also preserved their major 
institutional settings, but have carried essential transformations in their approaches, methods 
and styles; the judges. Different are, after all, the challenges facing democratization and the 
solutions required for fighting them.    
In the beginning of this work, we identified several principles which should guide the process 
of institutional design in countries on their way to democratic consolidation and 
constitutionalism. It was said that the newly introduced institutions, called to support the 
societies’ progress towards democratization, should help to create a new political-cultural 
environment and to learn and appreciate the institutions of constitutional democracy; that they 
should be culture-sensitive and responsive to the delicate challenges facing the particular 
societies in transition; that they need to be timely in a way as to be able to react to the proper 
demands of the time considering the constantly evolving and changing circumstances and 
demands during the transitions, elastic enough to adjust to these permanent changes and, at the 
same time, sufficiently enduring in order to stand for the fundamental values and principles of 
the constitutional democracy. We said also that the post-communist institutions should be 
democratic in form and nature, legitimate and efficient.  
All this said, the job of institutional designers may look very intricate as the principles outlined 
above do not rest in peace with each other but are in an inherent and subtle conflict. In 
particular, we saw in this work that the democratic nature, form and essence of institutions is 
often in conflict with their responsiveness to local circumstances, and that praising the first over 
the second threatens to result in idealistic designing which proved to be gravely counter-
effective. The elasticity of institutions is in an inherent tension with durability, as we observed 
that institutions which are too rigid frequently fail to adjust to the new challenges and 
permanent changes in patterns of governance, while institutions too flexible may undermine the 
basic ideals of the democratic system. For the former, we witnessed that the prescription of 
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certain technicalities of constitutional courts’ settings (such as the exhaustive list of their 
responsibilities or of exemptions from the duty to act) by constitutions, which are inherently 
unfeasible for easy change, makes the constitutional tribunals hostages of the settings which 
proved ineffective, restrictive, or detrimental. For the latter, we can observe nowadays that 
certain experiments with intrinsically non-democratic institutions, which are arguably called to 
address some interim difficulties,531 are able to shift the subtle progress in democratic 
consolidation so far achieved and demoralize the fundamental democratic aspiration of the 
society. Lastly, discussing the very widespread normative view on courts and politics and the 
problem of the counter-majoritarian difficulty532, we might see that legitimacy is not always in 
peace with effectiveness.  
It was emphasized, therefore, that the finding of an optimal design of an institution is 
principally a matter of a compromise to be drawn with an utmost care, prudence and wisdom. 
The compromise has to be delicate enough not to exclude any of the principles from the 
formation of institutions and allow each of these principles to influence the performance of 
them. But, at the same time, the compromise has to find the right balance and resist the 
temptation to over-represent a cause.  
The quest for the compromise in designing transitional constitutions may get a workable 
answer in the premise of constitutional design strategy resting on the hierarchy of provisions 
stipulating constitutional institutions: 1. mega-principles, embodying the core concepts of 
constitutional democracy; 2. principles, outlining the basic macro-political conceptions; and 3. 
rules and procedures, spelling out the more quotidian, routine performance of political 
institutions.533 This work’s proposed conceptual formula for transitional constitution-making, in 
this light, is that constitutions should be primarily based on institutional mega-principles, 
should identify the principles outlining the basic macro-political conceptions, and should refer 
to routine rules and procedures, explicating institutional configurations within the chosen 
macro-political conceptions, only in the presence of reasonably necessary justifications.  This 
theory can well accommodate durability of the fundamental democratic institutions and the 
elasticity of their rules and procedures, paving a way for accommodation, adjustment, 
implantation of new, often alien institutions into the local context. Meanwhile, the model has 
the virtue of reconciling legitimacy, through insistence on the primacy of the concepts or mega-
principles, with effectiveness, through openness to changing, improving and amending 
                                                 
531 Such as the reforms weakening the institutions of electoral democracy in the federal units (eliminating the direct 
elections of the governors) in Russia for the announced purposes of countering the terrorist threats or sustaining the 
economic growth- see supra notes 170-171. 
532 See the discussion on pp. 82-83 and footnote 237 (Bickel).   
533 This entire premise has heavily relied on Ronald Dworkin’s relevant theory of constitutional concepts and 
conception, supra note 378. 
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conceptions, rules and procedures to the extent that these can bring to more effective 
functioning of institutions.   
Given the enduring challenges of democratic development in all of the countries of this 
research, the question of the redesign of constitutions and, in particular, the institution of 
constitutional justice should be high on the agenda of decision-makers in the post-Soviet 
countries. The dominant institutional settings of constitutional courts in all of these countries, 
although not at all indistinguishable, nevertheless contain some common attributes which cause 
fairly identical limitations on the better democratic performance by constitutional tribunals and 
the judiciary in general.  
Chapter 3 demonstrated the defects of political empowerment where the courts were observed 
in a paradoxical standoff in which their responsibilities to perform as an arbiter in political 
disputes- a function itself essential for the development of constitution democracies-  appeared 
rather detrimental and ineffective. Such empowerment, owing, as we could identify, largely 
also to its architecture, often resulted in political attacks on courts, judicial abstention from 
deciding on political cases and hence erosion of the courts’ legitimacy.   
Chapter 4 revealed some other defects caused by the institutional mechanism of post-Soviet 
constitutional adjudication. Exhaustiveness of the mandate and of specific matters subject to the 
constitutional courts’ jurisdiction, for one, is a limitation on the courts’ capacity to handle each 
and every pertinent constitutional issue raised by a party. Then, the model has developed a 
“complex of jurisdictions” in post-Soviet courts: general courts abstain from adjudicating 
conceptual constitutional problems in the cases under their review, while constitutional courts 
are often unable to adjudicate cases which technically fall under the jurisdictions of general 
courts, even if these cases contain essential constitutional issues. Furthermore, the current 
macro-model stipulates limitations in terms of the courts’ latitude to adjudicate both matters of 
law and matters of facts: these limitations are associated with a substantial restraint on the 
capacity of constitutional tribunals to make pro-democratic decisions. Afterwards, the sole 
abstract mode of adjudication by constitutional courts, being the core characteristic feature of 
the system in place, obliges these courts to perform in an essential disconnection from the basic 
judicial conflict-resolving fashion of adjudication, and this fact adds to the alienation, 
ineffectiveness and impracticality of constitutional justice.  
Finally, Chapter 5 extensively meditated on the consequences of separation of the constitutional 
review from the general judicial function, finding this major institutional setting to be one of 
the most important causes of the emergence of a fragmented and unconsolidated judiciary 
which is unable to strongly stand for the rule of law.  
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The comprehensive solution to the number of the shortcomings mentioned above cannot be 
merely drawn by a redesign project. The troubles are deeply rooted in the political and legal 
cultures. This work found the particular weaknesses of the implementation of constitutional 
justice being essentially caused by the heritage of the constitutional tradition distinguished by 
embedded formalism and “vulgar Marxian positivism”.534  More over, this stark heritage of the 
Soviet legal nihilism has been considerably affected also by the corrupt practices of “political 
legalism”- a product of post-communist-era political manipulations by dishonest quasi-
autocratic ruling elites who employed and further activated the formalistic legal culture for 
reproduction of their political power.  
This disease, clearly enough, requires an all-inclusive cure, and a comprehensive intervention is 
needed for overcoming it. The designer’s portion of investment in the “cultural revolution” can 
be in reforming the overall logic of constitutional structure from one based on rules and 
procedures to one based on concepts and principles. This approach should help shifting the 
constitutional discourse from the deeply embedded Soviet-time vision of it as “state law”- the 
law of organization of the government, hence, eventually, the law of government 
empowerment, to the genuine discourse of constitutional law as the law of limiting 
government.535 This line should be successfully taken over by (constitutional) judges who can 
be instrumental in activating the fundamental meaning of constitutional democracy by activist 
insistence on the spirit of constitutional law rather than the letter of the positive law which is 
everywhere fine-tuned to please the power-holders.  
At the same time, while the most deeply-rooted and complex problems owe to the cultural 
settings and require a comprehensive political reform, many of the troubles of constitutional 
justice which we mentioned above are due to more “commonplace” defects and can be indeed 
cured by a designer intervention. The drawbacks of the Kelsenian model do belong to this 
category.  
Surprisingly, the choice of the Kelsenian model has never been seriously contested by post-
Soviet politicians or academics. The many challenges facing these countries’ constitutional 
courts are conventionally assigned to the realm of the political regime and culture. But the 
performance of constitutional review courts can vary even within the limits imposed by the 
political regime. This work has discussed a number of cases showing that the democratic 
contributions of constitutional courts have been restrained not only by the political factors, but 
often also by institutional limitations. The continental model of constitutional courts has, 
astonishingly, stipulated more limitations than possibilities for the democratic contributions by 
                                                 
534 Buttler, supra note 179, p. 59.  
535 For perspectives on “limited government” in the post-communist mental setting, see András Sajó, Limiting 
Government: An Introduction to Constitutionalism, supra note 362.  
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the courts. Its major limitation stems from the separation of the judicial function into two 
segments with ensuing restriction of the both: the two are assigned functions of certain kind but 
are barred from the implementation of the others. According to the original idea- the ideal 
form- the separated functions would be organically interacting in case of the necessity and the 
two fragments would recall each other to compliment their powers. But this ideal proved 
unachievable in post-Soviet countries where the gap in-between the separated judicial segments 
tended to isolation instead of the synergy. The design strategies of the constitutional fathers 
proved idealistic, and the functional virtues of the model of separate constitutional courts were 
never realized in practice.   
If the major limitation of the Kelsenian model was due to its separation of the two judicial 
functions, then the alternative should have considered a model where these are brought 
together. The consolidation of the judicial functions is possible through a number of 
institutional solutions, but the common ground in any of them should be abandoning of the 
Kelsenian model. However, repudiation of the continental model should not inevitably submit 
us to the classical diffuse system, even though the long established conventional wisdom would 
consider the latter as the mere alternative to the Kelsenian formula.536 The installment of a 
diffuse system with its essential elements, as emerged in the United States since Marbury, 
would substitute one ideal form with another. Although this work provided sufficient evidence 
against the position that the diffuse system is organically alien to the continental legal 
system,537 the optimal model of constitutional review for a post-Soviet country is likelier to be 
of a hybrid form. This hybrid form may offer different variations with particular settings, but 
we can identify certain milestone features which the new system can rely on.   
It is, firstly, unquestionable that the reform shall not be intended at either elimination or the 
subordination of the function of abstract review. Abstract review is essential for aspiring 
democracies and their constitutional foundations. However, this function, as the discussion of 
different hybrid systems showed, can be well handled by the higher court of general 
jurisdiction. It can be left to the discretion of the particular designers in each case whether or 
not the function of abstract review is implemented by the higher court in the conventional 
bench or it is assigned to a special sub-division of it, as in Estonia. However, a proposition 
merits attention that from both the considerations of enhancing the role of constitutional 
discourse in general jurisprudence and those of enhancing the functional effectiveness of the 
                                                 
536 Mauro Cappelletti, supra note 21.  
537 Id.  
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judicial action, the most optimal model would probably assign the final say in abstract 
constitutional matters to the single highest judicial decision-maker in the country.538  
The suggestion may potentially raise a stream of strong opposition as the constitutional courts 
in all post-communist countries are recognized having the most progressive, honest and 
professional judges in their countries. Some responses to this potential critique were drawn in 
this work. To summarize, I find the above-mentioned differentiation between constitutional and 
other judges to be slightly exaggerated, openly discriminatory and definitely outdated. 
Meanwhile, if a united court is supposed to be created that would merge the functions of the 
constitutional and supreme courts, let us say, is it not possible that the new court can host the 
former constitutional judges, if they were really the best in the nation? One thing that would 
indisputably benefit from this entire project is constitutionalization of the whole legal system 
which would indeed perfectly serve the needs of constitutional democracy.  
Secondly, constitutional adjudication should essentially return to the province of the inherently 
judicial method and be implemented in a conflict-resolving manner. This general rule may 
contain one albeit very important exception: abstract review. In other words, the reform should 
restore the typical judicial prerogative on adjudication of all constitutional violations (universal 
jurisdiction) and create a single exception from the standard of universality by assigning a 
special regime to the institution of abstract review. The special regime with its distinct mode of 
adjudication, limited standing and limited subject matter shall be the unique deviation from the 
characteristic judicial mode of adjudication, the latter allowing for concrete review, general 
standing and subject matter, appeal, and redress. The implementation of both of these functions 
by one body will furthermore ensure the synergy and organic interconnectedness of the 
functions of abstract and concrete review.  
Thirdly, the design of constitutional review system should aim at both durability and flexibility 
and hence needs to abstain from having its particular configuration stipulated on the 
constitutional level. The point is made not only from the considerations of the largely 
experimentalist nature of any reforms of constitutional review system to be implemented. It is 
true that any model of constitutional review that was to emerge in the post-Soviet area after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union would be largely experimental as no country had experience in 
this respect, and this is largely relevant to our days too. Flexibility in the routine form and 
function of the constitutional review is also necessary for allowing the institutions to adjust to 
the changing circumstances of the social and political environment in the ongoing transition. 
After all, the elasticity of the certain institutions of constitutional review should serve strategic 
                                                 
538 This is the case, ultimately, also in Estonia where the Supreme Court en banc has the final word on constitutional 
issues, despite the existence of a separate chamber for the adjudication of constitutional issues. The virtues of such a 
system were discussed in length in Chapter 5.   
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purposes of allowing constitutional judges to accommodate to the style of and the challenges 
coming from the other branches, particularly the executives who are notoriously famous for 
ignoring, harassing, blackmailing, and often attacking the courts, and make the judges more 
immune to these. And in this particular perspective, it is highly desirable that certain settings of 
constitutional courts, such as the scope of their jurisdiction and of the standing within the 
principle of universality, the standard of judicial abstention, etc. shall be reserved to the 
discretion of the courts themselves, as this would not only help them to find optimal modes of 
performance but would genuinely empower the tribunals and would make them strategically 
better equipped to respond to the government abuse.   
Constitutional design should be paid a renewed attention if the struggling democracies of the 
former Soviet Union choose to respond to the contemporary challenges facing democratization. 
Confronting the abuse of government power as the biggest of these challenges, it is imperative, 
as a renowned constitutional scholar puts this, to “discuss and learn those manners, institutions, 
and principles that efficiently limit all governments, democratically elected or controlled or 
not.”539 Constitutional courts, as the principal embodiments of the institutional formula of 
limiting government, have to be brought to the fore once again- to get a fresh start, insight, 
power and momentum, as the era of their decisive role in democratic development is only to 

















                                                 
539 András Sajó, Limiting Government: An Introduction to Constitutionalism, supra note 362, Introduction.  
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